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Adviser: Professor Talal Asad  
 This dissertation is an ethnography of private law in contemporary Port Said, 
Egypt.  Based on extensive fieldwork in 2005 and 2007, it considers how Port Saidians 
come to possess economic and social entitlements vis-à-vis one another and how 
concomitant obligations get construed and actualized.  As an analysis of quotidian 
practices of private law and surety, this dissertation is intended to contribute to broader 
scholarly debates about legal subjectivity and legal consciousness, and to reconsider the 
intersections between law, custom and morality.   
 The analysis of contemporary transactional and surety practices is rooted in a 
discussion of both Egyptian legal reform and the history and economic context of the 
research locale, Port Said.  Legal reform in the 19th and 20th century in Egypt radically 
altered the scope of law and carved out a separate space for moral personhood in the 
private sphere.  This shift to a secular modern law, in conjunction with processes of 
urbanization and the penetration of European capital in Egypt, can be seen as productive 
of new strategies by which the tenuousness of private law agreements could be mediated.   
 
 v 
In order to better understand practices of private law as both reflective and 
constitutive of moral and legal personhood, this dissertation concentrates on innovative 
uses of customary/commercial documents.  These documentary technologies, including 
honesty receipts, checks, and contracts, are ubiquitous in transactions and dispute 
resolution processes.  Port Saidians deploy them to radically enhance guarantees, and to 
fictionalize and obscure the true subject of a dispute or agreement.  This allows them to 
make determinations about how the law shall adjudicate their problems, to limit law’s 
intervention, and to reinsert moral normative values into exchanges.  In order to make 
such processes visible I analyze three important nodes through which documents and 
cases travel: the police, the courts, and lawyers.  I argue that attention to both moments of 
customary/commercial document production and the circulation of these documents 
between people and institutions is critical.  These moments of production and circulations 
are the processes by which documents not only determine rights and make obligations 



















Notes on Transliteration 
 
There are a number of transliteration systems in use, and at the same time there 
are at least two forms of Arabic to be transliterated – Egyptian colloquial and Modern 
Standard.  Because my research deals with legal terms to some extent, there are times 
when standard Arabic is in use, and at other times I quote terms from the spoken 
colloquial Arabic of Port Said, Egypt.  Some terms and pronunciations may differ from 
those in use in Cairo or elsewhere in Egypt; I have tried to record words as I heard them.  
Although many base their transliteration on that employed by IJMES (International 
Journal of Middle East Studies), I have sought instead to minimize the use of diacritical 
markings for ease of reading.  As such, I employ the conventions used by Diane 
Singerman (1995), (with the exception of using kh instead of x).  Consonants in 
parentheses following the transliterated English consonants (in the left column) indicate 
Egyptian colloquial pronunciation in reported speech throughout the dissertation.   
 
Consonants       
Transliterated English    Arabic 
 
’                                                                             the glottal stop, ء 
b       ب 
t        ت 
th (unvoiced)  (s)     ث 
j  (g)     ج 
H       ح 
kh       خ 
d        د 
th  (z)     ذ    
r       ر 
z       ز 
s       س 
sh       ش 
S       ص 
D       ض 
T       ط 
TH  (z)     ظ 
 ع       ‘
gh       غ 
f       ف 
q  (’)     ق 
k       ك 
l       ل 
m       م 
n       ن 
h       ه 
w       و 
y       ي
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Short Vowels 
 
a – approximately the same a as in English back but never elongated 
e – approximately the same e as in English ten 
i – approximately the same i as in English win 
o – approximately the same o as in standard English pop 




a – approximately the same sound but slightly longer than the a in English mad or 
palm 
i – approximately the same as in English seat 
u– approximately the same as in English pool 
 
Note also that Singerman bases her conventions on the Dictionary of Spoken Arabic of 
Cairo (Cairo: American University Press, 1986) by Virginia Stevens and Maurice Salib, 
and on A Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic (Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1986) by el-Said 
Badawi and Martin Hinds.  Consonants therein are doubled to indicate shadda (doubling) 
of the consonant.   
 
For standard Arabic, I have followed Arabic spellings in the Hans Wehr Arabic-English 
Dictionary, replacing diacritical markings with the simplified system above.   I have 
retained proper names and Arabic words common in English texts in their common 
transliterated forms (for instance, Port Said instead of bur sa‘id).
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The Egyptian civil code, like other civil codes, defines and classifies status, 
capacity, property, obligations, modes of guarantee, and systems of proof.  In its 
specifications the code constructs an anticipatory framework for a range of possible 
circumstances, and in so doing is revealing; it tells us something about Egyptian society. 
In its classification of types of property, for instance, the code articulates ideas about the 
individual and ownership.  In defining the juridical person the law specifies the types of 
entities that can enjoy rights and have legal capacity as well as conditions under which a 
juridical person shall be considered to lack legal competence.  This is law in its 
constitutive role, crafting statuses, rights and obligations, and one modality through 
which values are both expressed and given ideal form. 
Yet we know that law is much more than what is inscribed in doctrine and that a 
doctrinal or formalist approach eclipses much of how law shapes social life. Doctrine 
outlines felicitous conditions for a valid contract, and the circumstances under which a 
party becomes liable and another party has a right to compensation.  But it cannot tell us 
how citizens actually articulate claims to property, affect claims, and resolve disputes 
about claims. An ethnography of law, by contrast, is both a methodological shift away 
from doctrine and an epistemological assertion that law is made through practices.  
Moreover, observations of how law is used, interpreted, avoided, subverted, obeyed, and 
otherwise mediated shed light on the social.   
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This dissertation is an ethnography of private law in contemporary Egypt.  It is a 
study of how Egyptians in a particular locale – the city of Port Said - articulate property 
claims and seek to make those claims effective, as well as how they resolve disputes 
around such claims.  At the same time, it is concerned with promises, deals, and 
transactions not directly related to property, which come to be fictionalized or masked as 
property claims.  As such, this study must more broadly be conceived of as concerning 
how stakeholders come to possess entitlements vis-a-vis one another, and about how 
concomitant obligations get construed and actualized.  
Private, or civil, law is a framework within which private interests and obligations 
are delineated, and an instrumental approach allows us to concentrate on how rights and 
obligations are delineated and actualized, and on what significations might accrue in the 
process.  As such, this study considers disputes and contractual practices as moments in 
which citizens make decisions about how the law might be brought into a private matter.  
These are moments that highlight the tension between legal and social personhood, 
between the constitution of rights and obligations legally or normatively; such moments 
also problematize the notion that such demarcations can be made.  Civil law treats 
individuals as equal before the law and makes clear the substantive bases of legitimate 
property claims and the legal procedures for realizing such claims.   In so doing, positive 
law doesn’t recognize the complexity of interpersonal relationships, local and familial 
hierarchies, and moral-ethical concerns.  By examining the processes by which 
stakeholders make claims and secure obligations in Port Said, it is possible to better 
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understand how practices at law are inflected by local discourses of custom, morality, and 
community.1  
My examination of practices of private law narrows in on one particular facet of 
private transactions, forms of surety, and related disputes: documentary devices and their 
circulations.  I consider the dynamic interactions between people, institutions, and the 
legal and semi-legal documents used in dispute processing and transactions.  Commercial 
documents (awraq tuGariya), some of which are commonly classified as customary 
documents (muharrarat ‘urf iya) are a device in popular use among Port Saidians – and 
among Egyptians elsewhere although perhaps in slightly different ways. 2  Among the 
customary/commercial documents I look at are honesty receipts (iySal at amana; sing. 
iySal amana), bank-issued and non-bank-issued checks (shikat and shikat ghair bankiya; 
sing. shik), bills of exchange or drafts (kambiyal at, sing. kambiyala), ‘false’ contracts 
(‘uqud al-Suri, sing. ‘aqd al-Suri), and anti-contracts (awraq al-Did, sing. waraqa al-
Did).3  Because of their ubiquity, and the novel and creative uses to which they are put, 
they are devices by which we might better understand legal consciousness and legal 
subjectivity.  As will be shown, honesty receipts in particular are used in unintended 
ways, in non-commercial contexts, to secure promises unrelated to cash transactions.  
Moreover, these and other customary/commercial documents often engender a high 
                                                
1 Although there are ways in which I link instrumental uses and avoidances of the legal system to other 
social phenomena in Egypt and root practices within a particular legal history, I am not interested in 
arguing for the existence of a legal or litigation culture.  For contrasting views on the idea of legal culture, 
see Rosen 1989 and Blankenburg 1994).   
2 In local parlance, lawyers and non-lawyers alike tend to use the singular form exclusively, even when the 
plural is indicated.  Sing., muharrar at ‘urfiya. 
3 In Colloquial Egyptian Arabic, some of these words differ from Modern Standard Arabic.  An honesty 
receipt is known as wasala am ana (pl. was ulat am ana), a false contract is known as ‘a’d is-Sur i (pl. ‘u’ ud 
is-Sur i), and an anti-contract is known as a wara’at id-Did (pl. awr a’ id-Did). 
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degree of risk for those whose names appear on them – risk of incarceration or of 
financial obligations far beyond the actual agreement between the parties.   
It is most fruitful, I posit, to consider these commercial technologies as part of a 
particular legal context – to not assume, for instance, that because they look like 
commercial documents in other locales that they are similarly used or have a similar role 
in transactions.  As such, we shall pay particular attention to the nodes through which 
they pass: from traders’ shops to homes to lawyers’ offices to police stations to case files 
to courtrooms.  Taking account of the legal context, nodes of circulation, and local 
context offers a way to situate these objects as ‘social actors’, as Latour advocates.  
Moreover, as we begin to think of customary/commercial documents as social actors 
interesting questions arise about why and how my interlocutors use them.  How might 
they constitute recognizable and effective obligations?  How do novel uses and 
circulations of customary/commercial documents actually create ‘pressure’, as my 
interlocutors often noted.  How might we understand the form they take and practices of 
production and exchange as processes by which social labor is being performed?  What 
values do they convey, what ethical significations do they accrue?  Answering these 
questions requires simultaneous attention to form, moments of production, and exchange, 
or circulation. 
To adequately address the specificity of private law and uses of 
customary/commercial documents also requires reckoning with the legal historical and 
local context in which they operate.  Port Said’s history is short relative to other 
Egyptian cities.  But it is a history fraught with dramatic economic and social shifts that 
have given rise to a community unbound by some of the continuities that shape life in the 
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Delta or Upper Egypt.  Because its economy is largely based on retail trade and 
importation, local transactional practices can be seen to bear on other facets of quotidian 
life.  Commercial technologies generate some of their meaning and import from the 
particular locality in which they are being used, Port Said, and its history.   
At the same time present-day practices of private law are inextricable from the 
reconfigurations of law that occurred in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  This 
intensive period of legal reform was not simply a process of writing new codes, 
establishing new courts, and creating a new legal profession; it was part and parcel of a 
more fundamental cultural shift.  The reforms ushered in a new social and legal order, an 
important piece of which was reformers’ efforts to narrow the scope of shari‘a 
jurisdiction.  A new secular law for modern Egypt emerged that created distinct spaces 
for law and morality, shifting morality to the domain of personal responsibility.  In 
conjunction with processes of urbanization that refracted communities and the 
penetration of European capital into Egypt, these transformations can be understood as 
producing new forms of tenuousness in matters of private law.  In modern, secular Egypt, 
how do Port Saidians guarantee credit, make promises secure, and settle disputes in ways 
that are both pragmatic and moral?  In an era and an urban context that complicates 
‘customary’ modes of authority and adjudication, how might ‘urf still play a role in 
adjudicating disputes and making obligations binding?  What has the law come to 
represent for contemporary Port Saidians?  
Port Saidians tend to express the idea that it is neither moral nor pragmatic to 
pursue recourse for civil matters through the legal system in a straightforward way.  They 
tend not to put their faith entirely in the law.  Adjudicative processes are not always 
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considered the most appropriate by which due rights and obligations may be determined 
and enforced, and the impersonality of law makes it unresponsive to contingencies, social 
hierarchies, the necessity of mercy that normatively weight transactions and dispute 
resolution processes between members of the community.   
Practices of private law reveal the creative responses people have to a legal 
system that doesn’t quite fulfill their needs because it’s not expedient enough.  At the 
same time we can see creative responses to a legal system that isn’t quite nuanced or 
merciful enough to fit with people’s notions of a just solution or due process.  Hence, 
practices of private law and innovative uses of customary/commercial documents can be 
a window on to how rights claims and the fulfillment of obligations are also processes 
intimately related to the constitution of relationality and ethical personhood.  Practices of 
private law incorporate particular forums  (courtrooms, lawyers’ offices, mediation 
offices, office of the experts, and so forth) and moments of interaction (mediation, 
promise-making, negotiation, debate) between socially close and socially distant parties.  
These are moments and forums in which rights and obligations are articulated, through 
which parties seek to convey trust or a willingness to take a risk, be merciful and 
generous, or forcefully self-interested.  The documents that are part of these interactions 
and that circulate through these forums do not simply reflect or refute a claim.  They 
create new understandings, bring people together or force them to take action.  
This can be seen by briefly considering two points Robert Cover makes about 
law. He notes, firstly, that: “Law is a resource in signification that enables us to submit, 
rejoice, struggle, pervert, mock, disgrace, humiliate, or dignify” (in Minow et al. 
1995:100).  An ethnography of law suggests that law is a resource in signification not 
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limited to its textual signifiers.  Law is evoked rhetorically, feared and flaunted.  In the 
process, it contributes to the attribution of meaning to action, as well as to the 
constitution of relationships and of the self.  Law’s capacity to signify can be related to 
another point Cover makes, that legal interpretation is an act of violence.  Judgment in a 
court of law has consequences for the body and for one’s property.  In Port Said, 
businessmen and women, affianced couples, ex-spouses, family members, and neighbors 
leverage law’s violence to hold one another to promises and to refresh interpersonal and 
economic obligations.  By using customary/commercial documents to fictionalize the 
nature of disputes they redirect law’s gaze, introducing more meaningful - criminal – 
consequences into civil disputes.  Simultaneously, Port Saidians limit legally-determined 
outcomes, and thus actively manipulate and constrain law’s violence.  Taken together, 
these can be understood as strategies by which Port Saidians make decisions about how 
the law shall adjudicate their problems and whether surety practices shall marshall law’s 
violence.  In the following chapters, I am concerned with how these capacities are 
mobilized in a specific community and through the use of specific documentary 
technologies.  
 
Law and Society and Legal Subjectivity in the Middle East 
This analysis relies upon the juxtaposition of two bodies of literature – American 
socio-legal studies, and studies of law and state-society politics in the Middle East.  
Within U.S. law and society scholarship I have found work on legal pluralism and legal 
consciousness or ‘law in everyday life’ to be particularly instructive.  More recent studies 
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of documents and documentation have provided an important avenue in to the data from 
Port Said; I will address this literature in a separate section.  
To briefly contextualize law and society studies, which surged after the 1960’s, it 
is important to recognize the contributions of early twentieth century anthropologists 
such as E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1969), Bronislaw Malinowski (1926), and E. Adamson 
Hoebel (1954) who made ‘primitive’ law an object of anthropological concern.  These 
scholars sought to delineate a comparable unit of analysis to that of Western law in 
foreign contexts, studying practices of crime, retribution, and adjudication in lieu of 
doctrine, largely non-existent in the societies they studied. As such, early anthropological 
studies of law were in part a search for a universal definition of law and cross-cultural 
linkages, bringing about increased recognition of local specificity with regard to law.   
Around the same time, American legal realists were similarly arguing that the 
only way to know what law does in society, and thus what it is, is to see it in action (c.f. 
Fisher et al. 1993).  Hoebel, by insisting on the value of cases as a unit of analysis while 
also arguing that law needed to be studied in action and understood holistically as 
embedded in a cultural setting, straddled anthropological and legal realist schools of 
thought.  As an outgrowth of both legal realism and early ethnographic studies of 
primitive law, by mid-century legal anthropology had moved from a ‘rule-oriented’ to a 
‘processual’ approach (see Nader and Todd 1978).  Legal anthropologists of this era also 
recognized the potential of the case methodology; cases are moments in which law 
becomes visible and interpretations of rights and duties are made. 
There was also a growing appreciation for the complex interactions between state 
law and non-state law and the ways in which they mutually informed one another.  These 
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studies were a corrective to early work on African and other non-western legal and 
political structures in the early part of the 20th century that did not, in fact, recognize a 
plurality of legal orders and rather focused on what scholars perceived as ‘pure’ 
indigenous forms unrelated to emerging state structures or colonial policies.  As Merry 
notes, classic legal pluralism, exemplified by the work of Burman and Harrell-Bond 
(1979), Chanock (1985), Comaroff (1985), Fitzpatrick (1983), Geertz (1983) and others, 
paid attention to the unequal power relations in situations of an imposed European legal 
system. Legal pluralism was thus envisioned as the uneasy coexistence of European and 
indigenous law, although indigenous law was often depicted as static (Merry 1988:869-
70).  Around the same time there emerged a new focus on studies of legal pluralism in 
advanced industrial countries (e.g. Abel 1982; Engel 1980; Nader 1980; Moore 1973).  
The questions taken up concerned power relations between dominant and subordinate 
groups in the context of the U.S. and Europe, and alternate forms of ordering and dispute 
processing, questions that asserted a vision of legal pluralism as not simply a colonial 
phenomenon or post-colonial legacy but rather a situation found in many forms in 
virtually any society (Merry 1988:873).   
The study of legal pluralism has done at least two things.  Firstly, it has promoted 
the recognition that where state law is present, it is not the only form, or even the 
dominant form, of legality.  There are inevitably other sets of legal norms that coexist 
with state law that must be acknowledged as playing both a constitutive role in society 
and a role in dispensing justice.4  Secondly, legal pluralism studies have called attention 
to the fact that coexisting legalities also intersect with one another.  They influence and 
                                                
4 In addition, some have examined the way that ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ (Moore 1973) and ‘private 
associations’ (Macaulay, 1986), whose governance is not directly determined by state law, co-opt the 
symbols and structures of state law. 
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shape one another through practices and in doctrinal production.  This feature of legal 
pluralism is most strongly asserted by Boaventura deSousa Santos in his theory of 
interlegality:  Santos differentiates between different spaces of legality, each of which 
operates on a different scale.5  These spaces of legality, he argues, cannot simply be 
differentiated by their objects of regulation because there is often overlap between them.  
As he notes:  
The difficulty lies in that socio-legal life is constituted by different legal spaces 
operating simultaneously on different scales and from different interpretive 
standpoints.  So much is this so that in phenomenological terms and as a result of 
interaction and intersection among legal spaces one cannot property speak of law 
and legality but rather of interlaw and interlegality. [288]  
 
Similar to what Merry terms a ‘dialectic between normative orders,’ (1988:873) 
yet to some degree more concrete in defining the scale and nature of these normative 
orders, interlegality is the phenomenological counterpart to legal pluralism.  It takes 
trespassing between multiple orders as integral to their operation and as constitutive and 
serves as a corrective to bounded conceptions of legal orders and analyses that focus 
overly on border crossings ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of law, or between informal and formal 
milieus. 
Hence, my dissertation is informed by legal pluralism debates, and yet takes up a 
somewhat different research agenda, along lines proposed by Paul Schiff Berman:  
                                                
5 In Santos’ theory, three broad spaces of legality predominate: national/state legality, local legality, and 
world/international legality. Each corresponds with a particular ‘scale’ of legality: local law (one example 
of which might be customary law, or for instance, the rules regulating a company’s internal operations) is a 
large-scale legality in that it is capable of addressing the most minute aspects of a dispute.  The same 
dispute in relation to a medium-scale legality such as national law brings into focus only some of the 
relevant details; it establishes a somewhat different network of facts because it operates on a larger scale.  
Beyond this lies International law, a small-scale legality.  As in mapping, “since scale creates the 
phenomenon, the different forms of law create different legal objects upon eventually the same social 
objects.  They use different criteria to determine the meaningful details and the relevant features of the 
activity to be regulated…In sum, they create different legal realities” (287).   
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A pluralist framework suggests a research agenda that emphasizes the micro-
interactions among different normative systems.  Such a case study approach 
would serve as a contrast to rational choice and other forms of more abstract 
modeling, by focusing instead on thick description of the ways in which various 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices actually operate as sites of 
contestation and creative innovation [Berman 2007:1168]   
 
An attention to plural legalities can thus be concerned not with whether people 
move between juridical-institutional and normative spheres but with the types of 
mechanisms, devices and innovations are part of such movement as well as with the 
social significations that might accrue in the process.  Port Saidians note both the 
presence and absence of customary law in contemporary society, and make reference to 
their duty as Muslims to be merciful and patient in relation to civil disputes and 
contractual obligations; some talked specifically of shari‘a and the necessity for a 
religiously-derived law in Egypt.  Without question, they situate themselves as 
responsive to overlapping normative and legal traditions.  As Berman suggests, the 
important question is how do specific practices, innovations, and uses of various 
procedural mechanisms and institutions provide a way of reconciling or moving between 
these traditions? 
On the other hand, there are ways in which this project is shaped by studies of 
legal consciousness and law in everyday life.6  Sally Engle Merry suggests that legal 
consciousness is how people conceive of the 'natural' and normal way of using law and 
their habitual patterns of action.  As such, it is the realm of both deliberate, intentional 
action and of habitual practice, and is embodied in practical knowledge expressed in the 
act of going to court as well as by talk about rights and entitlements (Merry 1990).  The 
                                                
6 My original research proposal was more explicitly along these lines, articulated as a study of ‘law-
mindedness’, which I defined as people’s practical sense of the law (and their pragmatic and strategic 
engagement with the legal system) as well as their sense of what the law signifies and stands for, and how it 
thus imputes meaning to action.  
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position that the study of law as practice is most optimally undertaken outside the context 
of legal institutions in the context of everyday interactions was notably put forth in an 
edited volume by Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (1993).7  Although they point out 
that varied interpretations of ‘everyday life’ construe radically different ethnographic 
objects,8 the authors’ primary concern with the everyday was to advocate for a shift away 
from law-centered studies in socio-legal scholarship.  In law-centered approaches, they 
suggest, scholars often align their analysis with one of two principle perspectives on how 
law affects society: instrumentally (by imposing external sanctions and inducements) and 
constitutively (by shaping internal meanings and creating new statuses) (1993:21).  Sarat 
and Kearns argue that studying law in everyday life is a way of bridging the gap between 
these two perspectives, because it helps illuminate law's interactive relation to society.  
There have been a number of important studies undertaken in the U.S. along these 
lines.  In a co-edited volume, Carol J. Greenhouse, Barbara Yngvesson, and David Engel 
(1994) consider the matrix of law, community and values in the context of three 
American towns.  Engel’s contribution, in which he compares personal injury claims and 
contract disputes, is concerned with decision-making in the realm of private law as a 
mode of moral and ethical signification. He posits that differing conceptions of 
individualism, falling along ethnic, economic, and religious lines, can be expressed in 
interpretations of personal injury litigation, and that discourse and practice surrounding 
such litigation play a role in reinforcing longstanding patterns of behavior in the 
                                                
7 Around the same time, there were volumes published on the ‘common place’ of law (Ewick and Silbey, 
1998) and on law and community (Greenhouse et al, 1994; Yngvesson, 1993).   
8 The authors make note of a number of interpretations of ‘everyday life,’ from its juxtaposition to public 
life by feminist scholars, to Habermas’ contrast of everyday life with instrumental reason and choice.  For 
Blachot, the everyday is the unseen and the unsaid in contrast to the perceivable, whereas for LeFebvre, 
everyday life stands in opposition to the technological superhuman processes of humanity (1993:3-5). 
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community.  This scholarship makes provocative claims for how identity and community 
are constituted in part by law use and avoidance, and emphasizes how exchanges in and 
around the edges of the courts produce legal and moral frameworks.    
Work by Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey (1998), while focused more on 
individual consciousness than on the making of community, also explores the ways in 
which law is connected to social status.  They argue that conceptions of the law and its 
legitimate role in dispute processing mark subtle variations in class; law’s authority, and 
one’s position vis-à-vis the law, is differentially conceived.  Merry (1990) also takes up 
the issue of law’s authority in her study of a small-town court in the U.S. by considering 
law as simultaneously constitutive (it establishes categories and makes certain things 
thinkable and unthinkable) and constituted (as a product of legal consciousness).  Merry 
points out that law is able to construct authoritative images of social relationships and 
actions that are symbolically powerful (8).  This potentiality of law rests, she asserts, on 
the unwillingness of Americans generally and her participants specifically to doubt the 
legitimacy of the law itself, or the value of a legally ordered society.  
Considerations of law’s authority and legitimacy in relation to the role it may 
come to play in private law transactions and dispute processing were useful for my own 
work on Egypt.   They suggested a line of inquiry related in part to the legitimacy of state 
law for Egyptians and its viability as a medium for recourse, and in part to the way ideas 
about law come to play a role in how legal recourse becomes a social signifier.  Where I 
seek to move this scholarship forward is by reinforcing it with a focus on the production 
and circulation of commercial documents, to think about how documents are used to 
contest the authority of law to define rights, problems, and appropriate solutions as well 
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as to create opportunities for redefining parties’ relationship to one another.  Further, in 
light of relatively recent and radical legal reform and the particular political context of 
Egypt, one cannot make claims, as Merry was able to with some assurance, that 
Egyptians today unquestioningly accept the legitimacy of their laws and legal institutions.  
As such some of the questions initially raised by socio-legal scholars looking primarily at 
data from the U.S. may be addressed from a radically different perspective in a study 
focused on Egypt.   
There has been important ethnographic research on state-society relations in 20th 
century Egypt and the Middle East.  Under the rubric of gender and citizenship studies in 
the Middle East, we see the ways in which gender shapes access to economic and social 
citizenship rights (Bibars 2001; Botman 1999; Davis 2000; Joseph 2000).  Others have 
focused on shifting class boundaries and land and property rights as part of political 
transformations (Cuno 1981, 1992; Mayer 1985) and local power relations in light of 
expanding state power and economic transformations (Gilsenen 1996; Lavie 1990; 
Mundy 1995).  Yet much of the scholarship on law and courts in the region is not 
ethnographic but rather tilts toward the doctrinal and focuses on legal and constitutional 
reform.  Studies of reform processes in the region analyze the linkages between law 
reform and particular religious and political movements and pressures, most notably the 
extension of colonial power, nationalist movements and the consolidation of state power, 
and the positivization of shari‘a; I will address Egyptian legal reform in detail in chapter 
one.  While this literature has been critical for deepening our understanding of larger 
ideological movements and how they become manifest in law, it has also drawn our 
attention away from equally important questions of law use and the pragmatic and 
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everyday concerns that impact the way in which law serves citizens in their interactions 
with one another.  
At the same time, this scholarship provides a roadmap for analyzing 
contemporary law-in-action; it heightens our awareness of the contestations that have 
wrought the legal system Egyptians grapple with today as they seek resolution to their 
private disputes.  For instance, changes to family law, or personal status law, have often 
been the subject of intense debate in the Muslim Middle East, where women’s rights 
advocates have contested laws on divorce, custody, and marital maintenance based in 
Islamic shari‘a.  Ethnographic research on the family courts and family law throughout 
the region (Agrama 2005; Baron 1991; Mir-Hosseini 1993; Moors 1995) has revealed the 
dilemmas litigants face in claiming rights in the space between new family legislation 
and discourses of tradition and gendered expectations.    
Baudoin Dupret is recognized as a foremost ethnographer of law in the Middle 
East, his research sites spanning from Morocco to Egypt to Syria, and his studies moving 
the field in provocative new directions.  Independently and in collaboration with Jean-
Noel Ferrie he has made a significant contribution to our understanding of law as practice 
in the region in his work on the  courts, the police, and legal pluralism in Egypt.  For 
instance, Dupret argues that during the adjudicative process judges and legal actors 
interpret the content of moral principles, thereby concluding moral indeterminancy; out 
of this process emerge new or newly articulated standards of Islamic normativity (Dupret 
2001; Dupret and Ferrie 2005).  In taking an ethno-methodological approach in their 
research, Dupret and Ferrie were interested to demonstrate how meaning is produced 
through interactions and exchanges.  One focus has been the making of police reports; in 
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such processes, the authors note, the accused consistently asserts moral positions in 
tension with and outside of the procedural focus on recording concrete data.  Moreover, 
in Dupret’s (2007) assessment, the tension between moral and legal norms takes shape in 
particular ways in the Egyptian context in relation to historical reconfigurations of law; I 
address this in more detail in the following chapter.  
Dupret’s focus on specific exchanges and processes has prompted my own 
interest in the moments of production and circulations of customary/commercial 
documents and in what people say about and in those moments, what kinds of meanings 
and hopes are assigned to them.  The data directed me to take into consideration 
scholarship on the Middle East concerning customary law (Ben Nefissa 1999; Drieskens 
2006; Kennett 2000; Nielsen 1998, 2004; Stewart 2003), legal pluralism (Dupret et al. 
1999) and social networks (Singerman 1995; Ghannam 2002) that point toward ways in 
which the juridical milieu is de-centered by other adjudicative and signifying processes.   
To some extent, this project also responds to studies of judicial and legal activism 
and debates over the rule of law in the authoritarian political context of Egypt.  As Amr 
Shalakany (2006) and Tamir Moustapha (2003) have shown, lawyers and judges have 
both historically and in more recent years played a very public role in advocating for the 
increasing liberalization and independence of the judiciary.  On many fronts, they have 
been successful; the Supreme Constitutional Court operates largely independently from 
the government.  Lawyers are at the forefront of battles over the renewal of the 
emergency laws and legislation that would expand human rights, including freedom of 
expression, the recognition of opposition parties, and have made public calls to end 
torture and unwarranted arrest.   What these studies so strongly articulate is the way in 
 
  17 
which law is a locus for the contestation of fundamental political, economic and social 
rights.  What I aim for in this study is a consideration of the way rights come to be 
constituted through less public and politicized modalities.  To some degree, the intensity 
of focus on the battles raging over human rights in the Muslim Middle East casts a large 
shadow over everyday practices of private law and the interpersonal and legal processes 
involved in how stakeholders come to possess entitlements vis-à-vis one another.  Rights 
and obligations are legislated and come into being as political and social justice projects, 
but they are claimed and actualized in everyday sociality and in the politics of private 
interactions.   
Finally, and in connection with the following section on documents and 
documentary practices, the attention paid by Brinkley Messick in particular to textual 
practices in the Middle East grounds my consideration of the types of commercial 
documents I ran across so often during my time in Port Said.  In The Calligraphic State 
(1993), Messick points out that  
[f]rom the formal interpretation of sacred scriptures to the mundane 
recording of administrative acts, textual relations have underpinned diverse 
polities.  To investigate the role of texts in a specific state, however, requires a 
view of writing that stresses its cultural and historical variability rather than its 
universal characteristics, and its implication in relations of domination rather than 
its neutrality or transparency as a medium. [1993:2]   
 
Drawing on Foucault’s (1977) theorization of the microphysics of disciplinary 
power, Messick suggests that both ethnographic methodology and a focus on print 
technology and texts are ways of investigating the modalities of power.  Governments 
produce modern subjects, in part, through documentary regimes that include 
identification cards, censuses, birth certificates, diplomas, and licenses.  These are all 
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processes of inscription by which citizens are brought into view and accounted for and 
are an important mode of subjectivization.  Further, legal codification and positivization 
processes homogenize populations, creating abstract and equivalent subjects.  Messick’s 
work suggests several lines of inquiry related to uses of commercial documents in Port 
Said, including the way in which these documents serve as modalities of power between 
transacting parties.  I consider the way the production of mundane and relatively informal 
commercial documents allow Port Saidians to leverage state power; at the same time, 
their ‘customary’ status means that that they derive authority from other sources.  As 
such, I seek insight not into how documents linked to state power are innovatively 
deployed to produce effective obligations.  Further, Port Saidians often treat commercial 
documents as ‘open’ texts, purposively absent information, in contradiction to their 
intended purpose of clarifying the terms of a transaction.  These literal spaces create 
allow for the continued rearrangement of obligations and for adjacent verbal agreements; 
the authority of the oral is re-inserted in the text.  In suggesting that verbal agreements 
are often embedded in these documents, my intention is not to over-emphasize the 
importance of oral culture in the Middle East.  This has been a notable theme in 
scholarship on the region, and includes studies of oral culture and poetics in politics 
(Caton 1990) and in relation to identity and everyday forms of resistance (Abu Lughod 
1986; Lavie 1990).  As Messick shows, recitational practices in Islam authorize texts 
under specific circumstances and the oral has historically been a privileged mode of 
transmission in shari‘a.  My own intention in drawing on Messick’s discussion of orality 
and textuality is to analyze how and why promises (verbal and unenforceable) become 
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embedded into contracts and other commercial documents among Port Saidians and to 
consider the social import of form.  
 
Documents and Documentation  
Documents and texts have throughout the history of anthropology been the object 
of the ethnographic gaze.9  More recently, anthropologists have begun to take cues from 
sociologists, philosophers of science, and law scholars to think more about 
documentation as a technology in the service of society.  Weber initiated this line of 
inquiry by proposing that documentation was a characteristic of modern bureaucratic 
development.  The modern office, for instance, is based on written documents, and the 
labor of producing, organizing and retrieving them (Weber, 1978:957). More broadly, 
organized action in modernity is comprised of acts, decisions, and rules recorded in 
writing in combination with the continuous functioning of officials.  Written records are 
integral to making procedures transparent and consistent, which grants them ‘legal 
authority’ according to Weber’s pure types (217-218).   
A number of scholars have engaged in ethnographic research on documents and 
documenting that seeks to reconsider Weber’s understanding of bureaucracy and 
documentation as a characteristic of it (cf. Smith 1990; Heimer 2006; and Goody 2000).  
Knowledge is indeed structured by documentary forms; as Annelise Riles (2006) and 
Adam Reed (2006) point out, documents have constitutive effects.  Yet bureaucratic 
protocols and documentation are supplemented by practices and actors outside the 
                                                
9 The anthropological use of historical texts, for instance, can be seen as extending from Franz Boas’ 
argument within American anthropology for historical particularism.   Although his theory was initially 
framed as a critical response to the theory of unilineal evolution, Boas’ insight that contemporary social 
phenomenon can only be understood by looking at the particular historical context in which it has 
developed has had far-reaching impact and underlies most anthropological inquiry today (Stocking 1974). 
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bureaucracy.   For example, Heimer posits that the ways documents come to be used and 
interpreted is variable.  Her research on types of institutional documents such as forms, 
checklists, organization charts, and the like in the medical context of a neonatal unit 
reveals that bureaucracy and ‘home’ both play a role in the collaborative construction of 
biography – in other words, in the constitution of the patient.  Likewise, Yngvesson and 
Coutin (2006) have argued that documents such as birth certificates and deportation 
notices are integral to the constitution of the self both legally and personally.  The 
understanding that documents produce categories of persons and activities has been 
enhanced by Foucaultian critiques of constitutive power regimes, and an anthropology of 
documents and documentation can illuminate the ways that documentary processes can 
be productive forms of power.   
 What are the implications of making documents the object of the ethnographic 
gaze?  Does a focus on the textual take our focus away from practice, from interaction 
and the spoken?  In her introduction to a collected volume on documents as artifacts of 
modern knowledge, Annelise Riles (2006) addresses not only the form and meanings of 
documents in different contexts, but considers a broader methodological question: What 
does a specifically ethnographic encounter with documents accomplish?  In drawing 
parallels between the works included in the volume, she notes: “only through 
ethnographic engagement did the authors come to appreciate the document’s form” (20).  
She directs our attention beyond what documents contain, the ‘information’ they convey, 
to form as another component integral to what a document might come to mean; this 
recalls White’s insights on the interrelationship between form and content (1987).  
Moreover, Riles points out that analysis of documents has the potential to be about more 
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than describing existing analytical categories instantiated in documents.  Rather, the 
ethnographic gaze can illuminate the way that people make knowledge through 
documents and create new categories and relations.  In a particularly legal context, then, 
the ethnographic gaze can perhaps shed light on how legal documents actually carry out 
the work of making individuals into holders of qualities, rights, and obligations.  In 
addition, Sam Kaplan suggests that documents can be analyzed in terms of a “socially 
mediated textual performance in which there are norms of interconnectedness between 
texts, their authors, and readers.”10  Riles asserts that ethnographic engagements with 
documents can both shed light on documentary forms, practices, and their contexts and 
meanings, and on the ethnographic encounter itself.   In line with Riles, I argue that 
documents are necessarily considered in relation to the processes that brought them into 
being, as well as in relation to their use, reception, and effects, both intended and 
unintended.   
Bringing Latour’s argument that objects are social actors into the analysis may 
further extend the way documents can be considered part of social processes. Latour 
holds that objects are actors, which he defines as “any thing that does modify a state of 
affairs by making a difference” (2005:71).  The objects at the center of this study, 
customary/commercial documents, do not merely ‘reflect’ a state of relationship, status, 
complaint or obligation.  They do not passively express or symbolize something, or at 
least not merely so.  On the other hand, they don’t wholly originate or determine social 
action, although “things might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, 
influence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on” (72).  Rejecting the attribution of 
                                                
10 Cited in Riles (2006:23).  Kaplan, Sam. 2002. “Documenting History, Historicizing Documentation: 
French Military Officials’ Ethnological Reports on Cicilia.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 
44:344-69.  
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both deterministic and passive roles, Latour posits that objects must be brought into the 
analysis as participants in the action, their participation fully considered.   
Documentation as a practice or process is an integral part of how documents 
become meaningful and hence do things: effect an agreement, define a right, exert 
pressure, dismantle or construct a relationship or a status.  At the same time, after they 
are produced documents are made to circulate between persons and between persons and 
institutions.  Along the way they may be misused or lost, take on unintended significance 
and create effects disconnected to the text they contain or the formal status they hold.  In 
the cases that I look at, documents traverse different legal and normative milieus.  Most 
importantly, they are not passive but rather modify states of affairs as they move between 
people and between people and institutions.  
 
Methodology 
From January through December of 2005, I lived with my husband and our 
newborn daughter in Port Said in order to undertake a situated and historically informed 
study of private law transactions and dispute resolution in this small Mediterranean city.  
I later returned alone to Port Said twice in 2007 for an additional five weeks of research.  
Port Said interested me because of its peculiar relationship to the rest of Egypt – often 
described by other Egyptians as ‘not really Egyptian’ - and its history as a cosmopolitan 
trading city.  Its status as a Duty Free Zone gave rise throughout the 1970’s and 80’s to a 
class of nouveau riche merchants. The stereotype of Port Saidians is that they are all well-
to-do thanks to President Sadat’s Open-Door economic policies that expanded its role as 
a center or trade and importation.  Port Saidians also have a reputation for begin cutthroat 
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traders: as the saying goes, shake hands with a Port Saidian and you may lose your hand.  
By the 1990’s, the city’s Free Zone status was in the process of being incrementally 
rescinded and the local economy and its residents were beginning to feel the strain of the 
shift to a less privileged market.  This shift offered up an intriguing framework for 
thinking about private law.  How did Port Saidians do business with each other?  How 
were contracts made and upheld in a trading community that had recently undergone, and 
was continuing to experience, marked demographic and economic transformation?   
Originally, I hoped to examine practices of private law primarily outside the 
purview of legal institutions in the course of everyday transactions, contracting, and 
dispute resolution processes.  This methodology, influenced by the ‘law in everyday life’ 
scholarship discussed above and by deCerteau (1984) required developing multiple and 
overlapping relationships in the community in a short period of time, relationships that 
would enable me to spend time with people in casual conversation in homes, offices, and 
places of business.  However, early in our stay in Port Said my husband and I found 
ourselves in a dispute with our own landlord, which led to a visit to the police station and 
ultimately to making the acquaintance of Mustapha, a lawyer who became a mentor and 
guide during my research. As a former high-ranking police officer, from a landed family 
in nearby Dumyat, Mustapha had wasta; in local parlance, koussa (literally, zucchini, and 
metaphorically a reference to his connections and influence).  Mustapha introduced me to 
a number of other lawyers, insisted I accompany him to court, gave me documents 
concerning cases he was working on to clarify claims and strategies, and most 
importantly introduced me to clients and allowed me to observe while he advised them on 
their cases.  Other lawyers I came to know did the same with surprising openness. 
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Although a more ‘law-centered’ approach than I had originally envisioned, this change 
proved to be fortuitous in many ways. Shifting to a more case-focused methodology, and 
spending time at the courts and with clerks and lawyers as well as with people in their 
homes, allowed me to observe how cases moved in and out of the legal system.  It was 
also through my interactions with lawyers that I first learned about alternative uses of 
customary commercial documents, and I was subsequently able to raise questions about 
their use by interlocutors I came to know outside the purview of the courts or as litigants 
per se.   
In some ways, the cases analyzed in the following chapters form a disparate set.  I 
discuss cases or disputes that revolve around inheritance, marital support, loan default, 
theft, landlord-tenant and property disputes, rape and fraud.  They cross jurisdictional 
boundaries from commercial law to family law, and include criminal cases and civil 
cases.  In the midst of this seeming chaos, commercial documents are a throughline.  
They not only serve as the mechanism by which parties leverage the power of the law and 
by which disputes are resolved and agreements are guaranteed in varied circumstances 
but also, importantly, move problems and disputes between normative and legal milieus.  
This movement, and its pragmatic and socio-ethical implications, became a central 
analytical concern.   
The bulk of the research was conducted between January 2005 and December of 
2005, with two follow-up trips in January and June of 2007.  Between May and 
December of 2005, I visited the courts at least twice a week to sit in on civil sessions, 
meet with lawyers and clients, talk to clerks and arDa halgi (petition writers who work 
on the sidewalk in front of the court) and visit and observe in the family mediation 
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offices.11  I conducted at least one hundred interviews between 2007 and 2005, most of 
which I was able to record but some of which I could not because the interviewee elected 
not to have me use my recorder. Some interviews occurred in homes, others in cafes or in 
chairs on the sidewalk, in offices, and the like.  Along with interviewees in the juridical 
field as mentioned above, participants included litigants who I knew were involved in a 
legal case via their lawyer.  They also included people I came to know who might or 
might not have had experience making contractual or surety types of agreements and 
resolving petty disputes; almost everyone I talked to had a story to tell on the topic.  
About half of these interviews were repeat interviews with the same people and half were 
individual interviews with people I did not meet with again, or met again but didn’t 
interview more than once.  Some interviews were structured, but most were unstructured 
conversations initiated by general questions I posed about disputes or agreements, about 
the courts, lawyering, and the police, and about Port Said and its history and economy.   
On the topic of customary and commercial documents, I pursued questions about 
why specific documents were used in lieu of others, the circumstances surrounding their 
production, what exactly was inscribed in them, and what happened to them following 
their production.  Who held on to particular documents, and when and how did they 
move into others’ possession, or from one context to another?  I also asked people, both 
litigants and lawyers, to reflect on what impact they thought particular documents had on 
the trajectory of the agreement or dispute being processed.  I collected booklets of 
customary/commercial documents and obtained copies of some that were currently in use 
between parties.  I also accepted documents from case files, which included police 
                                                
11 The transliteration of this word is likely incorrect, although it is closest to how I heard it pronounced.  
The word seems to have both Arabic and possibly Turkish roots and is not in any of the Arabic dictionaries 
I regularly use.   
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reports, memoranda and briefs, reports from experts, and copies of contracts, honesty 
receipts, checks and the like.   
Despite my efforts to meet with opposing parties to the same dispute or case, I 
was typically only able to meet with one party; often the person I initially interviewed felt 
strongly that I should not talk to the other party.  This denial of access was, I believe, 
rooted in the sense that interviewees wanted to feel like I was their ally, and perhaps in 
the expectation that the opposing party would refute their version of a case and make 
them look bad.  By the same token, lawyers would sometimes discuss particular cases 
with me and not want to introduce me to the clients involved for a variety of reasons, 
including the practicalities of arranging meetings and, as some suggested, on the basis 
that the client could not do as good a job at explaining a case to me as could the lawyer.   
Other lawyers were able to see that talking to clients was an important research strategy 
for me and went out of their way to set up meetings.  I also observed and recorded 
meetings between clients and lawyers and meetings at the Office of the Experts.   
Ultimately, this amounted to hundreds of pages of field notes and about ninety 
hours of digital recordings.  Because I sought to allow participants to lead the 
conversation in directions they felt were important, a not insignificant amount of this 
material was relatively superfluous to my research questions.  Yet by allowing a great 
deal of freedom in my interactions, I also stumbled upon data that I would not have.  In 
general, I was guided by advice from Jane Schneider, who pressed me to consider 
interviews a process of inviting other people to help me think through particular 
questions or concerns based on their experiences, rather than a process of asking people 
to provide me with information or data.  
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Wael, my primary research assistant, was indispensable and introduced me to his 
friends, relatives and acquaintances in the community, out of which my local network of 
friends and participants grew.  He accompanied me to many meetings and interviews, 
although I also met with people alone. He translated bits of conversation I didn’t 
understand although I soon came to rely less on him for translation assistance and more 
for introductions (as a sought-after tutor, he was known in many circles around town) and 
for assistance with textual materials.  Beyond these practical components, his presence 
changed the dynamic of the research.  Drawing on Crapanzano’s (1980) discussion of 
interlocutors and triadic relationships in research, in a broader sense Wael served as an 
important ‘third’12 in my relationships with interlocutors; he put people at ease and 
enabled a fluidity of conversation by his very presence. There were times when his 
caution prevented me from asking questions I wanted to ask, and other times when his 
understanding of local mores and sensitivities saved me from being inadvertently rude.  
He thought to ask questions I hadn’t thought of, yet sometimes directed the conversation 
away from my own concerns. At the same time, he was someone with whom I was able 
to reflect on particular interviews and observations. 
To return briefly to the ethnographic encounter with documents, it seems 
important to reflect on the complications and benefits of my own access to certain 
documents in the field.  I sought to understand document production that I was typically 
unable to witness because these moments of production had already passed.  In addition, I 
sought to consider the meanings of documents that, in some instances, I never saw, and to 
                                                
12 Crapanzano draws both on Simmel’s notion of the triad (1964. “The Triad” pp. 145-69 in K.H. Wolff, ed. 
and trans., The Sociology of Georg Simmel, New York: Free Press) and on Sartre’s discussion of the third 
and triadic relationships (1964. Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. New 
York: Mentor).   
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wrestle with one-sided interpretations of the ‘real’ meaning and intention of documents 
produced in tandem with another party not present to provide his or her own 
interpretation.  My own distance from certain types of documents that came to play a 
prominent role in this analysis was to some extent a hindrance.  I couldn’t always see the 
material artifact around which a dispute or an agreement revolved and therefore had to 
rely upon others’ depictions and evaluations.  On the other hand, it forced me to deeply 
examine what was said about those documents, and to look for connections with other 
types of documents.  Perhaps because of this material inaccessibility, I was compelled to 
look at what documents did and how they came into being, rather than at the objective 
information they ‘contained.’  More than containers of information, I considered 
documents as vehicles and instigators of action.  As I will show, often their very 
existence mattered much more than what was inscribed within.  This suggests that it will 
be important to consider how they were imagined and what contributed to their 
effectiveness outside of the text they contained.  The fact that I was not privy to particular 
documents, and in other instances given easy access to legal files containing clients’ 
personal information, was perhaps a barometer of the way I was received and perceived.  
Yet it also indicates different notions of what is or should be considered private, the 
boundaries of which were drawn and redrawn based on social norms and the individual 
evaluations of those with whom I interacted.   
Further, it is worth noting the ways in which bureaucratic documents made my 
own research possible.  In particular I possessed a letter of introduction from the 
Binational (Egypt-USA) Fulbright Commission, written in both English and Arabic, 
which stipulated that I had received express permission from the Egyptian Ministry of 
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Higher Education to conduct anthropological research on ‘Legal Consciousness in Port 
Said.’  Most importantly, the letter stated that my advisor on this project was Dr. Sufy 
Abu Talib, Professor of Law at Cairo University.  Along with being a distinguished 
professor of law, Dr. Abu Talib had previously been head of the Egyptian Parliament 
(majlis al-sha‘b).  Moreover, as a result of holding this position at the time of President 
Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981, as prescribed by the Egyptian constitution, he had 
briefly assumed the presidency until President Mubarak was sworn in 45 days later.  My 
link to a man of such political importance in Egypt, verified in writing on a letter bearing 
an official seal from the Fulbright Commission, was vital for my access to both officials 
and ordinary citizens in Port Said.  Abu Talib, now deceased, possessed a reputation as an 
honorable and intelligent politician.  His  ‘presence’ in my research, along with the 
presence of Fulbright as a known educational research-granting agency, imbued me with 
legitimacy.  I also carried business cards from my university and business cards bearing 
the Fulbright logo, and a Fulbright ID card, which I passed out liberally.  Such documents 
reinforced my stated associations and aims and helped me counteract half-joking 
suggestions that I might be working for the CIA.   
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation is organized in such a way as to indicate some of the linkages 
between the past and the present.  Although the first three chapters are weighted toward 
Egyptian (and Port Saidian) social, economic, and legal history my intention is not to 
suggest a kind of teleology.  Rather, I find it useful to think of how specific historical 
events and shifts are reflected in contemporary practices.  Moreover, in discussions my 
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interlocutors often made reference to historical events and to ways in which Egypt had 
changed.  Such ‘rememberings’ were often tinged with nostalgia and not necessarily 
reflective of objective transformations.  Yet they served as important reminders of how 
the perception of reality impacts reality, and of how people anchor their life in the present 
to histories both imagined and real.   
In discussing cases, I have generally selected to present only a portion of a more 
complex situation in order to stay focused on the issue at hand; cases are often in process 
for years and involve numerous upsets and reversals and I found it difficult to incorporate 
too many details while also keeping the analysis cogent.  In other examples I only had 
access to bits and pieces of a complicated dispute; taken together with similar examples I 
have sought to articulate patterns.  Although the vast majority of my interlocutors 
requested to be identified and noted that there was no reason to mask their identity in my 
use of the data, I have changed their identities.  I did so in accordance with 
anthropological standards and to anticipate any issues that might arise in future if I made 
known the personal information of the participants and the intricacies of their private 
disputes, transactions, and legal cases.  In some cases I conflated biographical data with 
other informants because certain locally well-known individuals might be recognizable 
despite the use of an alias.   
In Chapter One, I begin with a schematic account of the Egyptian legal system 
and then examine how the period of major legal reform in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries fundamentally shaped it.  In particular, I am concerned with the processes by 
which jurisdictional variety was narrowed and address some of the scholarship examining 
the ‘identity’ of the new Civil Code and the logic behind the reforms.  It is possible to see 
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that legal reforms that sought to limit the scope of Islamic and customary law were also 
productive of what Esmair describes as ‘indefinite legalities’.  In this vein, novel 
practices of private law observable in Port Said today may be understood as unanticipated 
outcomes of reconfigurations of law. 
Chapter Two first examines a common phrase, bishakl wadi ‘ (typically glossed 
as ‘in a friendly way’) used in Port Said in relation to dispute resolution and considers the 
types of customary and moral discourses it may variously reference.  Following this, I 
move between three nodes of the legal system – the courts, the police, and lawyers.  I 
address how each of these nodes plays a role in helping litigants control the trajectory of 
their disputes.  The potential for delay in legal proceedings as they wind through the 
courts is useful in providing time and space for the renegotiation of disputes and acts as a 
temporal pressure on parties.  The police, representative of both repressive state power 
and a more benign form of authority, are a resource for turning private problems into 
official complaints, which litigants can use as leverage to pressure one another.  Finally, 
lawyering in contemporary Egypt can be understood as sets of practices and forms of 
expertise that defy the vision of early reformers.  Lawyers advise clients across multiple 
registers and in so doing aid them in maintaining control over dispute processing and in 
producing meaningful outcomes.   Documents originate and circulate through these three 
nodes and their circulation contributes to the meanings they come to hold.  
In Chapter Three, I delve into the historical specificity of Port Said as a center of 
trade and a Duty Free Zone.  In so doing, I am concerned not only with Port Said as a 
particular kind of community – one with shallow roots compared to the rest of Egypt, and 
recently experiencing dramatic socio-economic shifts – but as a site of intensive 
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transactional activity.  Local crediting through installments plans, I argue, predominates 
over other forms of credit, and surety practices in the sphere of trade inflect other 
transactional and dispute resolution processes unrelated to trade.   
Whereas the preceding three chapters are focused on the various frameworks 
related to practices of private law – legal reform, components of the contemporary legal 
system, and Port Said and retail trade – the following three chapters direct our attention 
specifically to customary/commercial documents.  In Chapter Four I consider the relative 
legal status of different documents and from the ethnographic data provide examples of 
how form, content, and circulation all contribute to their transactional veracity.  I show 
how these documents make things happen in defiance of their intended purposes as 
commercial documents, and analyze them as types of legal fictions by which the body is 
made into surety.   
Chapter Five narrows in on specific moments of production in the making of 
customary/commercial documents and considers the relationship between gestures of 
trust and the form documents ultimately take.  In particular, I argue that documents come 
to be signed ‘ala buyaD (“on the white”, with important information missing) not due to 
carelessness but because social value is accrued in doing so.  I also turn to the false 
contract as one type of customary/commercial document.  By analyzing a recent case 
involving two brothers I am interested in thinking more about the conditions under which 
it came into being and the role the contract plays as a type of artifact in the context of a 
promise.  This analysis addresses some of the concerns taken up by relational contract 
theory and reconsiders them in light of a contract intended to be fictional.  
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Finally, in Chapter Six, I look at the intersection between three documents in a 
case involving an alleged rape.  Here, a police brief, an honesty receipt, and a marriage 
contract all intersect, one giving rise to the next in a textual chain.  This textual chain 
generates a just solution not defined by law but rather constructed by the participants.  It 
suggests a way to understand how documents forge relationality in nonlinear ways and 
proposes that documents must be viewed not as reflective of particular realities but as 
social actors participating in the constitution of such realities.   
 






Legal Traditions and Legal Reform in Egypt 
 
Egyptian law, since the early part of the 20th century, may be seen as largely 
following the continental civil law tradition.  The legal reforms that began in 1882 and 
culminated in 1949 replaced Ottoman codes and provisional British colonial legal 
arrangements, and narrowed the scope of shari‘a significantly.13  Prior to the late 19th 
century, there was a large measure of fluidity between jurisdictions that allowed for 
disputes and crimes to be dealt with according to different legal traditions – shari‘a, 
customary law, and Ottoman statute law.  The reforms, including the promulgation of 
new law codes, the unification of the courts, and the development of formal legal training 
for lawyers and judicial personnel, stymied formal jurisdictional variety.  A legacy of 
these reforms, however, is that the unification and secularization of law has been 
productive of dispute management and transactional practices in contemporary urban 
Egypt that in some ways resist the character of civil law as impersonal and secular, and as 
standing in opposition to custom.    
My point here is not to wade into legal pluralism debates, although legal pluralism 
as an analytical framework has provided useful insights for understanding intersections 
between legal traditions in Egypt and throughout the Middle East.  Rather, discussion of 
the colonial era legal changes allows us to reconsider the ideal – the vision of reformers 
                                                
13 There were other significant changes that occurred after 1949, including the establishment of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court in 1969, although the era leading up to the promulgation of the new Civil 
Code in 1949 is generally considered the major reform era.   
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to make a rigorous, unified and ‘modern’ legal system – alongside the real - practices of 
law in daily life that are inclusive of non-state normative and indefinite legalities. 
In order to more fully comprehend the strategies Port Saidians use to make 
agreements binding and effective and resolve disputes about them, it is necessary to step 
back for a broader view of the legal landscape in which they occur. The doctrinal and 
institutional ruptures and shifts that occurred from the late 19th to the mid 20th century 
were not only important political processes in the making of modern Egypt.  They also 
rearranged the legal landscape in which Egyptians operate in the 21st century, and thus 
have import for an analysis of contemporary practices of private law.   
 
Law reform and the Civil Law Tradition in Egypt 
Egyptian law is a civil law system, with precedent (from the British common law 
tradition) applicable in administrative jurisdictions and in the appeal process.  The 
multiple branches of law are codified in, for instance, the Civil Code, Penal Code, 
Commercial Code, Personal Status Law, Tax Law, Company Law, Administrative Law, 
and so forth, to which amendments have been made throughout the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries.  Legislation emanates from the People’s Assembly (majlis al-sha‘b) and in 
the form of decree-laws from the executive branch.  The Ministry of Justice oversees the 
various jurisdictional levels in Egypt, including Constitutional Jurisdiction (Supreme 
Constitutional Court), and Ordinary Jurisdications, which include Courts of First Instance 
(maHakim ibtida’iyya) and Summary courts (maHakim juz’iyya, also known as partial 
courts and designated for minor litigation and criminal misdemeanors), the court of 
appeals and the court of cassation.  The Courts of First Instance are presided over by 
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three judges, whereas the partial courts are one-judge courts; the criteria for whether civil 
cases go before the Courts of First Instance or the partial courts is monetary, with cases 
involving 10,000LE14 or less reviewed in the partial courts.  In addition, there are 
Administrative Jurisdictions, Exceptional Jurisdictions (including the Courts of State 
Security, (emergency courts), (maHakim amn al-dawla tawari’) and the Courts of State 
Security (established by Law 105/1980)), Military jurisdictions, and administrative 
committees that do not provide adjudication (Bernard-Maugiron and Dupret, 2002).  An 
example of the latter are the local administrative centers (aHya’) located through out the 
cities and villages.   
The Ordinary courts preside over civil, commercial, and criminal cases, and from 
1955 until 2004, they also presided over personal status cases.  However, in 2004, Law 
10 created a separate jurisdiction for personal status cases as a way to alleviate the case 
backlog. The articles of this law provide for matters of personal status (aHwal al-
shakhsiya) to be separated from the general jurisdiction of the summary courts and to 
newly comprise a special court within that jurisdiction.  Although in Port Said, for 
instance, these new courts are just down the corridor from the rest of the courthouse, the 
justices are specifically assigned to the family court and no non-family cases are presided 
over.  Moreover, two experts, one of whom must be female, assist the courts.  The 
experts include a social worker and a psychologist, whose work is overseen by a 
specialist in family law; these three work as a team in what are known as the Dispute 
Mediation Offices.  Article five of Law 10 notes that these Dispute Mediation Offices are 
                                                
14 LE is the standard abbreviation for the Egyptian pound.  The current exchange rate, which has been fairly 
stable since 2005, is: 1 U.S. dollar = 5.9 Egyptian pounds. 
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mandatory for each family court so that conciliation attempts between the parties are 
formalized.15 
Criminal cases are opened and investigated by the general public prosecutor (al-
niyaba al-‘amma), charged with protecting general and state interests.  Judges, who 
belong to the Judges’ Syndicate (union), are almost exclusively drawn from the office of 
the public prosecutor and trained by the National Center for Judicial Studies in Cairo.  
Although judicial appointments are irrevocable, judges are assigned to courts on a 
rotating basis to prevent local connections from inhibiting impartiality.  All of the judicial 
personnel are state employees and the Judicial Authority Law of 1972 regulates their 
work (Bernard-Maugiron and Dupret 2002: xxxix).  Although lawyers and lawyers 
training will be addressed in more detail in chapter six, I will note here that lawyers 
receive bachelors degrees in law, followed by a required two-year apprenticeship with a 
senior lawyer who has been approved by the lawyer’s syndicate to present cases before 
the courts of cassation (appeals).  Comparable to the Bar Association in the U.S., 
membership in the Lawyer’s Syndicate is mandatory for lawyers to practice. 
Although the types of disputes and transactions I study seem to be only 
tangentially impacted by the current state of emergency, it is important to note that Egypt 
has been under emergency law continuously since President Sadat’s assassination in 
1981.  Article 148 of the Constitution (1971) authorizes the president to declare a state of 
                                                
15 Law 10 came into effect two months prior to my arrival in Egypt to begin the research, and I compiled 
some data on the various complications, successes and failures of its implementation by observing in the 
family courts and through interviews with the director in charge of training family court judges and 
mediators (who was based at the National Center for Judicial Studies in Cairo) one of the Port Said 
mediators.  In particular, the first round of training and the directives for those occupying the newly created 
mediator positions seem to have been vague and mediators felt unprepared for their work.  Although 
statistically the family mediation offices report successful efforts to reconcile couples, some mediators (and 
many lawyers) are quick to point out that there is much room for improvement.  Unfortunately, there is not 
room in the dissertation to examine this data in more depth.   
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emergency, and the emergency laws were most recently renewed in 2006.16  This means 
that individuals accused of offences deemed to be of a political, military, or moral nature 
can be tried and sentenced in State Security courts; these exceptional courts are arguably 
not exceptional but a permanent feature of the judicial system since military justice was 
instituted in 1966.   
This schematic description of the Egyptian legal system hides its rather 
complicated history.  Prior to 1882, when Egypt was under Ottoman rule, there were 
multiple and intersecting legal jurisdictions that legal reform sought to streamline.  As 
Peters (1992) notes, for instance, between 1842 and 1883 there developed two parallel 
hierarchies, that of Islamic law and of Ottoman statute law.  Mohammad ‘Ali established 
specialized judicial councils with different competencies; to address the constraints of 
increasing international commerce he set up merchants councils (maj alis al-tujjar). 
Certain categories of crimes (for instance Hadud crimes, those expressly prohibited in the 
Quran) were the exclusive domain of religious judges (quDah; more commonly 
transliterated as qadi/s) who enjoyed a wide measure of freedom and judged according to 
strict codes of evidence.  When qadis were forced to dismiss a case for lack of strong 
evidence, the administrative council of the governorate could hear the case.  Elsewhere 
(1999) Peters demonstrates a number of ways in which statute and Islamic laws were 
interpenetrating.  For instance: a victim of theft in this era could select to bring his case 
either to a qadi or to the police; criminal sentences issued by the qadi had to be enforced 
and implemented by the state; the state held the power to determine the competence of 
the courts to hear cases according to criteria it set, and the like.  
                                                
16 As of summer 2009 there continued to be much public and parliamentary debate over proposals to 
replace emergency laws with anti-terror legislation, which opposition parties have supported and the ruling 
party (NDP) has resisted.   
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By 1876 the Mixed Courts were formed, administered by European judges to 
oversee cases related to Europeans residing in the country, and by 1883 the role of the 
qadi in criminal cases had ended.  At this time new National Courts were established for 
Egyptians to parallel the Mixed Courts, and a new code to determine its juridical 
operation was completed. As the new Mixed and National courts were granted 
jurisdiction over criminal and commercial cases, the particular types of fluidity Peters 
describes, of cases moving between jurisdictions at various points in their processing, 
ceased to exist.  By 1956, the courts were entirely unified under Gamal Abdul Nasser’s 
leadership.   
The Civil Code, promulgated in 1948, was the work of renowned legal scholar 
Abdel Razzak al-Sanhuri (1895-1971), and includes components of Islamic law, Ottoman 
codes, and French and other European codes.  As Shalakany and Hill have both pointed 
out, Sanhuri’s project in crafting the code was both the modernization of Islamic law, and 
the drafting of a modern code based on European models that promoted social justice.  
The extent to which these aims are overlapping, and the ‘identity’ of the code is the 
subject of debate (see Shalakany 2001).  In general, it is important to note that the 
jurisdication of Islamic shari‘a in Egypt has been formally restricted over time to that of 
family law, and codified shari‘a today primarily governs matters of inheritance, custody, 
marriage and divorce, and awqaf (religious endowments).17   Additionally, as a result of 
amendments to the constitution by President Sadat, shari‘a is noted as the source of law 
in Article Two of the constitution and Article One of the Civil Code.18  
                                                
17 In addition, for capital offenses, the Grand Mufti must approve all death penalty sentences. 
18 Article two of the Egyptian Constitution formerly articulated that shari‘a was a source of legislation.  As 
of Sadat’s amendment of 1980 the wording was changed to: “Islamic jurisprudence is the principle source 
of legislation,” the interpretation of which has spawned numerous hisba (the canonical injunction of 
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Scholars have sought to clarify the underlying logic of the legal reforms and to 
understand the reconfiguration of shari‘a (see for example Asad 2001; Brown 1997; 
Rutherford, 2008; Skovgaard-Petersen, 1997).  In particular, some scholars have been 
concerned to show how this emergent liberal legality was an expression of the political 
goals of Egyptian nationalists to achieve independence from British colonial rule.  As 
Nathan Brown argues, fashioning a court structure and code quickly and along a 
European model was necessary to keep colonial administrators out of the process (Brown  
1997:30).  Yet it is of greater utility to consider how the reforms are expressive of and 
connected to larger historical reconfigurations and specifically to secularization 
processes.  Talal Asad suggests that this period is fundamentally marked by the European 
project of civilizing and establishing a new order in its colonies, including Egypt.  This 
new order required “a new conception of what law can do and how it should do it” 
(2003:240).  Secular nationalists viewed the restriction of shari‘a as an important 
component of the civilizing process and of the creation of a “modern autonomous life” 
(2003:253).   Throughout this period the scope of shari‘a jurisdiction was narrowed and 
the scope of codified secular law expanded.  Codification and court reform can thus be 
understood as a process of separation of the spheres of law and morality, public and 
private.  Asad further argues that the legal constitution of a new political space in which 
social order was to be maintained through these separate spheres is inextricable from the 
penetration of European capital in the country (2001:10).  Morality was moved to the 
realm of personal responsibility.   
                                                                                                                                            
‘enjoining good and prohibiting evil’) cases in recent years (see Lombardi 2006, for more on article two).  
Moreover, Article One of the Civil Code, under the General Provisions section, states: “Where no 
legislative provision is applicable, the judge shall pass his ruling according to usage and practice.  In the 
absence of usage, his judgment shall be pronounced according to Islamic Law principles.”  Doctrinally 
speaking, shari‘a maintains a presence in Egyptian civil law as an authoritative legal source. 
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In the shift to a new legal order based on European-derived codes, it is important 
to see as well a shift in legal personality and the correlation between cultural categories 
and status before the law. As Asad notes, individuals were to be equal before the law, 
regardless of Islamically defined ‘necessary’ inequalities, such as that between the 
genders and between Muslims and other religious minorities (2003:254).  This is an 
example of how creating new separate spaces for both state law and Islamic religion and 
morality forced the latter to mold itself around the new secular order, its legal authority 
usurped (215).  Asad is to some degree concerned with the motivations of the various 
reformers of the time, including Mohammad ‘Ali, Husayn Fakhri, Muhammad Abduh, 
and Ahmad Safwat.  But he is concerned to make the point that no matter how much 
these reformers articulated a desire to adopt the new laws in such a way as to create 
continuity with the past, the reforms were fundamentally forward-looking toward a vision 
of modernity and revolutionary.   
In light of this more nuanced understanding of legal reform, how might we 
reconsider analysis of ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri’s efforts to promote contractual justice 
in Egyptian civil law?  Guy Bechor (2001) argues that in writing the New Egyptian Civil 
Code Sanhuri sought not only to regulate private legal relations between individuals, but 
also to create a wider social order.  This was to be carried out through judicial discretion, 
based on the application of Article 135 of the New Code which states: “a contract is void 
if its object is contrary to public policy or morality” (Bechor 2001:197 n. 78).  Further, 
the New Code introduced the ‘moral-altruistic doctrine’ of unforeseen circumstances, one 
point upon which it clearly diverges from the French Civil Code (upon which the 
Egyptian code is largely based) as well as previous Egyptian codes.  This doctrine 
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emphasizes the need to show compassion for a party to a contract facing difficulties or 
calamity.  Although ultimately the scope of ‘unforeseen circumstances’ was narrowed to 
address only general rather than personal circumstances, Sanhuri insisted that the 
specifics of this doctrine should remain open to interpretation (194).  Despite Bechor’s 
claim that Sanuri’s work contained a ‘hidden’ agenda for the civil code to limit the 
liberal/individualistic tendency of its predecessors and to advocate for contractual justice 
based on compassion, forgiveness, and fairness, the civil code must necessarily be seen as 
an integral part of secularization processes by which legality and morality were further 
demarcated and separated.  This was the ‘social ordering’ wrought by the code: it was 
constituting a secular society in which compassion, forgiveness, and fairness were to 
become matters of private morality and self-regulation.   
Moreover, it is possible to see that reform processes and the 1948 Civil Code had 
implications for the constitution of new meanings of legal personality and for how 
citizens come to relate to law as authentic and legitimate.  Armando Salvatore (2004) 
proposes that legal reform processes in the late nineteenth century in Egypt collapsed 
ijtihad (jurisprudential method in Islam), ihtisab (primary binary instruction) and the law-
interpreting and activating institution of ifta’ (non-binding legal opinions).  The result 
was what he terms an ‘imploded shari‘a’ that held more public-normative meaning than 
legal significance; this, he argues, is the status of shari‘a today.  Furthermore: 
Shari‘a thus defined has provided a soft and flexible background to the 
notion of legal personality either by constituting an ‘environmental noise’ for the 
operation of the legal system proper or by educating Muslim citizens into forms 
of personhood that conform to the impersonality of rule and are able to ease up 
their access to the higher formalization of legal personality within the system of 
positive law.” [Salvatore 2004:133]  
 
He goes on to suggest that: 
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What I see here is not a dualistic normative and legal landscape, but 
mechanisms of translation between different levels of formalization of norms 
legitimized by different institutions or authorities.  Within these mechanisms, the 
same imploded view of shari‘a plays a role in authorizing mechanisms of 
disputation and adjudication with varying degrees of formalization as well as of 
exposure to the procedures of law enforcement through state instances.” [134]    
 
Salvatore posits the implosion of shari‘a as a meta-level phenomenon that 
provided the normative basis for the codification and positivization of law in Egypt 
generally and the emergence and acceptance of the new civil law framework in particular 
(127). He focuses on what he describes as ‘mechanisms of translation’ between “different 
levels of formalization of norms legitimated by different institutions or authorities” (134).  
One important mechanism of translation is ifta’ (the giving of fatwas, or non-binding 
legal opinions by muftis) situated as a ‘soft institution’ that is socially important but 
formally autonomous from the state-centered legal system (132).  In other words, ifta’ is 
a mechanism by which the shari‘a-related normative order is constituted in contemporary 
Egypt in the context of a civil law system largely unbound by Islamic principles.  This is 
a useful way of thinking about how shari‘a maintains a ‘kernel-like’ presence linked to 
law.  At the same time, there are ways in which what Salvatore sees as the imploded 
shari‘a and what might more broadly be seen as secularization processes produce new 
‘indefinite legalities’ that reinsert moral and ethical requirements into dispute 
management and transacting practices.  I return to this point below.   
Finally, let me briefly address Jeanette Wakin’s (1972) treatment of 9th-10th 
century Sunni Islamic jurist Tahtawi’s writings on shurut, model documents or 
formularies.19  Her discussion of the function of documents in Islamic law provides a way 
                                                
19 See also Mallat (2004) on formularies and the shur ut literature.  
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to situate the status of commercial documents under later laws and to reflect on the 
innovative uses of commercial and customary documents in Port Said today.  Wakin 
investigates the relative authoritativeness of oral and textual evidence under Islamic law 
and points out that although documents were robustly in use to clarify and record 
contractual arrangements, oral testimony was the only form of proof in the shari‘a 
(1972:6).  Even witnessed documents drawn up in front of the qadi himself had to meet 
strict requirements to serve as evidence.  This strengthened the witness system, in which 
qadis designated men of good moral character in the community to serve as official 
witnesses to the court, by giving rise to the practice of witnesses serving as notaries to aid 
(and earn money by aiding) parties draw up contracts in the proper form and witnessing 
their production.20   
Over time, Wakin notes, the technical knowledge required to make sound 
documents came to be inscribed in manuals; as such, the shurut literature developed out 
of practice.  Moreover, “the shurut literature grew out of the attempt by jurists to bring 
ideal theory and practice closer together” (10).  She notes that another example of this 
practical literature was that addressing Hiyal, legal evasions or devices derived from 
shari‘a by which one may legally arrive at a different result than that intended by the law.  
Hiyal served important functions in commercial transactions to avoid the appearance of 
interest (riba) on transactions while simultaneously enabling it.   
Several points may be emphasized here.  Firstly, under Islamic law in the early 
Islamic period documents were widely used and yet their evidentiary value was weak 
                                                
20 The traces of this are still seen today: arda Halg i sit outside the Port Said courts with, as Ibn Khaldun 
described for the fourtheenth century, small desks and for a small sum draw up simple documents for 
people to submit to court.  These men (exclusively) have no formal training but generally learn their trade 
from their fathers.   
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except under certain conditions.  Secondly, there were technical requirements to be 
heeded in the making of Islamically correct contracts that didn’t contravene the 
prohibition on riba.  This was true during the Ottoman era as well.  However, the new 
civil and commercial codes of the early 20th century did not hold documents and the types 
of transactional arrangements inscribed in them to these same Islamic standards.  Rather, 
documentary proof usurped the space of primary legitimacy once held by oral testimony, 
and interest within certain limits was authorized.  Further, we can understand the tradition 
of Hiyal, or legal fictions, as a way of making common practice and necessity in the 
marketplace conform to Islamic legal theory. 21  Innovative uses of commercial and 
customary documents are similarly practical responses to and ways of evading legal 
constraints in contemporary Port Said.  Yet unlike Hiyal, they are informal manifestations 
of legal fictions rather than part of a formal prescriptive literature.   
 
‘urf 
What status did customary law (‘urf) come to having following the reform period?  
In the legal-historical literature there is far more attention paid to the ways in which the 
precepts and procedures of Islamic law were sidelined through secularization processes 
than there is to how customary law fared in the midst of these transitions.  To some extent 
this is unsurprising.  In the early Islamic period, shari‘a, as sacred law laid out in the 
Quran, the sunna and the Hadith, was posited as the divinely ordained usurper of existing 
customary law.  Therefore, customary law had theoretically already been replaced by 
shari‘a by the time of the late 19th and early 20th century reforms.  It is important to 
recall, however, that although not a formal source (aSl) in Islamic law, custom has in 
                                                
21 Legal fictions in shari‘a are also addressed at length by Schacht 1964, and Horii 2002.    
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practice been relied upon as a source.  Schact notes, for instance: “What little authentic 
evidence is available shows that the ancient Arab system of arbitration and Arab 
customary law in general, as modified and completed by the Koran, continued under the 
first successors of the Prophet, the caliphs of Medina (A.D. 632-61)” (Schacht 1964:15).  
Libson argues that until the 16th century there was a de facto recognition of custom 
among Islamic scholars.  By 1877, Mohammed Ali’s Mejelle (Ottoman Civil Code) 
included ten articles addressing rulings on custom, indicating that it’s legal role had 
become more formalized in the context of Egypt at least.  However, the Mejelle was later 
replaced by the 1948 Egyptian Civil Code, in which custom is listed as a source without 
explication.  As legal traditions, customary law and shari‘a can be seen, to some degree, 
as interpenetrating and mutually constitutive (Libson and Stewart 2009).   
Despite idealizations of customary law as radically separate from the state and a 
resistance to its form of ordering, customary law and state law jurisdictions have 
historically run parallel to and intersected with one another.22  For instance, during 
Cromer’s era we find that “the British allowed local notables to serve as magistrates and 
apply traditional law when resolving disputes” (Rutherford 2008:36).  In other words, 
minor officials were officially granted leeway to preside over customary law proceedings.  
In Austin Kennett’s well-known study of ‘bedou’ in the Sinai and the western desert, 
based on research conducted in the 1920’s, he shows that by the early 20th century the 
                                                
22 As Mahmood Mamdani (1996) points out in his analysis of customary law in the era of late colonialism 
in Africa, the system of indirect rule created a segregated system of law of, on the one hand, ‘civilized’ law 
for the colonial population and for indigenous and urban elites, and on the other hand ‘customary’ law for 
the rural and poor indigenous masses.  He points out that customary law as instituted, codified, and 
approved by the colonial administration was in fact only a select version of the varieties of customary law 
that existed, and the leaders appointed to oversee such systems were enshrined in positions that had prior to 
this been more flexible and the qualifications for these positions were newly determined by administrators.  
Customary law consolidated the non-customary power of chiefs in the colonial administration.  See also 
Snyder (1981) on the creation of customary law.  
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government played a role in Bedouin judicial procedures and decisions.  Criminal cases 
typically involved both the application of Egyptian penal law and Bedouin law, since 
tribesmen were also Egyptian subjects.  Hence, a man who committed murder might both 
serve time in a government prison and, following his release, pay compensation to the 
family of the deceased according to the decision of a tribal court.  In practice, this duality 
was sometimes obviated at the discretion of the local government official or police 
officer, who might waive the application of criminal procedure (Kennett 2000:31).   
In addition, Safia Mohsen’s (1970) subsequent work on the awlad ‘ali of the 
western desert follows up on Kennett’s data, corroborating that criminal cases came 
under both state and tribal jurisdictions. Mohsen also notes the steps undertaken by the 
Egyptian government in the late 1960’s to bring awl ad ‘ali under government control.  
Projects to increase cultivated land, to promote crafts and industries, and other projects 
were intended to settle tribal populations more permanently; these strategies can be seen 
as ways to make the tribesmen more visible and subject to state law.  Yet it’s important to 
note that it was not mandatory to bring civil cases for damages or property disputes 
before state judges.  Although generally settled according to ‘urfi  mediation and 
adjudication procedures, awlad ‘ali could choose the forum they desired, and sometimes 
brought civil cases when the ‘native procedures’ failed to achieve a satisfactory 
settlement (Mohsen 1970:29).   
The difficulty in tracing the impact of legal reform on customary law stems in part 
from the fact that  ‘urf refers to a diverse range of practices, as well as from the fact that, 
unlike shari‘a and the shari‘a courts, it was not specifically targeted as in need of 
improvement or redress.  Rather, as the state extended its control over rural and Bedouin 
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populations through the types of projects Mohsen describes, it was perhaps assumed that 
these newly modern subjects would reject traditional modes of adjudication in favor of 
the rule of law.  It is impossible to say precisely what kind of impact legal reform had on 
customary law but it is certain that some procedures ascribed to customary law provide 
an alternative to and work in interpenetrating ways with state law.   
Drawing on scholarship of customary law in contemporary Egypt I shall briefly 
discuss some the broad features that characterize it.  The diverse nature of ‘urf is revealed 
in the terms used to reference it.  Customary law is also referred to as haqq al-‘arab 
(Arab justice), majlis al-‘arab, (Arab customary assembly or council) or majlis ‘urfI , 
(customary arbitration or customary assembly), jalsat al-‘arab (Arab assembly or 
council).  These last three specifically reference particular adjudicative structures and 
processes, all of which are characterized by an arbitral form of adjudication.  Related 
terms associated with ‘urf are tahkim (mediation) and the desired result of sulH 
(reconciliation) (Ben-Nefissa 1999: 145).   
‘Urf is historically associated with the tribal, Bedouin groups that lived (and 
continue to live) in the region, and therefore also implies a legal personality in which 
rights are conferred upon individuals only in the context of the group, and therefore in 
which compensation or other obligations are collective rather than individual.  As 
Barbara Drieskens (2006) shows, this is still a feature of ‘urf in contemporary Egypt, 
even in urban contexts.  Further, ‘urf is often characterized by Egyptians and non-
Egyptians alike as having a spatially or geographically limited domain, occurring in 
remote areas such as Upper Egypt, the western oases, and the Sinai, which positions it as 
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a rural urfi practice largely absent in the urban milieu.23  Most studies of customary law 
in Egypt in the last half century, while excellent contributions to the field, reaffirm this 
conceptualization (e.g. al-Hilw 1989; Altorki and Cole 1998; Ben-Nefissa 1999; Hill 
1977; Nielsen 1998; Stewart 2003; Zayed 1998).    
Drieskens provides an important counterexample both to the conception of 
customary law as a rural phenomenon and as a stable rather than emergent phenomenon 
by examining the process of families in suburban Cairo negotiating reconciliation.24  She 
illustrates the way they draw upon notions of honor and haqq al-‘arab (Arab justice), and 
the threat of retaliation in order to achieve a resolution.  Although both families involved 
in the dispute were Sa’idiya, from Upper Egypt, they did not follow a formal course of 
action towards reconciliation, involving a majlis ‘urf i  (customary council) as might have 
occurred had the dispute occurred in an Upper Egyptian village.  Rather, the parties 
deployed selected elements of this customary process.  She notes: 
 In the settlement of a specific case, Cairenes creatively construct a 
tradition, ‘urf, and adapt elements from more formal structures of customary law 
to the Cairene context…In comparison to the Upper Egyptian context, Cairene 
custom appears as a dynamic, unstable, and contextual form of conflict resolution.  
Although the Cairenes involved in this case insisted on the customary (‘urfi) 
nature of their solution and presented it as based on a long-established, formal 
tradition, they were in fact constructing a very different and contextual form of 
sulH, one adapted to the peculiarities of suburban life. [Drieskens 2006: 23-24] 
   
Her work is an important illustration of how ideas and practices of customary law 
move between urban and village locales.  It is also useful for considering how disputes 
move between state law and customary law.  The disputants in this case consider the 
                                                
23 Stewart, however, disaggregates between ‘modern’ customary law and a ‘traditional’ customary law in 
contemporary Egypt; the first of which describes the rules governing property relations as identified by 
Hernando de Soto (2000), and the second of which refers to processes of arbitration, truce, compositions, 
and blood feuds at work to varying degrees throughout the country (Stewart 2003:2). 
24 She makes no claims for how customary law is enacted generally in Cairo, pointing out that there is no 
‘typical’ case of reconciliation in Cairo. 
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option of involving the police and pressing charges relating to physical violence yet 
ultimately reject this in favor of accepting a public apology and payment for the injury.  
The police and state law are positioned as viable options; by rejecting this course in favor 
of ‘customary’ options, the customary is given substance as, in part, opposed to and other 
than state law.   
One can also see how contractual practices may simultaneously derive notions of 
validity and surety from contract law, and notions of liability and honor from customary 
law.  Stewart (2003) describes the importance of guarantors in his discussion of 
customary law among the Bedouin of the Sinai, illustrating the high degree of 
responsibility one takes upon agreeing to act as guarantor.  The guarantor pledges to take 
on the obligation should the obligee default.  As an alternative to guarantors, or in 
addition to them, parties are sometimes asked by the arbitrator to sign blank promissory 
notes, or promissory notes with the amount of money under debate filled in, in order that 
if the responsible party fails to pay on the debt, this promissory note can be used to raise 
a legal action against him in order to obtain the money.  Stewart’s work on Bedouin 
contracts (2003) is provocative in that it disrupts assumptions about how honor and 
obligation underwrite transactions in customary law.  In particular, he argues that unlike 
typical bilateral contracts, Bedouin contracts are 3-party, unilateral contracts with a 
principal, obligee, and guarantor.  Whereas bilateral contracts are generally focused on 
the issue of redress in case of breach, Bedouin contracts are aimed at encouraging – even 
forcing – parties to keep their promises (2000:180).  Such contracts, it appears, create 
obligations within a particular context in which, Steward argues, honor is the 
“quintessential pressure pledge” (181). Stewart’s work emphasizes that differences in 
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contractual form (3-party) and content are critical, and takes into account the relational 
networks that make Bedouin contracts binding. 
 
Indefinite Legalities and Mechanisms of Translation 
Secularization processes have narrowed the scope of shari‘a, and modernization 
processes including urbanization, migration and increased state control over 
geographically-isolated areas and their populations, have narrowed and continued to alter 
practices of customary law.  Although doctrinally tangential to state law, religious and 
moral norms and customary law continue to shape the way Egyptians resolve disputes 
and enact transactions.  In order to consider how this might be so, Samera Esmair’s 
(2005) analysis of the colonial era legal reforms is particularly useful.  Eschewing a 
political approach, Esmeir is concerned with how the legal reforms in Egypt were 
constitutive processes intended to reshape Egyptian society according to a particular view 
of humanity.  She notes that legal reform occurring between 1883 and 1936 “claimed a 
discrete juridical sphere, constituting juridical institutions unique to it such as specialized 
independent institutions (courts, bar, law school), professional actors (lawyers, judges, 
jurists), and expert knowledge (codes, court rulings)" (4).  This law 'performed itself' as 
standing above everyday life and the particular, as standing for and applying universal 
rules. As Esmair rightly suggests, these reforms were meant to produce a particular 
humanity, to separate law from society and human relationships, and to create 
dichotomous spheres: general and arbitrary, human and nonhuman, normative and 
factual.   
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By taking a constitutive approach, Esmair is better positioned to discuss cracks in 
the surface of ‘comprehensive’ reform: the emanation of what she describes as ‘indefinite 
legalities’ that defied the new juridical field being carefully wrought. "[N]ext to the 
formation of an independent juridical field other non-juridical legalities continued to 
proliferate outside of the juridical field...these non-juridical legalities were not enacted by   
the codes, and were not carried out by members of the new legal  profession.  As such, 
they were left without a juridical account of their existence"(101).  An example of what 
she describes as indefinite and non-juridical legalities is rural despotism: landlords 
continued to exert power over the fellahin in ways that directly contradicted liberal 
legality.  Their local authority was part of a normative order that the new legal order was 
intended to override and supplant and yet persisted.  Such manifestations of social 
inequality contradicted the argument that positivization was fundamentally a project of 
inclusion.  Esmaeir’s work is important for insisting that an examination of the formal 
project of comprehensive legal reform must reckon with both its intentions (for instance, 
the specific form of ‘humanity’ it sought to constitute) and its unintended and unforeseen 
outcomes.   
This brings us back to Salvatore’s conception of an imploded shari‘a.  In noting 
that legal reform was in part a process of educating Egyptians into new forms of 
personhood (by which being a good Muslim was translated into being a good citizen), we 
can identify a parallel with Esmair’s discussion of the new ‘humanity’ colonizers sought 
to produce.  These were processes that sought both to move morality to the realm of self-
regulation and to authorize and legitimate the rule of law.  Yet, as Esmair points out, 
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these processes were productive of other forms of ordering that did not derive from rule 
of law but rather contested it.    
Salvatore also acknowledges that the implosion of shari‘a has likely given rise to 
a modern legal subjectivity that is not well understood.  He suggests: “[r]elocating 
research at this juncture on the dilemmas faced by legal actors might be highly 
beneficial” (133).  This study of private practices is precisely concerned with the types of 
dilemmas faced by actors and their responses.  And Salvatore’s notion of ‘mechanisms of 
translation’ can fruitfully be extended to this juncture.  Customary documents, their 
production and use, are to some degree mechanisms by which Port Saidians translate 
their own ethical and normative concerns and desires into contractual arrangements.    I 
am concerned to illustrate, in the following chapters, how an ethical vocabulary 
expressed by the phrase bishakl wadi ‘ (in a friendly way), the use of the courts as 
leverage, the role of lawyers between clients and the law, and uses of commercial 
documents that control the trajectory of disputes and limit state intervention in private 
law matters, are all ‘mechanisms of translation’ between these different normative and 
legal orders.25  
Strategic and judicious uses of the legal system, as I shall show through the 
ethnographic data, are often linked to pragmatic concerns about how to leverage law and 
create social value for the protection or assertion of property or status rights.  Strategic 
uses of law are also responses to the inefficiency of the courts and the possibilities 
introduced by such inefficiency.  But mediated legal recourse is also in part a process by 
which ethical personhood is constituted.  One way to see this more clearly is to draw a 
comparison with Islamic responses to capitalist penetration and the emergence of Islamic 
                                                
25 The expression ‘in a friendly way’ and its connotations will be discussed in depth in chapter two. 
 
  54 
banking in Egypt and elsewhere.  Debates about capitalism and its potential to weaken 
the fabric of society may be seen as both linked and parallel to contemporary concerns 
about private law as representative of a kind of individualizing justice and a potential 
threat to social solidarity and customary and morally-guided modes of adjudication and 
compensation.  As Charles Tripp notes: 
Ideas of exchange form part of a complex web of imagining the world and 
evaluating it, producing particular business enterprises, legal systems and states to 
enforce the rules.  This is directly relevant to Muslim responses, since rulings on 
fair exchange are central to all the major juristic schools of Islam.  In fact, one can 
argue that many contemporary Islamic responses to capitalism stem from 
anxieties about unlicensed or unfair exchange, leading to various strategies 
devised to ‘tame’ the process and to make it authentically yet also productively 
part of an Islamic system, reinforcing rather than undermining, the solidarities and 
trust of transactions. [Tripp 2006:4].26    
 
Questions about legitimate exchange practices, allowable gain and profit and the 
validity of various commercial documents were taken up during the reform period: 
Mohammed ‘Abduh, who was a prominent Islamic legal scholar and eventually Grand 
Mufti of Egypt, and his pupil Rashi Rida issued a number of fatawa on the issue of riba 
(unlawful gain) in the late 19th century, and Sanhuri was likewise concerned to clarify 
that some forms of intereste were legal.  As Mallat (1996) points out, the fatwa issued in 
1904 by Abduh and Rida over the legality of profit from Egyptian Savings Fund 
certificates marked the emergence of a new field.  Quranic statements regarding 
commercial transactions and the prohibition of interest were brought to bear on forms of 
investment and commercial instruments originating in the West and newly part of the 
Egyptian economic sector (287).  
                                                
26 Tripp also notes that concerns about capitalist penetration and its impact on social solidarty, materialism 
and competition were certain present among Christian Arabs as well, as evidenced in writings by Christian 
Arab scholars (2006:35).   
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Interest continued to be an animating concern throughout the 20th century, and the 
issue of guaranteeing returns on investments has been a tricky one to align with Islamic 
prohibitions on unlawful gain.27  The tension over what commercial law allows and 
Islamic principles prohibit can be seen in a case from 1985 before the Egyptian 
Constitutional Court.  This case was brought following Sadat’s amendment to the 
constitution, which declared that Islam was the principle source of law rather than simply 
a principle source of law, and on this basis the plaintiff claimed that article 226 of the 
Civil Code was unconstitutional.  Article 226 stipulates that interest is allowed in cases of 
delayed payment, which is considered a form of riba in shari‘a.  The court rejected the 
complaint and ordered the plaintiff, the rector of Al Azhar University, to pay a fine and 
litigation fees (Tripp 2006).  Perhaps in response to the failure of the courts to address 
perceived discrepancies between the civil code and shari‘a on legitimate gain and profit, 
Islamic banking has emerged as a way to provide a structure for ethical exchange and 
investment practices.  
In Egypt, Islamic banking began in the 1960’s with the Mit Ghamr Savings Bank 
founded by Dr. Ahmed Al-Najjar in 1963 (Mayer 1985:36).  The continued growth of 
Islamic banks in the 1970’s and 80’s through the present also coincides with, and is 
inextricable from, the opening of the country to foreign investment and market growth.  
Moreover, Islamic banking must be viewed as responsive to secularization processes 
more broadly.  Muslim intellectuals have tackled economic issues in order to delineate an 
ethical scope of practices that enable Muslims to effectively engage with capitalist 
modernity. As a result, Islamic banking provides a clear framework, parallel to a secular 
                                                
27 Sheikh Tantawi, the Grand Mufti of Egypt for many years, has addressed this issue through fatawa and 
controversially declared that government savings bonds were permitted, even though they entailed 
guaranteed interest payments (see Tripp 2006:129-132, and Mallat 1996).    
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financial institutional framework, for international and smaller-scale transactions and 
investments to be carried out according to Islamic principles. 
In contrast, what we find in examining surety and dispute processing strategies in 
Port Said is that a similarly clear framework for ethical engagement with the law has not 
been delineated for this range of practices.  Instead, we find creative uses of commercial 
instruments to guarantee promises, delayed transactions, and non-monetary exchanges by 
using the body as surety.  Sometimes commercial documents like checks and bills of 
exchange that are used to guarantee a marriage proposal will result in a marriage or the 
terms of a marriage contract being upheld.  Or a commercial document will be secured in 
lieu of pursuing criminal charges for theft, as a demonstration of mercy.  Sometimes 
commercial documents are left partially completed to express a sense of trust by 
introducing risk into a transaction.  The repertoire of documentary practices and practices 
more broadly situated as mediated legal recourse can be interpreted as having multiple 
and interconnected meanings.  Surety and dispute resolution strategies straddle the desire 
to protect oneself and one’s property, and the desire to constitute oneself as a moral and 
merciful person.  In the absence of a structured framework such as that in the economic 
sector through Islamic banking institutions and in writings on Islamic economics, 
practices of legal recourse and forms of surety for a range of contractual arrangements are 
much less uniform.  This comparison illuminates a space in which secular law may 
provoke or give rise to indefinite legalities, creative avoidances, and ethically signified 
practices unaligned with an official discourse and associated institutional framework that, 
like in the case of Islamic banking, runs somewhat parallel to the secular institutions of 
the state and its laws.  
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Conclusion 
Reconfigurations of the legal system from the late 19th through the early 20th 
century were significant and integral to the constitution of a modern, secular state.  As 
Asad points out, Egyptians perceived the adoption of European codes and procedures part 
of becoming civilized (mutamaddin) (2003:252).  Moreover, the new secular order 
separated the spheres of law and morality and made morality a largely private matter.  In 
conjuction with Esmair’s argument that this new legal order was productive of other 
indefinite legalities, we can begin to think about how practices of private law in 
contemporary Egypt include acts that aim to reinsert morality into the domain of law.  
We might better understand when Port Saidians ask the police or lawyers to mediate a 
dispute in the register of custom or morality, rather than purely in their capacity as 
representatives of law, as examples of the productive power and unanticipated effects of 
the reforms.  The many cases against a husband or a debtor refusing to pay money owed 
that get ‘dropped’ by the plaintiff following the judgment, in order to show mercy, might 
be similarly understood.  Like litigants anywhere, Port Saidians try to make law bend to 
their version of the facts and their image of justice.  Their practices of private law are not 
particularly exceptional, their aims are not always moral, and they are often self-serving.  
But when we talk about litigants in any context desiring to use law judiciously we know 
nothing further about the content and the specificity of those desires unless we consider 
them in light of the particular legal and social history of which they are a part.   
 In the following chapter I begin with a discussion of the phrase bishkl wadi ‘, 
which connotes civility and customary modes of processing disputes and securing 
agreements.   I then shift to the ethnographic data from Port Said (with some exceptions) 
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to examine how three nodes within the juridical field - the courts, the police, and legal 
professionals - structure and are structured by dispute resolution and transactional 
practices in the present-day context.   
 






Nodes of Circulation: The Courts, the Police, and Lawyers 
 
 
Like disputants anywhere, Port Saidians are pulled between moral-ethical and 
pragmatic concerns when they conduct business, make agreements, and manage 
situations when things go awry.  This chapter considers the tension between these 
concerns and lays out some of the strategies people employ to resolve disputes or secure 
agreements in ways seen as good and efficacious.  Discursive practices around dispute 
processing and surety practices locate the moral-normative orders to which Port Saidians 
seek to inhere. The phrase bishakl wadi ‘ (in a friendly way) is commonly used to 
describe certain strategies or approaches to private law matters, or as a contrast to what 
has actually occurred (for instance, a situation in which parties did not act ‘in a friendly 
way’ toward one another). 28  The phrase, although multivocal, puts certain practices 
within a moral framework and denies other practices moral value.   
Following this, I move to a discussion of three nodes of law through which 
litigants’ problems and the documents associated with them circulate: the courts, the 
police, and lawyers. In the course of my research I spent a great deal of time in lawyers’ 
offices, at the courthouse observing in the main hall, the courtrooms, and in clerks’ 
offices.  I also observed meetings at the Office of the Experts, which is part of the 
Ministry of Justice.  I only visited a local police station on three occasions, but I often 
heard from litigants and lawyers about interactions at police stations and about the 
                                                
28 This can alternatively be translated as ‘in a peaceable, calm, or gentle way’ (The Hans Wehr Dictionary 
of Modern Written Arabic) 
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importance of police reports for instigating or moving civil cases forward.  In the course 
of this work I observed how the courts, the police, and lawyers all play a role in 
resolution strategies that prioritize mercy, patience, and the constitution of relationships 
and social networks.  Moreover, as I discuss in more depth in chapter six, they circulation 
of documents between these institutional spaces and between people is critical for how 
they accrue meaning, make things happen, and act as mechanisms of translation.  In order 
to situate documentary circulations, however, this chapter will focus on the courts, the 
police, and lawyers as specific nodes in the juridical field.  
The police and lawyers mediate between the people and the law.  Although 
closely linked to state power and legal institutions, these actors are inevitably ‘of’ the 
people, cognizant of and participating in customary strategies of dispute processing.  In 
the historical record and in data from Port Said alike, we can observe the police and 
lawyers as active contributors to the strategies by which legal recourse might be infused 
with a sense of private morality or incorporate customary procedures.  
On the other hand, the courts and the police are leveraged as sources of state 
power to make rights claims efficacious.  The courts, inclusive of bureaucratic 
procedures, practices of judging, and expert review by the Ministry of Justice Office of 
the Experts, are both an institutional space into which my interlocutors bring their 
problems and a form of leverage that can be threatened and rescinded.  I examine some of 
the scholarship on popular uses of the courts in Egypt in order to draw on these insights 
and consider the questions these studies raise before turning to data from Port Said.   
Although the juridical field inevitably transforms problems that enter into it, as 
Bourdieu has noted (1987), how it transforms them is in focus here.  For instance, my 
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consideration of delay illustrates both how delay as a procedural device can be a part of 
constituting ethical justice as well as a source of pressure to expedite rights claims by 
‘wearing down’ the other party.  Delay is a temporal strategy that both creates pressure 
and offers spaces for renegotiation.  As cases wind their way through the courts over the 
course of years, litigants often seek ways to recoup debts and renegotiation solutions 
using alternate means; these alternate means are not simply adjacent to litigation but 
deeply intertwined with such litigation. 
My analysis of the police and lawyering, in Port Said as well as more generally in 
Egypt, also takes account of some of the contradictions and tensions related to involving 
these actors in matters of private law.  Just as the institutional spaces of the courts and the 
office of the experts intersect with extra-judicial modes of dispute resolution, lawyers in 
Port Said see their role in litigation and their relationship to clients as reaching beyond 
that defined in the early 20th century by law reformers.  I examine legal representation in 
Port Said as a broad range of practices inclusive not only of litigation, the production of 
legal documents, and legal advising but also of mediation, advising, and representation in 
what are seen as customary modes.  Lawyers play a critical role in moving disputes and 
transactions between multiple discursive and institutional milieus.  This movement is 
integral to the production of meaningful and efficacious obligations, and in some cases 
for helping clients resolve their disputes  
 
Bishakl wad i ‘  
In matters of private law, people select moments to put the courts to work on their 
behalf.  Many Port Saidians pointed out that it was shameful to go to court for almost any 
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reason because, in part, going to court makes a private matter public.  At the same time, 
they seek to recoup debts, to get a settlement or compensation, in other words to “take 
one’s right” (yukhud ha’uh).  As such, the moral injunction to resolve a dispute 
peacefully and a belief in the appropriateness of solving a dispute bishakl wadi ‘ is often 
in tension with economic need and a sense of legal right.   This phrase is a distinctive 
phrase without distinct referents: to be ‘friendly’ or ‘peaceable’ may reference a diverse 
set of actions.  It was simply posited as the best approach to large and small disputes over 
broken contracts and broken promises, unpaid debts and inheritance rights and the like, 
and involving parties who were socially close (family members, friends, spouses) and 
socially distant (strangers and acquaintances).  Although what ‘friendly’ means is unclear 
outside the context of specific cases and explanations, there are some ethical discourses 
to which it can be linked. 
The phrase bishakl wadi ‘ is attached to ideas of civility, morality, and good 
upbringing.  As Azza, an engineering professor at the local university, put it, it is one’s 
duty as a Muslim to resolve problems bishakl wadi ‘.  Moreover, she noted, Muslims 
believe that all those through ‘the seventh house’ are like family and should be dealt with 
as kin; it is particularly imperative to resolve all issues within the family bishakl wadi ‘ 
rather than through the courts.  By contrast, those who can’t solve things bishakl wadi ‘ 
lack tarb iya (good upbringing), they are among the wretched who “swindle and do tricky 
things to get what they want,” as one older fisherman described it.  Abdel Kader, a 
neighbor, articulated the connection between wadi ‘ resolution strategies and Islamic 
values by pointing out “people here don’t want to go to court, they want to settle things 
quietly amongst themselves because that’s what our religion says.  The Quran is like a 
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manual for the VCR, it’s a manual for our lives, telling us what to do in all situations, and 
we follow it.”  A good Muslim, in other words, resolves all problems with others bishakl 
wadi ‘, guided by his religion.   
Nabil’s description of what he does when he mediates is an example of how 
bishakl wadi ‘ as an ideal moves between legal and normative orders.  Nabil is a local 
supervisor in the Ministry of Education, a rumored secret informer for the government, 
and someone frequently called upon to mediate disputes in the neighborhood or in his 
extended family.  A young woman who lived in his building pointed out that he is well-
respected in the neighborhood not only because he is patient and thoughtful but also 
because he is pious.  Nabil noted that whether or not people “solve their problems in a 
friendly way, a customary way” (yiHalu mashakl bishakl  
wadi ‘, bishakl ‘urfi ) depends on their behavior or manners (sul uk).  He offered an 
example about two sisters and a brother who were involved in a dispute over a building 
they had inherited from their father.  The brother did not want to give his sisters their 
share of the inheritance because, he argued, he had already given them their rights over 
the years by bringing them gifts when he would visit.  Despite this poor excuse – it is 
expected that visitors bring gifts to those they visit – Nabil met with each sibling 
separately and convinced the sisters to forfeit their rights to partial ownership of the 
building.  He described his mediation efforts as convincing them “from a religious 
perspective” (min naHayyat id-din), while also admitting that according to shari‘a it was 
their right to take their share.  “I told them that God will double their share in heaven, He 
will reward them for making peace with their brother.”  His attempt to help them resolve 
their problem bishakl wadi ‘, made moral claims: Nabil exhorted the sisters to be patient 
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and wait for reward in heaven.  At the same time his recommendation directly 
contradicting shari‘a in terms of the laws of inheritance.  It was the sisters’ right, 
according to shari‘a, to inherit.  But it was customary to give up this right and to do so 
was perceived as usual, friendly, and civil; this is not an uncommon practice.29 Following 
this, the family members returned to the office of inheritance matters in the court and 
formally redistributed control of the property according to Nabil’s recommendation.30  
Unsurprisingly, this way of connoting good upbringing and civility is also a 
mechanism by which class distinctions are made amongst Port Saidians and is used to 
depict a kind of social geography of the city.  Al-zuhur, a large sha’bi (literally, ‘popular’, 
with the connotation of middle or lower class) neighborhood on the southwestern edge of 
town is often cited as a place where people don’t or can’t solve problems bishakl wadi ‘.  
This is linked to its demographics, although the specific demographic composition of the 
area is often sub-textual.  Many people who arrived in the post-free zone waves in the 
late 1970’s onward from small towns and villages throughout Egypt, and who are 
therefore not ‘old’ Port Saidians, live in al-zuhur.  For example: 
Some people make problems by hurting themselves [and blaming others].  
Be we are such a kind family you won’t ever find anything like this in our family.  
That would be in al-zuhur. (Marwan) 
 
You’ll find most crimes [in Port Said] happen in al-zuhur.  (CH: Why 
there?) Because most people who live there come from outside. (Donia)  
                                                
29 See, for example Moors (1995).  In addition, Shaham (1997) notes of Egypt in the first half of the 
twentieth century, “In many cases, subsequent to the death of the head of a peasant family, his male heirs 
arranged for the transmission of his property to their control without initiating any formal legal procedure.  
The deceased’s sons (or, in their absence, his brothers or uncles) usually took control of his property.  The 
deceased’s female heirs – such as his mother, wife, daughters and sisters – did not initiate any legal 
procedure to realize their inheritance rights, and their welfare was taken care of by the men of the family.  
This kind of customary familial arrangement tended to break down subsequent to the death of one of the 
deceased’s sons, which harmed the coherence of the extended family” (205).   
30 Although the phrase bishakl wad i ‘ was used primarily by the many Muslims with whom I spoke, it was 
used by Coptic Christian interlocutors as well and is not attached to a strictly Islamically-defined morality.  
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To resolve a dispute bishakl wadi ‘ means, in some instances, achieving 
reconciliation (SulH) by negotiating or through mediation with a third or additional 
intermediaries.   In Port Said, this typically involves bringing in family members or 
neighbors who listen, ask questions, give opinions, and encourage the disputing parties to 
come to some compromise.  At one end of the spectrum mediation might involve 
elaborate efforts to set up a meeting with a local politician to mediate a dispute between 
constituents; on the other end of the spectrum are spontaneous mediations that happen in 
the street following a car accident, as bystanders gather around the cars, calm the drivers 
and discuss who might be at fault and how he should compensate the other party.   In 
addition, as will be discussed below, lawyers sometimes serve as mediators for parties to 
a dispute.  One common thread that runs through the various manifestations of friendly 
strategies is talk.  Talking to one another, either face-to-face or through intermediaries, is 
a gesture of good faith and civility.  Talking problems out is a process by which morality 
and civility are inculcated and good relationships are built in the community; the ability 
and willingness to do so is evidence of these characteristics.   
A middle-class trader reflected on the qualities of a good mediator, the ideal 
procedures of customary mediation, and how living in an urban place made it difficult for 
mediation to be successful. 
In the countryside people know each other because it is like one place and one 
family.  But here, [in Port Said] people live far away from each other because the 
city is big…My mother’s cousin is one of those people who solve problems.  His 
word is strong.  He settles disputes among people without the intervention of the 
police or the court.  His word is like a sword (kalamtuh saif).  However, it is not 
only one person; there are usually three persons in such sessions.  These persons 
are the best people and they are characterized by being religious, kind, highly 
respectful, and rich so that money cannot be a point of weakness and no one can 
bribe them.  Before solving any problem they write two honesty receipts, one 
against each party.  The person declared to be in the wrong pays the amount of 
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money written in the receipt as a compensation for the damage he inflicted on the 
wronged party.  The wronged person can forgive him and refuse to take the 
money, or he can decide to give it to the poor, or he can keep the money.  The 
amount of money is decided by the mediators according to the scale of the 
problem, and only the party declared to be in the wrong will pay.” 
 
Initiating litigation disrupts the flow of non-legal strategies.  At the same time, 
although raising an action in court seems contrary to ‘friendly’ strategies, crossing this 
line is not permanent or irrevocable.  In fact, it can re-instigate efforts to resolve the 
problem bishakl wadi ‘.  Often, a civil action is raised when other resolution efforts have 
reached a stalemate, or when the terms of a resolution have not been followed through 
on.  In response to receiving official notification from the court that one is named in a 
lawsuit, the defendant may redouble his efforts within the bishakl wadi ‘ repertoire to 
assuage the first party.   
 Yet it is also the case that sometimes pragmatic concerns, or even a desire to seek 
revenge on another party, trump the ideal of resolving disputes in a friendly way.  The 
data from Port Said makes clear that my interlocutors are often juggling their personal 
fiscal concerns and their desire to maintain and build social ties, their property rights and 
the moral directive to resolve problems bishakl wadi ‘.      
 
The Courts 
Before moving on to my own data on the Courts of First Instance in Port Said, I 
shall first consider other scholarship on popular uses of the courts in Egypt. There is little 
legal ethnography of Egypt, and scant scholarly discussion about the perception and use 
of the courts in everyday life.  The most prominent examples of such research are those 
of Hill (1979) and Brown (1997).  Both scholars consistently point to the complex 
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strategies Egyptians employ in relation to dispute resolution, including the use of 
customary law, or what might broadly be considered informal dispute resolution and 
mediation processes, in conjunction with state law.  Hill’s work, Mahkama! Studies in the 
Egyptian Legal System, Courts and Crime, Law and Society (1979), describes aspects of 
Egyptian law and procedure, lays out the structure of the courts, and analyzes select 
cases.  Hill provides sketches of sessions in the family court and the types of interactions 
occurring between lawyers, judges, clients, and other court personnel, and devotes a 
chapter to criminal activities and their legal processing by the public prosecutor.   
Most useful for our purposes here, she addresses property law through an 
extensive discussion of a dispute over lease rights to a piece of property near Alexandria.  
She illustrates a process of alternating strategies employed during a number of ‘episodes’ 
of engagement between the parties.   When the dispute arose, the original lease contract 
was consulted, with differing interpretations as to its implications for each of the two 
primary parties; registered letters were sent back and forth articulating expectations 
regarding the contract and the renewal of its terms, a civil case was eventually raised in 
court, and criminal charges were brought in relation to an attack on the property by 
relatives of the renters who tried to forcibly take possession of the property.  Interspersed 
with these legal actions, the three parties (the owner, renter, and the Bedouin watchman 
who became involved because of the attack on the property) met multiple times to discuss 
options regarding a solution to the (by then multiple and interrelated) disputes; some of 
these meetings were presided over by a shaykh acting as mediator.  Although Hill’s data 
is generally under-theorized, she makes an astute observation in concluding:  
Whereas property owners may constantly have litigation in process to protect or 
redeem their property rights, actual settlement will, more likely than not, be by 
 
  68 
means of private negotiation and compromise.  That is, those who have the 
personal relationships at their disposal by virtue of being of the same social status 
do this. [121] 
 
There are some parallels with Brown’s analysis of civil cases. Nathan Brown’s 
work on popular uses of the court and business and the courts, which comprise two 
chapters of his book The Rule of Law in the Arab world, was presumably based on 
qualitative research and offers some detailed analysis of litigant strategies regarding 
sample cases. These cases, as described by his interlocutors, reveal various bargaining 
and mediation strategies that accompany legal action in various types of cases.  Brown 
takes an instrumentalist approach to the study of popular uses of the courts, noting that 
the courts are one tool among many that Egyptians use and that “The extensive use of the 
courts by working- and middle-class Cairenes in marital disputes suggests that the formal 
legal system is hardly seen as the forum of last resort…Yet the courts are hardly seen as a 
forum of first resort either” (1997: 200).  This is a rather broad observation, although he 
seems to be suggesting, based on his discussion of several marital dispute cases, that 
litigants’ strategies involve the simultaneous use of multiple forums.   
The narrowly instrumentalist approach Brown takes doesn’t adequately address 
the social dynamics and mechanics of court usage.  It is not enough to say that Egyptians 
use multiple forums (including formal litigation and informal mediation) in strategic 
ways, because this does not move us closer to seeing how differential access to power 
underwrites particular strategies or the way legal norms and traditions intersect in 
practice, but rather situates parties as equal players and forums as distinct.  Moreover, 
Brown’s argument takes for granted the idea that state law is fixed, rather than shaped by 
usage and interwoven with other legalities 
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Both of these works contribute to what we know about law ‘on the ground’ or as 
an aspect of everyday life, about how Egyptians rely upon plural legalities in seeking 
resolutions and making agreements, and point to the use of particular kinds of documents 
in relation to these processes.  Yet Hill and Brown ultimately raise more questions than 
they answer.  Neither adequately addresses the question of why people combine and layer 
multiple strategies in they way they do. How does the interplay between informal 
negotiation and litigation impact resolution? What are the social implications of making a 
problem into a legal case, or insisting on legal surety rather than relying on a promise? 
Neither do they investigate the mechanisms integral to the movement between legal and 
normative milieus in the process of resolving disputes and securing transactions.  What 
role do lawyers play, if any, in what appear to be ‘customary’ mediation processes?  How 
are the documents in use (contracts, commercial documents) interfacing with other legal 
documents (police reports, legal briefs, experts’ reports)?  
Documents, their production, exchange, and movement between institutions and 
people and between people, as well as actors that operate between the institutional and 
non-institutional realms such as court clerks, lawyers, court-appointed experts, and the 
police are all involved in these processes and yet often neglected.  Litigants do not 
proceed alone but are accompanied in their transactions and disputes by objects and other 
players.  I turn now to Port Said and its courts.    
 Egyptian state law and its courts are a particular kind of resource.  As noted 
previously, Cover argues that law is a “resource in signification” (Cover et al. 1995:100).  
State law is a locus for the contestation and production of social meaning; the authority of 
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its institutions and discourse make it a particularly powerful arena.31  When Port Saidians 
turn to the law in the context of resolving a dispute (by initiating a legal case), or 
preemptively obtain a commercial document to secure an agreement (and, as we shall see 
in later chapters, secure non-monetary agreements in this way as a form of legal fiction), 
they draw upon the power of the state to legitimize and back up their claims even when 
they don’t intend to pursue a legal case through to a judgment.  They deploy state law as 
one source of authority among others, allowing it to transform but not utterly subsume 
the trajectory of a resolution process.  In these types of practices state law is seen not 
merely as a structuring agent, but also as a bargaining and regulatory endowment 
(Galanter 1981).  Galanter shows how this is manifested in the importance of courts as 
“sites of administrative processing, record-keeping, ceremonial exchanges of status, 
settlement negotiations, mediation, arbitration, and ‘warfare’ (the threatening, 
overpowering, and disabling of opponents) as well as of adjudication” (1981).     
While it seems contradictory, it may be the case that Egyptian courts are a 
bargaining and regulatory endowment in part because they are overburdened, viewed as 
inefficient, and to some extent, as corrupt.  According to the Ministry of Justice Yearly 
Legal Statistics report, there were 1,462,897 civil and commercial cases and 124,208 
criminal cases under review in 2002; this massive number of cases was presented before 
a total of 267 Summary and Primary courts.32  More dramatically, Brown (1996) notes 
that the Ministry of Justice reported that more than twelve million cases came before the 
                                                
31 In his discussion of law, Bourdieu (1987) also posits that the juridical field is a site of contestation.  Yet 
he is more focused on arguing that state law is not an ontological entity but rather a site of internal struggle 
for control over meaning; while a useful contribution to thinking about the legal system, he doesn’t address 
broader issues of how law is a site of contestation and signification in society more generally.   
32 Sources: Egyptian Ministry of Justice Yearly Statistics report, 2002-2003, and Egyptian Ministry of 
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courts in 1991, although he points out that the actual numbers are likely much lower.  
While precise numbers may not be available from the Ministry of Justice, it is generally 
the case that the courts are overburdened. This situation was summed up for me one day 
by a lawyer who’d been practicing law for over twenty years in Port Said:  
Well, you find that in one session (galsa) there are about a hundred civil 
cases discussed.  The judge will listen to a few words in each case and take any 
papers related to each one.  After the session and before the next one, the judge 
reviews the papers in an attempt to understand everything about each case and 
then he gives his decision.  In this way, no case is given the proper attention. 
 
In his volume on privatization and legal reform in Egypt, Bahaa Ali El-Dean 
notes that, according to a Ministry of Justice report on the causes of backlog and delay, 
the average civil litigation requires between thirty and forty appearances before the trial 
judges, stretching over three years or more.  Moreover, each step entails some form of 
postponement.  El-Dean proposes that the causes of delay are rooted in a shortage of 
judges, poor case management, the referral of cases to the Expertise Office of the 
Ministry of Justice, and procedural laws governing litigation, which permit extensions 
that “are often abused by litigants to introduce delay” (El-Dean 2002:225).  El-Dean’s 
findings reiterate the assessment of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt 
(AMCHAM), which issued a report to the Egyptian government in 1996 on private sector 
development.  The report addresses, among other impediments to development, rule of 
law issues and noted: “the court system suffers from a lack of staff, poorly trained judges, 
a unreliable enforcement of rulings.  In addition, procedural laws allow for a plaintiff to 
delay proceedings for months and even years by continually extending the discovery 
process” (Rutherford 2008: 208).  Barriers to justice such as those mentioned by 
Rutherford and El-Dean form the rationale for several interrelated long-term legal reform 
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projects funded by USAID-Egypt.  The Administration of Justice I and II projects, 
initiated in the late 1990’s and currently ongoing, were intended to implement changes in 
the courts throughout Egypt including building renovation, improved signage and public 
information, training of judges and clerks, and computerized and coordinated record-
keeping.  The USAID Family Justice project is focused on continued improvement of the 
new family courts and offices of mediation that were put in place in 2004.  Despite these 
major projects, few improvements had been felt in the courts in Port Said by 2005, 
although most recently (2009) some renovation on the building had begun.  Let me take 
up and extend El-Dean’s (and AMCHAM’s) assessment of delay and inefficiency using 
the data from Port Said.   
Poor management of cases is to some extent due to practical limitations: court 
clerks in such important administrative positions as the notification department work 
without computers or adequate filing systems.  Office desks and shelves are piled high 
with folders full of handwritten documents.  Although the courts are beginning to 
undergo the transition to computerization and the storing and sharing of information via 
databases and networking, through a major project funded and directed by the United 
States Agency for International Development, this project was still in its initial phases 
during the period of my research and hadn’t impacted most day-to day court operations in 
Egypt.  One day I sat with Donia, the secretary to the wakil al-niyaba (a representative of 
the public prosecutor’s office) at the Port Said courts.  In talking about her job as an amin 
al-sirr (a clerk responsible for maintaining and recording private documents), she pointed 
out that she wrote everything by hand, both during investigations out in the 
neighborhoods and in the office. I asked about the filing system and whether it was 
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difficult to find requested files for particular cases in amongst the stacks that surrounded 
us.  I pointed out that the windows were always open and asked whether documents ever 
blew away.  She and the two other clerks in the room exchanged a laugh and admitted 
that sometimes they did.  But in general, she assured me, they knew where everything 
was.  Donia took down one bundle, untied the string that held together dozens of thick 
files, and showed me that the stack was of cases originating in one neighborhood, each 
one labeled in neat handwriting with a case number and case numbers grouped in order.  
Despite the appearance of disorder, this office and others with stacks of handwritten files 
adhered to an internal order.  A perhaps unintended benefit of socialist-era government 
employment policies is that civil servants like Donia continue on in the same position for 
decades; their institutional knowledge is integral to accessing information in an obsolete 
bureaucratic environment.   
Yet the absence of computers and databases for storing and sharing case file 
information between offices also means that information can go missing more easily.  
Brown reports that the positions of amin al-sirr and muHDir (bailiff and process-server) 
are perceived as most corruptible amongst court employees.  They are charged with 
“losing key documents, delivering papers to the wrong address, forging signatures to 
indicate that papers were served that actually were not, and failing to find a valid address 
– often in return for a bribe from one of the litigants” (1996:193).  The prevalence of 
these types of activities was confirmed by a number of clients and lawyers in Port Said.  
Michael, a client of Noor’s, had several stories along these lines.  Michael has been 
involved in almost fifty legal cases with his ex-wife over the past decade.  One afternoon 
in early 2006 he arrived at the court to attend to one case when a lawyer greeted him and 
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asked why he hadn’t been at a session earlier that day.  When Michael asked why he 
should have been at the session, he learned that a case in which he was a defendant 
regarding an honesty receipt he claimed to be forged had gone before the judge.  In his 
absence, he’d been found liable and received a three-year prison sentence.  He estimated 
that a clerk had been bribed so that he wouldn’t receive notice to appear in court, and he 
and his lawyer would therefore miss the opportunity to submit evidence and a brief to the 
court in contradiction to his ex-wife’s claim.  He explained: 
The trick is as follows: I have several places where I can stay [apartments 
he owns or rents], and I still have them.  One of these flats is on the beach and I 
go to stay there just in the summer every year.  I don’t go there a lot because it’s 
on a high floor and there’s no elevator.  Yet it’s written in my name [rented or 
owned by him].  When they went to inform me, they went to this flat.  Of course 
they didn’t find me, or anyone, there and that was it.  At the court, I was informed 
[in the notification office] that this was my address.  So the notification is correct.  
But I don’t go there [regularly] so I didn’t know.   
 
He later discovered the notice waiting for him at this address.  His assumption of 
how it came to be delivered there rather than his regular address is based on his 
experience with the courts over the years.  Having suffered (and perpetrated, he indicated 
with a mock-innocent gesture) a similar deceit in the past, Michael assumed that his ex-
wife’s lawyer had bribed someone in the notification department to send the notice to this 
vacation apartment instead of his full-time residence.  The clerk could not be accused of 
wrongdoing because the address was correct, but the strategy assured that Michael would 
not receive it on time.  Because strategies involving ‘losing’ key documents and failing to 
deliver notifications from the court occur with some regularity, Brown points out, judges 
are often willing to delay cases if a needed document is not in the file or a party doesn’t 
appear (1996:193).  This is one of many circumstances that delay cases, often repeatedly.   
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Throughout 2005, the lawyers I mostly rotated between seven lawyers, Mustapha, 
Salma, Noor, Abdullah, Aly, Hamdy and Hossam, all of whom talked to me about their 
cases, introduced me to clients, gave me copies of documents from case files, and let me 
accompany them to court.  These lawyers, and others with whom I spent less time, 
assured me that they were well versed in strategies for delaying cases to the advantage of 
their clients.  These included finding ways to ensure that a case will have to be referred to 
the Ministry of Justice’s Office of the Experts for review of a technical matter. Typically, 
a lawyer will submit a contestation or appeal (Ta‘n) to protest the validity of an aspect of 
the action or claim against their client.  Following this the judge will order a review by 
the expert’s office.  For example, a lawyer might submit an appeal on the basis of forgery 
(even if the defendant did actually sign the document under dispute), contesting the 
claimed value of an agricultural plot or the structural integrity of a building (if the case 
involves a dispute over property).  Like the courts, the expert’s offices are overburdened 
by cases to review; in fact, judges like to refer cases for expert evaluation because it is a 
quick way to remove a case temporarily from the docket.   
Parties to a case and witnesses may have to visit the expert’s office many times 
over the course of a year or longer to give testimony and provide documents and other 
evidence.  For instance, in a dispute over property neighbors may be brought as witnesses 
to testify that a party has been residing at or using the property, or to testify that a certain 
crop has been grown on the land.  Referrals to the office of the experts are a delay 
strategy for the benefit of the judge or one or both parties.  At the same time, these 
mandatory meetings at the office of the experts provide a space in which litigants are 
forced to interact with one another and during which they can voice their claims or 
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willingness to renegotiate.  In other words, these court-mandated meetings often provide 
the opportunity for ‘informal’ negotiation.  The procedures followed in the experts’ 
offices are far less formal than during a formal hearing.   
The experiences of the el-Sayyid family illustrate both of these potentialities of 
expert review: their role in delay and in providing opportunities for negotiation.  Nineteen 
members of the extended el-Sayyid family had been involved in a dispute over inherited 
farmland with one family member, Ramadan, for over twenty years.  Attempts at 
resolution had initially been conducted solely through customary proceedings in the 
village where the property was located.  But in the late 1990’s a lawsuit was initiated, 
which ultimately gave rise to three additional lawsuits involving different sets of family 
members against Ramadan.  According to Dr. Alaa, a nephew of Ramadan, both sides of 
the family were using legal cases to wear one another down.  In order to do so, family 
members regularly introduced new evidence into ongoing cases in order to initiate more 
review processes through the experts’ office.  
On a warm day in June I rode with Mustapha and three members of the el-Sayyid 
family from the courthouse to the south end of town.  After passing through customs we 
drove for another ten minutes or so to reach the south police station (qism shurta al- 
janub).  It was a small, one story building on a dusty plot, an old building with screen 
doors, concrete floors.  We were immediately ushered into the office of the vice inspector 
(na’ib ma’mur).  He sat behind a wooden regulation desk, and a low-ranking officer 
stood next to him greeting us.  Mustapha and I sat on the couch in front of the desk, and 
two of the family members, Dr. Alaa and his uncle, Bashir, sat in chairs adjacent.33   
                                                
33 I relate this because, guided by Samer Shehata’s interesting work on power relations and organizational 
culture in Egypt (2003), I was often keenly aware of where everyone was sitting in such meetings. The 
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After a fair amount of friendly chatter and the serving of soft drinks and tea – it 
was clear that everyone knew one another quite well - Mustapha and Bashir gave 
statements regarding one of the pieces of property under dispute.  Bashir’s report asserted 
that his brother Ramadan had done damage to a piece of land that was under dispute in an 
ongoing lawsuit.  Neighbors had reported recently seeing Ramadan burn and till under 
the crops on this land, after which he’d covered it with hay and brought cows to graze on 
it.  This was apparently a strategy to support his claim to the agricultural expert that the 
land was not usable for agriculture and therefore not as valuable; family members were 
claiming in this case to be owed profits from the agricultural production on the land.   
Bashir’s police report was intended to instigate an investigation by the 
agricultural engineer assigned to the case at the Office of the Experts; he wanted to make 
sure that the engineer promptly resurveyed the land in order to establish that it had been 
recently tilled under before the evidence was difficult to obtain.  The police report would 
be added to the case file, joining other police reports and documentary evidence 
submitted over the years.  Previously the parties to the case had been required to report to 
the office of the experts to give testimony and provide documents (such as deeds, maps 
and receipts) related to the value of the land in question it’s size, what crops were being 
grown on it, and how much was earned yearly from the property, and this police report 
would result in another such meeting.  A police brief is among the many types of 
                                                                                                                                            
seats one takes or is given in an office such as this is often an indication of the relative status of the people 
in the room.  Most institutional offices I visited had a large desk with two chairs in front of it that faced one 
another, rather than the desk, with a small tea table between.  Beyond this there might be any number of 
chairs and couches for others to be seated upon.  Being called up to sit in the front-most chairs is a signal 
that the individual or his/her issue is important; being asked to leave these seats for ones further from the 
desk is a dismissal of sorts.   
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documents introduced as a way to create delays, in that each document instigates an 
additional step in the legal process. 
Hence, the expert review process causes cases to drag on interminably and 
therefore aid litigants by putting indirect pressure on the other party to drop a lawsuit or 
give in and negotiate an informal settlement.  At the same time, the procedures involved 
and the informal setting of these meetings also promote interaction among the litigants 
that create opportunities to put direct pressure on the other party, or conversely to re-
instigate friendly negotiation.  I visited the Office of the Experts four times with members 
of the el-Sayyid family in 2005, and once on my own to interview the supervisor of one 
such office.  On average, the meetings I observed lasted about an hour and were attended 
by Ramadan and his lawyer and a handful of family members from the opposing side and 
their lawyer, although one meeting I attended lasted four hours and was attended by over 
twenty people (which included the litigants and witnesses from both sides).   
In the instances I observed, members of the family, including Ramadan, sat near 
one another on couches and chairs in the small office as the expert asked questions and 
recorded responses on large sheets of paper by hand.  During each of these meetings, 
those present made off-hand comments about the situation, joked with one another and 
bantered.  The expert did not attempt to create a more formal atmosphere but participated 
in the banter while also gathering testimony.  Litigants take these opportunities to show a 
willingness to talk, which can lead to extra-judicial negotiations that may effectively 
resolve the dispute.  This had happened previously with the el-Sayyid family, although 
those negotiations fell apart and family members took their dispute back to court.   
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But the meetings are also a space for asserting authority.  As we left the office one 
afternoon, two members of the family began to fight loudly with one another, screaming 
insults and threats with such ferociousness they had to be physically restrained by their 
lawyers.  These arguments and off-hand insults made during the meetings with the expert 
display tenacity and an unwillingness to compromise or renegotiate.  As Mustapha 
commented following one such heated argument at the experts’ office, the other side 
needs to know that his clients will never bend and that they are prepared to fight for their 
inheritance.   
Procedural laws ease the strategic use of delay and create spaces for extra-judicial 
resolution.  For instance, Abdullah described a case he was working on presently 
involving a mother and daughter who had purchased goods on credit from a small store 
and then found themselves unable to pay the installments.  The shop owner raised an 
action against them in court using the honesty receipts they had signed as surety.  
Abdullah planned not to attend the session, and had advised his clients not to attend 
either; when and if the judge passed a sentence against the mother and daughter, 
Abdullah would in turn raise an appeal to reject the sentence based on the fact that they 
hadn’t been present for sentencing.  The case would take a couple of months to reach the 
appeals court, after which it would take several more months for the case to move back to 
the primary court to receive a date for reinstatement of the original judgment and its 
validation.  By this time, the two women would have had enough time to save the money 
they owed so that they could repay it and have the case dropped entirely.  The delay is the 
simplest way to buy more time to repay the debt.  Although this strategy wastes court 
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time and resources, there do not appear to be any consequences for either lawyers or their 
clients who elect to pursue this course of action.    
Although statistical data was impossible to obtain in relation to false claims of 
forged evidentiary documents as a delay tactic, it is evident from my interviews with 
lawyers, clients, and court clerks that it is an exceedingly common strategy.  Several 
lawyers noted that introducing forgery to delay the proceedings is so common that that 
the Ministry of Justice Office of Experts in charge of forgery claims has become 
increasingly backlogged and inefficient.  Lawyers rely on forgery claims as a procedural 
device to interrupt the proceedings and question the merit of the primary evidence, 
submitting that it was wholly or partially forged in their client’s name.   
I often raised the question to lawyers about what legal deterrents might exist to 
curb the practice.  There are few, it seems.  If a defendant argues that a check, for 
instance, was forged with his signature, the plaintiff is responsible for paying the fees 
associated with the expert handwriting evaluation to prove otherwise.  Therefore, the 
financial penalty lies with the plaintiff and not the defendant, who makes the false 
contestation.  Moreover, the fee for handwriting analysis by the forgery experts’ office is 
variable and calculated as a percentage of the amount of money at stake in the case (for 
instance if the forgery claim is related to a check).  This means that the larger the sum 
stipulated in the document under review, the higher to fee for the plaintiff to prove that it 
is an original, unforged document.   In addition, if a document or signature is found to be 
real after the review process, the party falsely claiming forgery can be brought up on 
criminal charges.  However, Aly, a lawyer with a private practice as well as an 
appointment in the legal department of a local company, insisted that although the law 
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allows this, the judge rarely directs the case to the public prosecutor to pursue charges.  
Typically, the false accusation of forgery only results in a small fine.       
Endless delays and inefficiencies in processing cases are such well known-
features of the Egyptian courts that frustrations manifest themselves in well-known 
parables.  Marwan, a young web designer and primary contributor to a web site on the 
history of Port Said, brought his father and sister to visit my husband and I one evening.  
As we sat with soft drinks chatting about the website, which also serves as a virtual 
community for Port Saidians, the topic of the Egyptian legal system came up.  Marwan 
immediately laughed and, practically in unison, he and his father declared ‘the donkey 
will die!’  By way of explanation, Marwan’s father told me a parable of Goha:  
Goha says he will teach a donkey to speak and give it to the king as a gift.  But, 
the people asked, how is such a thing possible?  It would take forever to teach a 
donkey to speak!  Goha replies that it will take him forty years.  By that time, the 
donkey will be dead, he (Goha) will be dead, and the king will be dead.  So it 
won’t matter! 
 
In other words, Marwan pointed out, if you take a case to court, by the time the 
issue is resolved, everyone involved will be dead so it won’t matter.  In telling me the 
parable, Marwan and his family members expressed a sense of bemused irony about the 
perceived failures of the legal system.  It doesn’t matter, they emphasized, because it’s 
better to work things out bishkl wadi ‘ anyway.   
 Delay is a well-known feature of the Egyptian courts, due to both legal 
strategizing and bureaucratic inefficiency.  This acts as a temporal, as well as monetary, 
source of pressure that litigants can put to use to redirect the course of litigation back into 
informally negotiated settlements in relation to litigants’ pragmatic concerns as well as 
their ethical concerns to resolve problems bishakl wadi ‘.  
 
  82 
The Police  
Although the cases I observed were largely civil cases, it is critical to note the 
way in which the police played a role in leveraging legal authority in disputes.  It is not 
unusual for Port Saidians to establish a property claim by making a statement at their 
local police station, as seen in the el-Sayyid case described above.  The police embody 
both the coercive power of the state as well as a resource for reconciliation and access to 
justice.  As will be shown, these two are not mutually exclusive.  As representatives of 
state power interactions with the police can be productive, allowing people to access and 
marshall state power in their practices of private law.   
Mahmoud’s story may be a point of entry into the contradictory role the police 
play in matters of private law.  Mahmoud is a fixer, the right-hand man to Dr. Ahmed 
Salama, a wealthy physician from a well-known family in Port Said.  Mahmoud has 
worked for Dr. Ahmed since he was a teenager and helps him manage his real estate 
holdings in Port Said, runs errands, does plumbing work, acts as his local driver, and 
performs myriad other tasks complex and menial.  But he and the doctor had recently 
gone through some difficult times and Mahmoud was no longer working for him 
consistently.  Instead, he had begun purchasing used Hyundai cars, fixing them up, and 
reselling them.  Most of his sales were to men who would then register the cars as taxis 
and rent them to other drivers for a small profit, and they typically purchased the cars 
from Mahmoud on credit and paid back in installments.  
One evening we sat in his apartment in al-marwa, a neighborhood of government-
subsidized apartment blocks on the southwest edge of Port Said.  It’s a small and neat 
apartment, filled with the elaborate gold furniture in the style common among young 
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middle-class married couples in Egypt today, and was pleasantly warm for a cool January 
evening. Mahmoud was relating how his father’s cousin had his driver’s license suspend 
following an argument with a police officer. Mahmoud was particularly concerned with 
the situation because this man owed him a significant amount of money and hadn’t been 
able to pay it back following his run-in with the police.   
 
M: I wasn’t there.  But they say that Abu Amru was about to hit a car, so in order 
to avoid this car he swerved and almost hit the police officer’s car.  He didn’t 
actually hit the officer’s car but the officer was vain and shouted at him.  So Abu 
Amru shouted back and they argued with each other.  The officer let him go, but 
the following day he sent for him.  He took his driver’s license, and suspended the 
vehicle from being driven for five months.  He is a family man and at this time his 
daughter was in high school!  The officer didn’t care about his situation.  We even 
sent mediators to persuade the officer to give Abu Amru back his license so he 
can work for others, so that he can live and have money for his family.  But the 
officer was so cruel.  This officer didn’t give him a chance, so he simply couldn’t 
provide for his family.  One day I saw him crying deeply and he told me the 
whole story.  He also told me that he decided to stop the private lessons his 
daughter takes in order to graduate from high school because he doesn’t have the 
money.  I felt so sorry for him and gave him the money to pay for his daughter’s 
private lessons.  Of course, I knew he couldn’t pay the installments [he owed me]. 
 
At this point, we discussed the mediation he arranged with the officer.  Although 
Mahmoud didn’t go down to the police station himself, he had convinced some of Abu 
Amru’s friends and some other police officers to go down and talk to the man.  Despite 
this pressure, the police officer refused to revoke the suspension of Abu Amru’s license 
or the car, and there was nothing left to do but wait for the five months to pass.  
Mahmoud’s experience resonates with other stories I heard in which people sought to 
plead with a police officer to be merciful.  In such an instance the officer is viewed not 
strictly in his administrative or authoritative capacity, but as a moral man whose 
sympathies may be brought to bear on the situation.  
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Our discussion of attempts to mediate with the police officer led to my asking 
whether Mahmoud had ever gone to the police station to file a complaint in relation to his 
business dealings.   
M: Sure, I would go [to the police] if someone hasn’t paid for 4 or 5 months. 
 
CH: What’s the goal of going to the police at that point? 
 
M: Going to the police station is a kind of threat and puts pressure on the client to 
start paying.  Otherwise, I will take the car [back]. 
 
CH: Because the police call them down to the station…?” 
 
M: Well, I fill in a blank honesty receipt that they’ve signed and go to the police 
station.  I inform them that this is a receipt with the amount of money the man 
owes me.  I’m accusing the client of the crime of betraying the trust (khiyanat il-
amana).  Of course, first the police station will call him down and ask him why he 
didn’t want to pay and give him a warning.  If he pays [at that point] everything is 
okay.  But if not, the case goes to the public prosecutor and then to the court.”   
 
CH: How do the police interact with someone in that situation?” 
 
M: They talk to him first in a good way (bishkl wad i ‘) to convince him that it’s 
right to pay one’s debts.  [If this doesn’t work], then they follow the 
procedures…Of course, I don’t actually ever go to the police station myself.  
When there’s a problem, my lawyer handles everything for me. 
 
 Mahmoud notes that the police begin by asserting what they see as a general rule 
– that it is right to pay one’s debts.  In so doing, the police are marking out the 
bureaucratic space of the police station, and their duties, as inclusive of moral 
exhortation.  
Let me first address the police as a source of repressive power before moving on 
to consider their role as mediators.  In Timothy Mitchell’s analysis of peasant politics in 
mid-twentieth century Egypt, the violence perpetuated against peasants by both 
government forces and by the landowning class created an ‘economy of fear’ (2002).  
 
  85 
Mitchell further argues that power imbalances were sustained through local practices of 
regulation, policing and coercion, and such imbalances are in turn mobilized by the 
‘center’ (government forces) for its own purposes.  These levels of coercive power and 
the way they interface are important for understanding the way police power is 
manifested in contemporary Egypt. According to some analysts, such an economy of fear 
persists today.   
In Egypt, the police are under the administration of the ministry of the interior and 
as with other ministerial departments deployment and training of the police force are 
centered in Cairo.  In 2004, President Mubarak delivered a speech on Police Day, during 
which he noted that: “’those in authority, and in a position to implement the law’, should 
be ‘at the forefront of these believers [in human rights]’, since upholding the law and 
implementing it expediently to protect the citizen's rights are key prerequisites for 
successfully applying democracy.”34  Despite Mubarak’s vision of the police as 
protectors of human rights, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, journalists and 
scholars continue to assert that the police rely upon intimidation and force in their 
interactions with the public  .  Torture, abuse, and illegal and unwarranted detention by 
Egyptian police are themes addressed periodically in the international media and in 
reports issued by rights groups.  Moreover, the sensitivity of the state towards accusations 
of police abuse can be seen in censorship practices and the arrest of those who seek to 
                                                
34 As reported in Al Ahram, 29 January-4 February, issue 675, “Human Rights Message on Police Day” by 
Nevine Khalil, 2004. 
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publicize the issue.36  More recently, police abuse has become a topic of concern among 
young bloggers.37 
At the same time there is a history of the police serving more benignly as 
intermediaries between the state and the people in Egypt.  Fahmy (1999) provides insight 
into how Egyptians saw the police in nineteenth century Egypt, analyzing police records 
to draw conclusions about whether or not the police were accessible to people and 
perceived as an avenue to justice or simply represented the oppressive power of the state.  
In the era of Mohammed Ali’s khedival rule (1905-1848) the nascent police force was 
reordered and made into an efficient force that penetrated into most regions of the 
country both rural and urban.  Contributing to the efficiency of this police force was the 
existence of levels of inspectors and spies beneath the police, such as the shaykhs 
discussed by Toledano (1990), who provided the police with information on local 
residents.38  Although on the one hand these elaborate networks transformed police 
stations  “from stationary government buildings into vibrant nerve centers with tentacles 
spreading throughout the urban and rural fabric eventually enabling the state to control 
and manipulate society in unprecedented ways” (Fahmy 1999:351), police stations were 
also a resource for dispute resolution within communities.   
                                                
36 Among other examples, in 1998, the secretary general of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights 
(EOHR) was arrested following a report published by the organization on police abuse of Coptic residents 
of the Upper-Egyptian village of al-Kosheh (Pratt 2000).  
37 See for example “Isolated Incidents” by Karim El-Khashab, Al Ahram Weekly, 7-13 December, 2006, 
Issue No. 823.  Blogs include, for example, www.globalvoicesonline.org, arabist.net/arabawy, and others.   
38 Toledano (1990) examines the different kinds of shaykhs that existed in Egypt’s cities in the nineteenth 
century.  In particular, he compares the work of neighborhood, quarter, and guild shaykhs  and their 
respective relationships to the state.  In contemporary Port Said people often make reference to the shaykh 
al-hara, whose job it is to keep tabs on a particular neighborhood and who can then be called upon as a 
witness to verify accounts involving people’s whereabouts, occupation, marital status, and so forth. See 
also Tollefson, 1999 on policing in the 19th century.  
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 Police stations were sites not only for enforcing law but also for interpreting it 
(361).  Fahmy notes that individuals were aware of the different jurisdictions at their 
disposal, including the mahakim shari‘a (religious courts) and the majalis (councils or 
courts based on Ottoman laws), yet did not assume that the majalis were ‘secular’ and 
thus philosophically distinct from the shari‘a courts.  He points out that “the police with 
their siyisi [political/state] laws were often thought of as a means by which people could 
achieve what they understood as their shar' rights” (362).  This is illustrated by a number 
of cases in which people turned to the police as a first resort in matters relating to 
shari‘a-based rights of dowry (for instance, competing claims between a divorcing 
couple over rights to the household possessions) and inheritance.  The police in such 
cases were approached by individuals to assess the legal basis of their claim to rights and 
charged with pushing the case forward.   
 In this vein, Fahmy argues that police stations were ‘enabling’ sites, where people 
sought refuge, and where they chose to bring conflicts out of a sense that the police 
would assist them in their complaint.  It is easier to see why this was the case in criminal 
cases; the nineteenth century ushered in a new era of forensic medicine that these police 
had at their disposal to draw conclusions about guilt and innocence that could later be 
used at trial.  Fahmy demonstrates that there was an increasing awareness among the 
public that the police station was a site for investigations that relied upon new scientific 
methods, and for investigations that followed procedures designed to ensure a more 
impartial justice.  
 It is possible to see from Fahmy’s work that the police have historically been a 
resource for conciliation efforts.  My own data suggest that the police continue to play a 
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complex intermediary role between the people and the state in relation to contemporary 
dispute resolution practices.  Their authority is built on a connection to state power, yet 
they are simultaneously ‘of’ the people and sometimes attempt to help disputing parties 
reconcile and employ a moral, rather than legal or bureaucratic, language.  
The police are simultaneously feared and the object of sympathy in Port Said.  For 
instance, the police rank and file, in their ill-fitting white summer uniforms with wide 
black belts, and black wool winter uniforms, tend to illicit more pity than worry from 
local citizens. Shurt i who patrol the city are more visible than the less numerous and 
more cloistered high-ranking officers, and these officers are the poorest and least 
educated on the force, often from the rural areas of Egypt.  Although they are civil 
servants and thus receive benefits and a pension, they are poorly remunerated and stand 
little opportunity for advancement. 
Shurt i are sometimes the enforcers of laws that residents perceive as unjust and 
sometimes collaborators in petty illegalities.  Um Rachid’s interaction with a local 
policeman serves as one example.  Um Rachid is a gregarious woman who lives a 
difficult life in a shantytown on the outskirts of Port Said.  Her Palestinian husband 
brought her to Libya for many years while he worked, and then returned to Palestine 
leaving her and their two pre-teen daughters to fend for themselves in Egypt.  In telling 
me about her life, Um Rachid jokingly pointed out that she was a man, holding her 
smoldering cigarette between thumb and forefinger as if to reinforce the image.  As she 
described it, each day she awoke to face another day of trying to survive and raise two 
girls without the support of a husband or other family members.  This included frequent 
visits to Salma’s law office where she was able to fill her water bottles in the office 
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bathroom because her hut lacked running water.  “What can I do?” she asked me one day, 
rhetorically, and with a hearty laugh pointed out that now she was headed for jail. 
We had an apartment, but I was trying to get a government (subsidized) 
apartment.  So just at the time when I left the old apartment, gave it up, to show 
that I had no home, someone else was given the government apartment.  So what 
could I do (Hasl eh)?  I built a hut (‘isha), with these hands.  I brought some 
materials and made a big room for sleeping, a small kitchen, a small bathroom, 
and that was it (khalaS)!  A hut. No water, but a place to live.   But I made it on 
government land, in zir-zara.39  While I was building it, a policeman came along 
and asked what I was doing, saying it was forbidden.  When I gave him 10LE, he 
smiled and asked if he could help!  (she laughs broadly).  But when I finished the 
hut, they came for me anyway and took me to the police, saying it was illegal.  
Now, I’m supposed to go to jail for a year and pay a fine of 1000LE.   
  
 In her discussion of the incident, Um Rachid conveys the idea that offering money 
to a policeman to induce him to overlook her illegal shanty is not particularly unusual or 
risky.  The policeman was seemingly enthusiastic about the exchange, and there was no 
sense of severe consequences for bribing a low-level official.  The policeman represents 
state authority only marginally; for the most part, he is simply a poor shurt i struggling 
like Um Rachid to make ends meet.  Um Rachid and others build their huts in zir-zara 
and in other shantytowns in Port Said with the expectation that they will be able to work 
around official policies that prohibit informal housing in these areas, in part by bribing 
police officers.  The police are shown to protect and assist citizens not necessarily in the 
course of carrying out their duties, but by neglecting such duties and ‘looking the other 
way’.  Only later, when the local administrative office becomes involved and sends 
policemen out to arrest her, do the police come to represent a source of repressive power. 
                                                
39 Zir-zara is an area on the outskirts of Port Said, near the bus station and the industrial areas, where there 
are a number of huts like the one she described.  Zir-Zara runs adjacent to one of the main garbage 
collection areas for the city. 
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 The relative ease with which people often interact with shurt i on the street in the 
course of daily life can be contrasted to visiting a police station, the domain of higher-
ranking officers.  To some extent, connections (wasiTa, in Egyptian colloquial, wasta) 
ease entry into this space of authority.  Ahmed, a young unemployed teacher, explained 
his own view of the local police.  He noted that some time back an acquaintance of his 
had stolen several hundred Egyptian pounds from him by failing to deliver a payment to 
an office as an agreed upon favor.  Ahmed was loathe to report the incident to the police, 
not because he had no documentation to support his claim but primarily because he felt 
nervous about going to the station for fear that he would be mistreated.  He said that he 
finally agreed to go when a friend who was friendly with the police chief promised to 
accompany him. 
Police power as a manifestation of coercive state power inhibits people’s access to 
rights when it prevents them from seeking rightful protection and recourse.  Yet this 
threat, both imagined and real, can also work in one’s favor as a form of pressure.  Police 
briefs manifest police power because they enable the police to take actions such as arrest, 
investigate and interrogate.  In chapter six, I examine police briefs in more depth as a 
type of document that constrains indeterminacy and allows a dispute to move between 
legal and normative orders.   
 
Lawyers 
As can been seen in the preceding discussion of the courts, lawyers contribute to 
the way that law is used as a bargaining and regulatory endowment in the way that they 
direct litigation.  Delay is often crucial in this undertaking, in that it provides both 
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temporal and spatial opportunities for litigants to renegotiate, repay, or devise a new 
strategy.  Yet delay strategies also raise questions about what it means to represent and 
the role of the lawyer.  As sociolegal scholar David Zammit notes in his work on Maltese 
lawyers, “Delays must be related to the ways in which lawyers see their role in litigation 
and these professional understandings are in turn connected to the kinds of expectations 
that their clients have of them” (2009:2).  In the context of Port Said, it is necessary to 
take heed of this sentiment by turning our attention to the way lawyers serve as 
intermediaries between not only the law and their clients but also between state law and 
the normative orders of civility, morality and ‘urf.   
Wael and I typically visited Salma in her Arab district law office on Friday 
evenings, when she met with clients.  Like most lawyers in Port Said, her small office is 
in a low-rise mixed-use building in the Arab district; the unkempt and dark stairwells in 
such buildings belie the neat and efficient order of the lawyers’ offices.  One Friday we 
dropped by just as she was settling herself behind her desk, wiping the dust off the glass 
top with a tissue.  It was perhaps ten at night and she was just beginning work for the day.  
I could see several figures through the darkened glass doors forming a line in the hallway 
that runs the length of her office.  Salma suggested Wael and I take seats further back 
from her desk to free up the two seats directly in front and waved in her first clients, a 
young man named Fawzy and his mother.  Immediately, she started to berate Fawzy, 
complaining in a loud, aggressive tone that she was tired of the whole situation.  “Neither 
one of you is doing right by the other!  You should just get divorced because your match 
was wrong from the beginning.”  She turned to Fawzy’s mother upon making this point.  
“The age difference is too much!  They are wrong for each other, don’t you think?”  To 
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which Fawzy’s mother agreed while shaking her head in a vehement show of 
disapproval; “It’s not right that she’s so much older than him!”  Fawzy is only 25, yet his 
wife Bushra is 47, has been married before, and has children from the previous marriage.   
One of the points of dispute is related to these children; Bushra is insisting on her 
right to stay in contact with them and Fawzy is opposed to her visiting them.  Salma then 
looked at Fawzy sternly and reminded him that he needs to give her marital maintenance, 
the money he agreed to give her each week for the household upon marrying.  “And you 
need to make sure there is food in the house for Bushra and your baby!  This is your 
duty.” Fawzy desperately tried to defend himself, moving nervously in his chair as he 
pointed out that he did buy cheese and milk for them.  But, he argues, she is always 
causing a scene.  “She’s staying at her parents’ house now, I tried to go and see her but 
she raised a fuss so I just left!”  Salma brushed away his defense with a dismissive hand.  
“I’m tired of it, tired of all the stories.”   
Throughout the meeting, Fawzy referred to Salma repeatedly as ‘mama,’ in 
seeming effort to calm her and encourage her to take pity on him.  Suddenly she seethed 
“Why are you calling me mama? I’m not your mother, that’s not my name.  I’m a lawyer, 
you call me Madame Salma or Ustaza Salma, don’t call me mama!”  
I begin with this vignette of Salma’s meeting with Fawzy and his mother in order 
to bring into focus the way Salma interacted with clients, an interaction that wove 
between discursive modes.  She slipped easily between a moralizing tone and one that 
emphasized her professional credentials and status, and when she pointed out his duty to 
his wife and child, the precise basis for this duty was vague.  Did she mean his moral 
duty as a father and a husband?  Or his legal duty according to the marriage contract?  
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This slippage between roles, and Salma’s easy overlap of normative and legal discourses, 
suggests that the practice of lawyering in Port Said is, like lawyering in other contexts, 
fraught with tension between modes and objects of representation.   
In the course of my research I observed male and female lawyers advising clients 
using moralistic discourse, and encountered lawyers serving as informal mediators 
between their client and the other party to a lawsuit.  I also talked to advocates who had 
advised clients about and participated in dispute resolution processes involving 
customary councils and mediations.  Of importance is the fact that these men 
(exclusively) appeared to be drawn in to a customary proceeding due to their status as 
lawyers, and in some instances in their capacity as lawyers, and not simply as a respected 
friend or relative.  This suggests that lawyers may at times help clients as intermediaries 
between customary and codified law. Yet the notion of lawyers as intermediaries does 
not sufficiently capture the complexities of their role, and assumes that legal and 
normative realms are perhaps more distinct might be the case.40  
Legal expertise in Port Said is not limited to legal doctrine and procedure but 
more broadly conceived as inclusive of customary law as well as Islamic norms. The 
history of the development of the legal profession in Egypt is an important piece of the 
analysis of contemporary lawyering because throughout the 20th century the 
professionalization of law has been a process of defining legal expertise as qualitatively 
different from what might be considered ‘traditional’ expertise.  Egyptian law schools 
                                                
40 As Stewart Macaulay (1979) has noted in relation to U.S. lawyers, the classical model of lawyering, in 
which the lawyer ‘applies’ the law and represents clients in an adversarial system, does not reflect 
professional practice.  In fact, ‘Main street’ and ‘Wall street’ lawyers alike bargain, coerce, mediate, and 
are sometimes unclear about the relevant legal norms that might apply in a case.  They are, he suggests, 
influenced by their own values and self-interests, and are interested in representing clients in ways that will 
be satisfying and will contribute to their present and future income. 
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narrowed the definition of modern lawyering to correspond with the changing codes and 
institutions.  Yet it is clear that what lawyers in Port Said do in their work as advocates is 
not limited to or constrained by what they learned in law school.41    
Although the first national law school had been established by the late 19th 
century, graduates were few and most went on to work in the government bureaucracy 
instead of going into legal practice (Reid 1974:29-30).  The shortage of men qualified to 
appear before the new courts meant that in the early years the requirements for 
representing clients were less clear.  In fact, lawyers for both the Mixed Courts and the 
National Courts were initially drawn from among the wukal a‘ and the arda Halgi, the 
former being particularly disreputable paraprofessionals known for their aptitude in 
forging documents, and the latter more innocuous complaint writers who stationed 
themselves outside the courthouses (Reid 1974: 45; Ziadeh 1967: 37-38).42 
In 1912, the National Bar association was formed exclusively for Egyptian 
lawyers, and the membership of the Mixed Bar association was half European and half 
Egyptian by 1930.  From their respective inceptions, the bar associations played an 
important role in the life of a lawyer, and Ziadeh notes that there was a strong sense of 
responsibility by members to maintain a high level of professional conduct and to assert 
the goals and standards of the bar both in relation to the courts and to the wider public 
(Ziadeh 1967: 30).   
                                                
41 In thinking about lawyers in Port Said playing particular roles in relation to ‘urf my intention is not to 
assert that these lawyers are somehow not fully modern.  Rather, I mean to suggest that ‘modern’ lawyering 
is not uniformly linked to state law, its doctrines, institutions and procedures. 
42 There are still complaint writers (‘ard ahalg i) who work outside the courthouse in Port Said; there are on 
average five who set up small desks each day and charge small fees to write up documents for people who 
are either illiterate or who simply don’t know the necessary format for simple documents to be presented to 
various departments in the courthouse. 
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Yet the legitimacy of advocacy as a profession was still under debate in the early 
part of the 20th century, as there continued to be practitioners who “lacked the necessary 
legal knowledge and the ethical standards for a viable profession” (40).  The legal 
profession was still absent a law by which membership rights and duties, standards 
defining the lawyer/client relationship and that of lawyers to the court and vice versa.  
The courts, rather than an independent governing body, maintained control over the issue 
of legal representation (40-41). This situation was partly rectified by the Advocates Law 
in 1893, which has been revised and updated a number of times since then.43  But in the 
context of the establishment of the rule of law amidst a multiplicity of jurisdictions and 
courts, sweeping changes in the legal codes, and the process of narrowing the scope of 
Islamic legal jurisdiction, the professionalization of advocacy was gradual, hard won, and 
fairly recent.    
Throughout these decades, a definite line was beginning to be drawn around what 
constituted a lawyers’ work and what did not.  This is revealed in the original 1893 
version of the Advocates Law, which stipulated a prohibition against lawyers pursuing 
activities that might degrade the profession (Ziadeh 1967:42-43).  While what pursuits 
this might specifically refer to is unclear, what is clear is that there were standards by 
which a lawyer need abide in order to be constituted as part of the professional cadre.   
These standards were implemented not only through the Bar Associations but also 
through legal education, and throughout the early twentieth century, legal training in the 
national law schools was increasingly refined as a discipline.  
                                                
43 This law included stipulations about the secrecy of clients’ business, fees, and the requirement of legal 
diplomas, which was only overlooked in cases where muH am un (lawyers) were recognized as having status 
equivalent to degree holders by virtue of years of practice (43).  This exception was gradually done away 
with as these lawyers retired.   
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Although there is little except journalistic attention to the movement of women 
into the field of law, the gradual inclusion of women in the profession was part of early 
twentieth century battles to expand women’s economic, social and political rights.  While 
many supported women’s education as an important component of a modernizing nation 
– women were responsible for nurturing and educating the new generation – there was 
still widespread resistance to the idea of women in the workplace and particularly in such 
domains as law (Baron 2005).  Despite this, the first Egyptian female lawyer was 
admitted into the syndicate in 1933, followed by handfuls of others, although the first 
significant cohort of female lawyers didn’t emerge until after the 1960’s (Rizk 2004).   
Moreover, until Nasser came to power in 1952, the legal profession was primarily 
the domain of the upper class and exclusively reserved for men.  Most lawyers hailed 
from well-off families, a trend that was exacerbated by the high fees for legal education 
throughout the first half of the 20th century that excluded qualified but poor students.  But 
following the revolution, Nasser sought to make education more egalitarian and set in 
motion a merit-based educational system that enabled students from all backgrounds to 
pursue law.  Along with other measures to facilitate women’s entry into fields previously 
closed to them, such as politics, the Nasser era is also marked by increased access for 
girls and women to secondary and higher education.   
In Egypt today the qualifications to enter a Faculty of Law, determined by 
placement in the General Secondary School examinations, are less demanding than many 
other faculties, such that students often enter law school not by intention but because 
other faculties are closed to them.  This means that the sheer number of lawyers has 
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grown exponentially since the 1950’s, that more students come from middle class and 
poor socio-economic backgrounds, and that academic standards have decreased.  
Legal expertise, in light of these socio-educational shifts, has become accessible 
to more individuals who decide to enter into the legal profession. As Shalakany notes, as 
of 2006 there were 32,000 law students enrolled in Cairo University Law School across 
three sections: French, English, and Arabic.  The vast majority of these students are 
enrolled in the Arabic section, the least prestigious, which graduates approximately 5,000 
students each year (2006:851).  Judging by the number of law graduates alone, (and even 
taking into account that some percentage of these graduates will pursue careers outside of 
law), many more citizens have access to the services of lawyers than was true in earlier 
eras.  
It is likely the case that the increase in female lawyers throughout the second half 
of the twentieth century, in conjunction with increasing numbers of NGOs that address 
women’s rights and access to justice, has translated into greater access to legal 
representation for women in particular.  At the same time, based on observations at the 
courhouse and according to the Port Said lawyer directory, which is updated annually, 
there are far fewer practicing female lawyers compared with male lawyers.  The large 
number of young female legal trainees that could be found in law offices and at the courts 
assisting established lawyers in 2005 and 2007 is not necessarily an indication that this is 
changing; female trainees seem more likely than their male counterparts to leave the 
profession when they marry or to pursue other careers.  Finally, based on my own 
observations, there doesn’t appear to be a clear trend in relation to the gender of clients 
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and the gender of their representatives; there are similar occurrences of same gender and 
cross gender lawyer-clients pairings.   
Moving away from the development of the legal profession and broadening 
access to legal representation, I now move to consider the forms of knowledge that 
lawyers are expected to possess in order to be considered an effective advocate.  To begin 
with, Egyptian law students take very similar courses at the different Faculties of Law, 
and all courses throughout the four years of enrollment are required.  This means that law 
students do not specialize but are generalists, and the curriculum, which is also unified 
across French, English, and Arabic sections, includes various fields of public and private 
law44 with four required courses in shari‘a focusing on the codified laws of marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance (Shalakany 2006:852).  At the same time, many of these students 
graduate with a degree in law unequipped to begin a career in the legal field because the 
quality of legal education suffers from the sheer number of students.  
From what I observed, to be considered a good lawyer in Port Said one must 
move easily between common sense and legal discourse, and be both ‘of’ the client and 
‘of’ the law; this, I would argue, is the case for both male and female lawyers.  In Hannah 
Pitkin’s (1967) rendering, lawyers’ representational practices encompass both ‘standing 
for’ the law and ‘acting for’ the client.  Lawyers are expected to know the law and be 
savvy in how they move cases through the courts.  At the same time, most lawyers are 
small-firm and solo lawyers who develop personal relationships with clients and who 
operate within a very small and socially conservative local context. Most of the lawyers I 
spent time with in Port Said have caseloads full of petty disputes between spouses or 
                                                
44 For example, courses covers trade law, maritime law, landlord/tenant laws, laws of evidence, 
administrative law, tax law, arbitration, labor law, and so forth.  On Egyptian legal education, see also 
Qashqoush 1991.  
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neighbors or landlords and tenants, cases in which parties have relatively weak legal 
grounds for a case against the other but feel a strong sense of right.  They are ‘acting for’ 
their clients by virtue of taking these small cases, for which they will receive little 
remuneration.45   
Their willingness to take on such petty cases can be viewed as one mechanism by 
which they build local credibility.  By committing their time and resources to such cases, 
and in some instances working pro bono or in exchange for services or the long-term 
prospect of favors, lawyers acquire a good reputation.  By and large, lawyers are 
expected to empathize with clients’ difficult circumstances, and to take on their 
‘problem’ cases because they represent deeper social and economic imbalances.  For 
instance, in discussing the case of Um Rachid and her illegal hut, Salma noted defiantly:  
“Why did she get arrested, when there are others who built on government land without 
permission as well? She has bad luck.”  As she pointed this out to me, Um Rachid sat 
between us, listening intently.  Salma’s alignment with her clients’ feeling of having been 
wronged, whether by a spouse, an official, or the imagined state, is a way of articulating a 
shared sense of social justice.  Lawyers not only talk to clients about their problems in a 
moral register (as we see Salma doing) but also embrace visible symbols of piety.  
                                                
45 It was difficult to obtain information from lawyers about how much compensation they receive for 
different types of cases; despite standardization of fees it seems that there is a degree of flexibility in how 
much lawyers charge based on the ability of their clients to pay.  Many clients pointed out that along with 
paying monthly retainer fees, lawyers were always calling to request small sums of money to cover fees 
assigned by the court to initiate certain proceedings.  Yet all but the most successful lawyers seemed to be 
earning a modest wage based on their ability (or inability) to pay phone and other bills and the relative 
simplicity of their offices, and they pointed out that some clients cannot afford to pay except through 
bartered services and favors but they accept their cases in spite of this.    
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Prominently displayed copies of the Quran and Islamic calligraphy decorate their offices, 
and all of the local Muslim female lawyers wear the hijab.46    
This is not to say that lawyers in Port Said, like lawyers anywhere, aren’t also 
sometimes considered to be untrustworthy and greedy.  Mahmoud mentioned one day 
how difficult it is to find a good lawyer.  He changes lawyers frequently, he said, because 
many of them are inclined to ‘sell the litigant’.  In other words, if the other party to the 
dispute were to approach Mahmoud’s lawyer and offer to pay him to undermine the legal 
case, his lawyer might ‘flip’ and the case would go nowhere.  Turning his palms upward 
in a gesture of frustration, Mahmoud asked, rhetorically, how it is possible to respect 
lawyers or doctors when neither of them is merciful (raHim)?  Mahmoud emphasizes that 
a lawyer’s credibility is tied to his willingness to be merciful, and moral valuation.   
Both male and female lawyers also take a highly personal approach to their 
interactions with court personnel.  In the process of translating clients’ problems into 
viable legal cases, they rely on relationships at the court to get the result they want for 
their client.  This is aided by the fact that work in the legal profession tends to run in 
families in Port Said, so that one family may include both lawyers and clerks.  Submitting 
documents to various offices within the court, negotiating with the police when a 
complaint is filed or a client is brought down to the station, and interacting with lawyers 
representing the other party in the main hall and the ‘syndicate tea rooms’ of the 
courthouse are all opportunities to gain leverage through networks.47  While the purpose 
                                                
46 This was also the case for the Coptic Christian lawyer I spent time with, Noor.  She had small religious 
statuettes on her desk and among the small gifts she gave me were cards depicting saints.   
47 In the Port Said courthouse, there is a series of rooms off the main hall dedicated to the lawyers’ 
syndicate, including the president’s office, and a sitting room for female lawyers and one for male lawyers.  
Between sessions, lawyers often gather here to talk, exchange information, strategize, and buy one another 
soft drinks and tea.   
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of client meetings is to advise, strategize, and nurture the lawyer-client relationship, visits 
to the court are about making things happen.  Lawyers go to the court to keep a case 
moving forward.   
When I asked lawyers directly about whether relationships with court personnel 
were important to what they did, most vehemently noted that this was of utmost 
importance. Mohammad A. noted: “A woman said she was a partner with her husband in 
a company, and the husband folded the company and took the profits.  So I went to many 
different departments in the court to get information on this company.  There are a lot of 
clerks who can help here – they can give me some documents and details I need because 
they like me and want to help.”  Mustapha also addressed this in reference to a question 
about how his good reputation in the local law community helps his work.  He pointed 
out that: “Sometimes I go to the public prosecutor and ask to read the brief and often they 
don’t want to give them to other lawyers because maybe they’ll change something in the 
brief, forge it, or they won’t even let them in the room with the client.  But they let me, 
because of my police connections.”   
Hossam reiterated the importance of being able to make things happen on a case 
by getting in good with clerks in the various offices at the court. “They take money.  And 
as much money as you give them, this is as much service as you will receive.  So if you 
don’t pay a bribe (rashwa), everything will take it’s time and be official.  But with 
money, something can take five minutes instead of hours or days or more.”  Along with 
the importance of connections amongst clerks, lawyers need to be able to build bridges 
with others in the justice system, including the police and the judges.  Sharihan, another 
young lawyer, pointed out that female lawyers are known to be particularly adept at 
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influencing the police to release clients being held at the station.  Judges as well are often 
‘too shy’ to refuse the request of a female lawyer who wants to delay a hearing or to have 
certain evidence dismissed, she suggested.  Although her influence over judges may be 
unique even among female lawyers, the underlying point is that she and others are very 
cognizant that their ability to ‘work’ the system at various levels is critical to being an 
effective intermediary.  As such, lawyers have the ability to make things happen on a 
legal case not only because they understand legal procedure, but also because they have 
connections at the court and at the local police stations.  They know the unwritten rules 
and have, over time, developed relationships with clerks and other gate keepers who can 
assist them in moving their case forward.    
In client meetings, lawyers are often representing, alternately, the law and 
common sense. They translate legal concepts of right and obligation into a layperson’s 
moral discourse, and explain legal procedures in shorthanded, concrete terms in order to 
simplify matters for clients who lack legal expertise. They also act as liaisons, shifting 
easily between the world of the court and the client.  In court, they represent the client 
before the judges, deploying a legal language that displays their legitimacy and right to 
stand before the judge in the capacity of advocate.  And in the warren of offices that 
surround the courtrooms, they cajole, flatter, and bribe their way through red tape to keep 
a client’s case from getting lost among the stacks.  Lawyers help a case move more 
efficiently through bureaucratic channels by building and maintaining close ties with 
court personnel.  
In addition, lawyers in Port Said are expected to have a sense of customary 
practices of dispute resolution, to advise clients with these practices in mind, and are 
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sometimes requested to play a role in the proceedings.  Mustapha, Hassan, and Galal are 
typical of most lawyers in Port Said in that they have essentially solo practices; Hassan 
and Galal have one or two junior lawyers in their offices, and all of them regularly have a 
law intern.  None specialize in any particular branch of the law, but tend to take any 
viable case that comes through the door, civil or criminal.  That being said, Mustapha is 
regarded as a particularly astute criminal lawyer, and Hassan represents a lot of 
employees in labor disputes.  
I begin with Mustapha and the el-Sayyid cases mentioned previously.  His 
primary client and representative for the family is Bashir, and the defendant is the 
Bashir’s youngest brother Ramadan.  The dispute began around 1984, upon the death of 
the father, but was only moved into formal litigation in the late 1990’s.  Prior to that it 
was addressed entirely through wadi ‘ and ‘urf i processes such as negotiation and 
mediation.  The dispute revolves around land plots inherited from their father, upon 
which Ramadan has ‘laid his hand’, or claims ownership of due to the fact that he was 
charged many years ago with managing the plots by his siblings who moved away from 
the village. Thus, despite the fact that the dispute now takes the form of related but 
separate lawsuits, family members attempts at customary arbitration in the past that 
failed.   
At one point during one of many conversations about this dispute Mustapha 
pointed out to me that Bashir had come to him recently and asked his advice about 
whether or not he should agree to yet another attempt to work out a compromise through 
a majlis ‘urfi in the village, which Ramadan had proposed.  Mustapha and Bashir 
discussed the possible benefits and drawbacks of participating, and in the end, Mustapha 
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advised his client not to agree to the arbitration session.  He argued that Ramadan might 
find a way to cheat and take unfair advantage in a customary session, and might attempt 
to ‘buy’ someone from their side, to pay them off in order to form an allegiance that 
would bias the arbitration in some way.  Mustapha convinced Bashir that he and his 
family would have a better chance of winning their cases if they kept them in the courts.   
Bashir’s expectation is that Mustapha knows what a customary arbitration 
involves, and the risks and benefits of it, to the extent that he can offer wise advice.  
Because Mustapha is from the village, he is intimately familiar with customs there. As his 
lawyer, Mustapha also knows the history of the el-Sayyid cases, and is aware that the 
family members have tried customary arbitration and various kinds of informal mediation 
in the past.  In fact, Mustapha helped arrange an informal mediation with a local 
politician some years prior.  He also knows where the cases stand in the courts, and what 
potential stages of the lawsuits remain.  Bashir is drawing upon Mustapha’s legal 
expertise, and relies upon him as a legal advisor.  Simultaneously, he is able to assume 
Mustapha’s familiarity with custom and customary law because they are both originally 
from ‘the village’.   
Hassan graduated from the prestigious Faculty of Law at Cairo University in 1973 
and has been in practice since then.  He has been asked on a number of occasions to act 
as arbitrator in customary sessions in different villages in the Dakhaliya, the governorate 
where his family is originally from, and has agreed to do so many times.  In the course of 
our conversation, when asked whether knowing about customary law is part of being a 
lawyer, Hassan shrugged and simply said, “we have to know it.”  He also pointed out to 
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me that ‘urf was “out of the law, not in the law, [and] something we do in the small 
towns.”   
Like Mustapha, Hassan is originally from the village, in his 60’s, and is widely 
perceived as ethical, respectable, and pious.  At the same time, he is locally known as a 
wise and successful lawyer.  Unlike some, he is not rumored to employ dishonest tactics 
to win a case – he is often described as ‘one way street’, or honest.  He is considered to 
have good relationships at the court and to know the law and how to use it well on behalf 
of his clients.  Hassan has also been involved in politics through the lawyer’s syndicate, 
publicly supporting candidates for the national bar, and has written articles for the local 
papers and at least a dozen books on social justice issues.  As such, Hassan is not only a 
well-known legal expert, but also known as someone who is concerned with politics and 
issues of justice more broadly.   
He has actively participated in customary arbitrations as Hakim on more than one 
occasion.  And like Mustapha, those clients who asked Hassan to participate or advise on 
these matters did so out of a consideration for both his legal expertise and for his 
familiarity with customary arbitration – so again, based on the expectation that he has 
access to types of knowledge that set him apart from and above his clients, and types of 
knowledge that link him to them as someone with shared values and understandings. He 
also pointed out that lawyers are often asked to participate in majalis ‘urf i in order to 
‘prepare documents,’ which I’ll discuss more in the following.     
 Galal graduated from the law faculty in Mansoura in the Delta region about 
twenty years ago.  Although he is a successful lawyer, as evidenced by the dozens of 
phone calls regarding cases he would take during our meetings and by his new personal 
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computer, he is not thought of as particularly powerful or well-connected like Mr. Hassan 
and Mustapha.  He is business-like, and unlike many lawyers doesn’t tend to bring 
morality or religion overtly into the way he advises clients.   
In 2006 a client named Ashraf asked Galal to accompany him to his home village 
outside of Ismailiya, to take part in a customary arbitration between he and his brother. 
Ashraf and the brother were in dispute over the boundaries of some inherited farmland, as 
well as the profits being earned from crops grown on the disputed land.  Galal agreed to 
go, and describes the session as follows; in some of what he says, Galal appears to be 
speaking in the hypothetical, but upon subsequent conversations it became clear that he 
was specifically describing the session he participated in:  
We went to the village, and there was one man who acted as the arbitrator, 
and I was there too, I was the scribe, I wrote down what was said.  The man who 
is the arbitrator must rely on religion for this (role), he must speak and rely upon 
the words of God in order to find the right solution.  He will begin by making an 
initial speech – he will say this before the two sides have the chance to give their 
stories.  And it might go something like this: You say that this man owes you 
money and the Quran tells us this about debt.  The prophet instructs us to obey 
our agreements and follow through on them, etc.  He will open it by quoting a 
specific aya from the Quran that deals with the problem at hand, so one dealing 
with marriage if the problem is marriage, etc.  And then he will invite the two 
men to give their full sides of the story. They will first swear on their consciences, 
and in the name of god (aHlif bilallah) that what they say is true.  
 
 
In discussing the proceedings, Galal noted that there are sometimes witnesses 
participating but in this case, there were no formal witnesses, only one arbitrator, and one 
guarantor for each brother.  The guarantors, he noted, should be rich, so they can actually 
pay the debt if the party to the dispute can’t; in this case, the guarantors were both men 
who lived in the village, rather than friends or family members brought from Port Said.   
He then went on to describe how the session ended:  
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So after they came to a solution, and I wrote down the agreement, we 
brought it back to Port Said and brought it to the court to make it official.  Then, 
after this, if either side fails to abide by the agreement, the police can be brought 
in.  It is now an official, legal agreement, and not just ‘urf i. 48 
 
Galal pointed out that he didn’t actually take the document to the notarization 
office in the court, but rather to the judge, who signed it after verifying that both parties 
to the agreement had signed, and sent it on to another office in the court.   Following 
completion of the notarization process, Galal received the document back again from a 
clerk at the court and gave the original copy to his client and a photocopy of the 
agreement to his client’s brother.   
Galal admitted that this was the first time he had been a participant in a customary 
arbitration on behalf of a client.  So unlike Hassan, he was not necessarily asked to play a 
role based on his prior direct experience with customary arbitration.  Further, he doesn’t 
note any ties to a village, but insists that he and his grandfather’s father, are urbanites, 
part of the original residents of Port Said.  Despite the fact that he does not acknowledge 
a familial connection to village life, Galal’s clients assumed his familiarity with ‘urf and 
asked him to play an important role in the proceedings. Galal was asked – and paid a fee - 
by his legal client to witness and document the customary arbitration.   
In essence, his clients seek to use Galal’s legal expertise to produce a legally 
binding customary agreement.  In a customary arbitration there are a number of ways to 
guarantee implementation of an agreement, as discussed previously; ideally, the word of 
the participants, given in oaths taken before God and conscience, suffice.  Yet verbal 
agreements require a level of trust in the other party that was perhaps lacking in this 
                                                
48 The agreement stipulated that the boundaries of land held by Galal’s client were to be moved back to 
enlarge his brother’s plot, but that the brother would be responsible for paying him 10,000LE, the estimated 
value of the crops already planted there. 
 
  108 
instance, and in other instances where customary arbitrations are ‘backed’ by 
customary/commercial documents, by temporary trusts, or by guarantors.  This suggests, 
first of all, that individuals don’t always perceive the courts to be a particularly effective 
medium for adjudication and determining responsibility in the context of a dispute.  
However, they may still be useful for backing up resolutions reached through other 
means.  The courts are potentially more able to force implementation of an agreement.  In 
this case, should Ashraf’s brother or the brother’s guarantor fail to pay the money owed, 
Galal can help his client raise an action against his sibling or the guarantor.  At the same 
time, if Ashraf does not shift the boundaries of his farm plot as agreed upon, his brother 
can also initiate a legal process.  The original customary agreement serves as a piece of 
evidence usable by both parties.  Notarization or legalization of the customary agreement 
transforms it into a piece of evidence that is legally stronger and less likely to be rejected 
or ignored by the judge should the need to litigate arise.  
Galal bears the responsibility, imbued upon him because of his legal expertise, to 
have the document ‘officialized’, and in so doing transforms it.  He says:  “It is now an 
official, legal agreement and not just ‘urf i .  An ‘urf i agreement, verbal or documented, 
does not bear the same weight as an ‘official or legal’ agreement, Galal points out, even if 
the agreement emerges from within a customary session that his clients and their relatives 
willingly participate in and agree to honor.  Galal’s role as scribe was critical for 
introducing the idea that the force of law would back the implementation of the 
arbitration agreement.  Because his clients are constituents of their home village, as well 
as in the legal jurisdiction of Port Said, Galal makes sure that the agreement is binding in 
both contexts.   
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Hence, lawyers may at times help clients as intermediaries between customary 
and codified law, and find ways for people to use them simultaneously, in overlapping 
ways that make both the codified and the customary more efficacious.  The ‘urf i 
agreement becomes more binding with the force of state law behind it, and the 
legalized/formalized version of the agreement is less likely to be contested because it was 
produced through a customary process and hence bears a legitimacy it might not 
otherwise have if a judge, even a family court judge, issued a decision in the case. the 
role they play is, in the instances described to me, related specifically to their expertise 
and skills as lawyers, and not, as Nielsen (2004) suggests, to the fact that they are simply 
well-respected men of the community.49  This is evidenced most clearly by the situation 
Galal describes, but also through the examples involving Mustapha and Hassan.  Rather, I 
posit that it is precisely because of lawyer’s legal training and experience in the courts 
that they are sometimes asked to be present at customary assemblies.  In particular, 
lawyers are savvy to the kind of paper trail that must be constructed, and have the ability 
to ‘officialize’ documents through the court, in order to guarantee that clients are able to 
‘take their right’ in court should the need arise.   
 
Conclusion 
Lawyers’ expertise is produced and authorized through everyday interactions with 
clients, in which they advise, coerce, nurture, and mediate in ways that resonate with 
                                                
49 Both Nielsen and Stewart address the issue of lawyers’ participation in customary sessions, and their 
discussions provide a backdrop to my own data.  Nielsen, for instance, notes: “…in cases where 
professional lawyers appear on the council, they do so on account of their personal standing and not their 
professional experience” (2004:364).  Stewart’s work in the Sinai presents a slightly different picture.  
Lawyers are included in customary proceedings in varying capacities; in one example, the lawyer is 
formally an attorney for the plaintiffs in a case of theft, having also been a plaintiff in the preliminary 
customary trial.  In other words, his role shifted, but in one stage of the customary preceding, he was acting 
as a representative on behalf of the victims (Stewart 2003:248). 
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local values and lend credibility.  At the same time, lawyers demonstrate their fluency 
and mastery over a specialized knowledge set largely inaccessible to average Egyptians, 
and link themselves with the rule of law in their depiction of resolutions and obligations.  
Knowledge of the set of practices broadly encompassed within customary law, 
and the right to represent clients participating in such processes, were not part of the 
narrowing definition of advocacy throughout the 20th century.  Customary law is a ‘lay 
person’s’ domain rather than that of a legal specialist.   In spite of the struggles to 
delineate and constitute the domain of legal expertise, to brand as professionals only 
those with mastery over this specialized knowledge, some contemporary lawyers include 
in their definition of lawyering the willingness to both understand and participate in 
customary arbitration processes.  
Litigation practices are consistently inflected with extra-legal concerns to enact 
justice that is personal rather than impersonal.  In local parlance, litigants are often 
concerned to resolve disputes bishakl wadi ‘.  Although its referents are unclear, the 
phrase expresses the general ideal that practices of private law should exhibit moral and 
customary sensibilities.  The courts, the police and the legal profession all have unique 
potentialities to inflect legal recourse with such ethical and moral gestures.   
I have focused on these three components of the juridical field because they are 
the primary nodes through which customary/commercial documents circulate after they 
are produced.  Although typically written, or rather filled in (most are pre-printed forms, 
as will be discussed in chapter four) in private space like homes and offices or in the 
semi-private space of retail stores, once inscribed such documents begin their movement 
outward through various channels.  Documents are brought to, and produced in, police 
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stations, they pass through lawyers’ offices, and they enter the courts in case files as 
evidence or supporting documentation.  Although there are many instances in which 
customary/commercial documents never leave the desk drawer of a home or office and 
still play a role in making obligations effective, there are many other instances in which 
the power to effect an agreement or course of action that has stalled is contingent upon 
their circulation.  Moreover, as I have sought to show, the bureaucratic spaces through 
which they move produce effects and provide opportunities for the reinsertion of private 
moral considerations. 
In the following chapter, I move on to consider Port Said and its local specificity 
in more depth.  The types of transactions and dispute settlement practices occurring in the 
juridical field as described above are also occurring in a local historical context. Taken 
together they situate and shed light on contemporary practices of private law and 













Port Said, Traders, and Credit 
 
Practices of private law are historically situated and context dependent.  As such, 
it’s necessary to consider the research locale, its population and economy in more detail.  
Port Said has its own unique history, having undergone a number of significant 
transformations since the late 19th century.  It is also a young city relative to other parts of 
Egypt and as a gateway city between Africa and Asia at the head of the Suez Canal is 
often described as cosmopolitan.  Although it hosted a large European population in its 
early years, over time a large Egyptian merchant class emerged.  There was one major 
shift in the 1950’s when Europeans began to leave the city after the Suez Canal was 
nationalized and another in the 1970’s when Port Said was designated a Duty Free zone 
and Egyptians migrated to Port Said in large numbers from rural towns.  These 
demographic changes and the economic policies that produced them, I argue, have made 
and remade the meanings of community over the decades, with implications for the local 
trading practices as well as for private law and dispute resolution practices generally.   
   In the second half of this chapter I address local economic practices among 
traders and local residents.  I begin by thinking about the development of different forms 
of credit in Egypt to contextualize local and small-scale credit.  One theme that arises is 
the prevalent tension between impersonal and personal relationships in crediting 
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arrangements, a tension manifested in surety practices.  I link historical trajectories with 
crediting and economic practices in order to think about the conditions of trust and risk. 
 
Global/Local Imaginings of Port Said 
 Port Said is a cosmopolitan maritime world city of historical import.  At the same 
time, Port Said is a smallish city in the hinterlands populated by recent migrants from the 
Egyptian countryside.  This contradiction runs through depictions of the city and 
encapsulates the complications of defining what kind of place Port Said is today.   As 
Cartier notes (1999), this is not an uncommon feature of world cities: although one might 
characterize such cities as Bombay, Buenos Aires, New York, and Singapore as 
emblematic of globalizing processes, not all areas of these cities are defined by outward-
looking worldviews that exemplify humanistic cosmopolitanisms.   
 Port Said came into being with the Suez Canal.  Before the canal, the city was not 
on the map in a literal sense.  An early Greek immigrant to Egypt describes the area in 
1862: “[I]t was a wide, sandy place, where not a single man tread, and it was in its initial 
form like a playing field, an unknown, uninhabited place.  In the winter, the sea and lake 
waters flood and cover the land and you find nothing here except for shellfish coming out 
of the sea” (El-Kady 1997:32).  After obtaining a concession from Said Pasha, the 
Ottoman ruler of Egypt at the time, French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps designated this 
strip of coastline, hemmed in by the Mediterranean Sea and the sprawling Lake 
Manzalah, as the northern entrance to the canal and broke ground in April of 1859.50  
                                                
50 As historian Zacharay Karabell notes, at the time the feasibility of the canal was unknown since none of 
this size or scope, connecting two seas, had ever been built, and there were myriad engineering concerns to 
be addressed.   Lesseps and Said both favored the direct route between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, 
although others involved in the plan felt that an indirect route, which would use the Nile to bring boats 
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Engineers and managers were brought from England and France to oversee the 
excavation.  Manual laborers, on the other hand, were conscripted through the corvee 
system of mandatory temporary labor from among the Egyptian fellahin (peasants, or 
farmers), and numbered more than 60,000 at the peak of the excavation prior to the 
introduction of mechanical excavators.  (El-Kady 1997; Karabell 2004).   Most of these 
laborers returned to their villages when their conscription ended.  However, as the canal 
project neared completion, and the city of Port Said began to take shape, some remained 
and comprised part of the original population.  Egyptian farmers came from the nearby 
delta areas to sell vegetables, poultry, and other supplies to the company; although they 
began by making short trips to sell supplies, this population gradually took up more 
permanent residence.   
 Sitting in my living room one day, with the entrance of the canal visible from our 
window, Mamduh, a local historian and preservationist, related a version of local history 
I’d heard from other Port Saidians. In the early years, he pointed out, Port Said was a city 
for provisioning (tamwin): poultry and vegetables and fish for the canal workers, and 
later, when the canal was finally completed in 1869 and ships began to traverse the 
isthmus, coal and food supplies for the ships and their crews.  Mamduh noted, “At this 
time (when the canal opened), new occupations emerged in Port Said for local workers to 
serve the boats: barbers, clothing makers, shoe makers…eventually more specializations 
unrelated to the port emerged, such as plumbing and teaching and carpentry.”  The 
development of these trades, Mamduh pointed out, was an indication that Port Said was 
                                                                                                                                            
from Alexandria to Cairo, and a canal from Cairo to the Red Sea, was more prudent both technically and 
politically.  In the end, Lesseps’ plan prevailed, in large part due to his close relationship with Said Pasha 
(Karabell, 2003).  
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evolving into a city of its own accord, outside of its role as a gateway and refueling stop 
between Asia and Europe. 
The economic role Port Said began to play in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries as a port gave rise to the cosmopolitan character of the city.  Port-related 
occupations remained crucial to the local economy for many years, and contributed not 
only to the diversity of the city but also to its increasing demographic stability; people 
certainly passed through on their way to other places but many also made it their home 
because there was work available and investment opportunities.  Thousands of 
dockworkers congregated at the docks every day to unload ships of their wares, to sell 
goods and provide services to the crews, and most importantly, to transport coal aboard 
the ships for fuel. There is a mythic Port Saidian dockworker known as Abu Araby and 
stories about his exploits are more plentiful in Port Said than the tales of Goha.  Abu 
Araby, like Goha, is the archetypal shrewd naif.  His interactions with international crews 
have made him multilingual and both his tricks and the lessons to be taken from them 
often attest to the ease with which he moves between cultures.  In this sense, Abu Araby 
is the everyman of Port Said, embodying the cosmopolitan humanism that locals and non-
local Egyptians often associate with the city.51  At the same time, however, Abu Araby is 
sometimes used as an adjective to refer to someone who lacks good manners and speaks 
roughly, an unsophisticated and untrustworthy schemer.    
 Although Port Saidians like to describe the late 19th and early 20th centuries as 
eras in which Egyptians and Europeans moved together in a cosmopolitan geography, 
early maps and the legacy of de Lesseps’ urban planning suggest a somewhat more 
                                                
51 Some insist that he was a real person, a friend of their grandfather or a great-uncle, while others argue he 
is a mythic figure. 
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tenuous coexistence. Hayy Al-ifranji (the European or foreigner district, formally Hayy 
al-sharq, the Eastern district), which included al-mina (the port, running along the 
western edge of the canal) and the area from the port to Mohammed Ali street ten blocks 
inland, stretching north to the sea, were generally reserved for the large local European 
population.  Al-ifranj i was, and to some extent still is, comprised of multi-story 
residential buildings in the belle époque style, with high ceilings and ornate balconies, 
and high-end stores and restaurants.52  
 By contrast, Hayy al-‘arab and Hayy al-manakh districts where most of the 
Egyptian population lived was notably more dense, with narrow streets and dirt roads and 
alleys remaining years after al-ifranji and Port Fouad had been paved.  Al-manakh has 
historically been a fisherman’s neighborhood, situated above and beside al-‘arab close to 
the sea.  Fishermen who had long fished this part of the coast seasonally gradually 
relocated more permanently and developed into a stable population.  Al-‘arab has long 
been populated by families who moved to the city in the early years from upper Egypt or 
the towns of the delta, including many from Dumyat and Manzalah, many of them part of 
the original ‘provisioning’ (tamwin) class the historian Mamduh described.  Except for a 
handful of powerful and wealthy Egyptian merchants, known as the ‘sons of Port Said’,53 
the local Arab population lived in al-‘arab or in al-manakh and only visited al-ifranjI as 
laborers and servants.  This suggests that the cosmopolitanism of early Port Said was a 
                                                
52 In 1926, a European style city with wide boulevards and free-standing homes, Port Fouad, was 
constructed on the eastern side of the canal as an enclave for the French and British professional classes 
employed by the Suez Canal company.   
53 The ‘sons of Port Said’ is a common descriptor both in discussions and in local history books used to 
describe the families who comprise the original, or near original, Egyptian families in the city.  Most of 
these were members of the propertied class who parlayed their wealth into shipping and import interests in 
the early decades of the city. There are about a dozen remaining ‘big’ families in town, who tend to own 
much of the property in al-afrang and control most of the wholesale trade; as Zahraan (2000), 2% of the 
population in Port Said controls 80% of the local economy.   
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demarcated cosmopolitanism shaped by east-west power relations: most Egyptian Port 
Saidians experienced the multicultural, multilingual city in a way limited by the fact that 
they were non-European.   
  In 1952, King Farouk was exiled in the military coup that eventually brought the 
young military leader Gamal Abdel Nasser to power, and in 1956 Nasser defied the 
French and the British by nationalizing the Suez Canal.  His announcement resulted in 
the Tripartate Aggression (al-adwan al-thulathi), also known as the Suez Crisis (al-azma 
al-suwisi) or the War of 1956.  Port Said was a primary battleground.  Much of al-
manakh was destroyed and swaths of al-‘arab were bombed by British war ships, planes, 
and ground troops.  In The Open Door, the Egyptian novelist Latifa al-Zayyat depicts the 
popular resistance in Port Said so critical to repelling British troops, as well as the 
destruction of the city and the scenes of inhabitants fleeing the city by boat across Lake 
Manzalah.  
 The Suez Crisis was the point at which foreigners began to depart from Port Said, 
Alexandria, Suez, and other port cities, as well as Cairo.54  Suez Canal company 
employees were abruptly denied access to their offices by Egyptian soldiers within hours 
of declaration of the nationalization, and ordered to return to their countries of origin.  
Some foreign merchants stayed despite the tensions, but in Port Said today there are few 
descendents of these original European families.  By 1966, almost three quarters (68.5%) 
of the city’s 282,876 residents had been born in Port Said; the largest residential grouping 
after this consisted of those born in the northern coastal cities such as Dumyat and Upper 
Egypt (approximately 20%).  There were slightly more than 20,000 foreigners living in 
                                                
54 Jewish families had already begun to emigrate in large numbers after 1948, and after 1956 Europeans 
found themselves out of work and at risk of losing property and investments due to new nationalization 
policies. 
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the city, comprising 7% of the total population (Al-Zogby 1970).  This is in contrast to 
the early nineteenth century when Europeans and other foreigners comprised 
approximately 25% of the local population.  Today, foreigners comprise a negligible 
percent of the total population of 529,700 (Mustapha 2004).   
  Between 1956 and 1967, the Egyptian elite expanded into the space left by the 
Europeans who had fled, both in terms of residence and in terms of control over the 
market and the port.  However, during the wars with Israel of 1967 (the Six-Day War, 
known in Egypt as ‘the setback’, al-naksa) and 1973, Port Said was once again on the 
military frontline.  The canal was closed from the 1967 war until President Sadat’s 
victory in 1973, when Egypt regained control over the Sinai Peninsula, and the lack of 
maritime commercial activity severely stunted the local economy.  As a result of this, and 
as a measure to protect the local citizens during the tense war years, Port Saidians were 
ordered to leave the city and temporarily relocate to other parts of Egypt.  This is known 
locally as al-hijra (the migration) and lasted until families began to return to the city after 
1973.  Many locals told me about al-hijra and how they abandoned their homes and jobs 
and temporarily moved with their families to the Delta, with some relocating to Cairo or 
Upper Egypt.   
Al-hijra had serious demographic and cultural implications, both in terms of 
integrating this new population into smaller communities in the delta, and upon return to 
Port Said.  As Dr. Hanafy Awoud notes (1999), Port Saidians integrated with other 
Egyptians in the ‘reception areas’ in the Delta, including marrying into local families, and 
when people began to return to Port Said at the end of the 1973 war, these families 
decided to move to the city as well.  Families who formerly lived on the outskirts of town 
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returned and squatted in apartments in al-‘arab or al-man akh, while others waited to 
receive government housing in new neighborhoods (such as al-salam al-jadid).  Adil, a 
metal-worker who was in his twenties and newly married at the time of al-hijra, 
describes his experience of coming back to the city after the temporary migration:  
We returned to Port Said and our house was bombed and no longer standing, so 
we moved into a neighboring apartment.  I put so much work into that place that 
if I’d been in America, they would have made me mayor of the town!  I put in 
new windows, new walls, painted, new plumbing, everything.  (CH: Didn’t the 
owners of the place want it back once they returned?)  No, they were waiting for a 
new apartment from the government and didn’t mind leaving this one behind. 
 
 The three wars succeeded in altering the shape of the city and its community in a 
number of important ways.  Firstly, the emigration of Europeans out of Port Said can be 
seen as giving rise to a radical re-imagining of the city as Egyptian, rather than distinctly 
European.  This shifted the local power structure, as the local Egyptian merchant class 
expanded and bought up European owned businesses and moved into formerly European 
residential enclaves.  Egyptians also inherited the jobs of the French Suez Canal 
Authority employees once it was nationalized.  Secondly, the original local population 
returned to a new spatial organization of the city, disrupting former neighborhood 
alliances and networks.  Thirdly, following al-hijra the population expanded 
exponentially as new rural families moved to Port Said for work in construction and, after 
1975, in the newly reopened canal and in Free Zone related trades.   
In 1974, the first of the infitah laws (Investment Law 43) was introduced, 
establishing a Duty Free Zone in Port Said and opening the country up to foreign 
investment. The original Free Zone laws, which included Law 24/1976 and Law 12/1977, 
were one component of the larger set of legal changes and economic incentives instituted 
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as part of the Open Door policies.55  The late 1970’s through the early 1980’s was a 
period of private investment and rapid growth in industry, import/export, real estate, and 
other economic sectors. One cannot underestimate the degree to which the promulgation 
of Law 43 and subsequent related laws changed the economic and social climate of Port 
Said.  
While the new policies tended to benefit the existing propertied class, the late 
1970’s are also the period in which an Egyptian nouveau riche class came into being 
(Abaza 2006; Amin 2000).  The Free Zone laws encouraged many farmers and small 
businessmen from outside the city to emigrate and take advantage of the open business 
environment available in Port Said.56  Relocating to Port Said to take up trading, 
particularly petty retailing in domestic goods, was popular in part because it was a field 
that seemed to required little experience or capital enter.  The Free Zone policies 
radically contradicted the state-centered economy and protections Nasser had introduced 
and mark the growth of what locals term the ‘capitalist parasites’ (al-Tufailiya al-
r’asmal i, or simply parasites, referencing both the rapid growth of privatization and those 
who flooded Port Said bent on financial gain.   
Sameh, a government employee in his early thirties who works for the Port Said 
health inspection department, and his friend Zaki, a photographer, were the first to 
                                                
55 Law 43/1976 established five free zones: Port Said, Nasr City, Alexandria, Suez, and Ismailiya.  Port 
Said’s free zone seems to have become the most successful because it encompassed the entire city and not 
just a designated section.   
56 The Free Zone law also gave Port Saidians particular privileges to which other Egyptians were not privy.  
For instance, they were able to purchase new cars without paying taxes on them, as long as the vehicles 
were used in Port Said (a certain percentage) in a given year.  Port Said was one of the few places in Egypt 
where the ‘black market’ did not exist, because trade that occurred outside of the legal regulations in other 
parts of the country was legal in Port Said.  The currency market is one example, as Iliya Harik notes 
(1998), and the value of the U.S. dollar in 1985 in Port Said ranged between $1.60 and $1.85, as compared 
to $.70 through the Central Bank of Egypt.   
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introduce me to this term, which I subsequently heard used by others.  Sameh and Zaki 
both live in Port Fouad, a suburb of Port Said across the canal, and note that their families 
are ‘original’ families of Port Said, with no roots elsewhere in the country.  Both used the 
term ‘al-Tufailiya to describe the new traders who came to Port Said after 1976.  These 
new traders were “not well-educated, but now they are rich” Sameh pointed out.   
The term is often accompanied by the sentiment that their presence has degraded 
the community and given rise to increasing social ills, as expressed to me by a retired 
importer named Galal.  Galal’s family also has longevity in the city (“we’re one of the 
old families, like the Sarhan’s and the Laheta’s”), and he and his family worked in 
pharmaceutical importing; it’s an open secret that he now makes his money in high-
interest personal loans.  He talked about how after 1976 the population grew and there 
was a rise in informal housing, crime, and youth delinquency.  Moreover, housing prices 
rose, and new apartment buildings built in the 1980’s to accommodate the incoming 
migrants blocked views of the sea and its breezes.  The children of these new wealthy 
traders, Galal suggested, do and sell drugs, they are known for it.  He added, “Sadat 
should never have made the whole city a Free Zone.  The only thing the Free Zone did 
was bring in a lot of criminals, and inspired people to abandon their traditional trades so 
that now they have nothing to fall back on.”   
The head of the lawyer’s syndicate since 2005, Ahmed Qazamil has wriiten a 
number of monographs that address the rise in crime, youth delinquency and drug use 
attributed to the post-free zone consumerist climate and influx of new residents.  One of 
these monographs, entitled “A Crime in the Powder District” (jarima fi Hayy al-buDra, 
1997) discusses a murder case in the mid-1990’s linked to homosexuality and drug use in 
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one of several apartment buildings close to the head of the canal. The moniker Hayy al-
buDra came into common parlance in relation to the wealthy residents of the building, 
described as part of the capitalist parasites, and their presumed drug use.  
The capitalist parasite was the topic of conversation one evening at the Bank Club 
(nadi banuq).  I sat with a group of older men, most of whom worked in banking and one 
of whom, Kareem, was an economist who had published articles on the maritime 
economy.  He had this to say: 
One of the main points to think about is tolerance.  Egyptians are very 
tolerant, and kind-hearted.  They are willing to sit and talk with one another and 
find a solution that works for everyone.  Each one is not interested in simply 
taking his right.  People have rights and they have duties towards one another in 
society, and they seek to find a balance between the two.  This is true of everyone, 
it doesn’t matter if you are educated or not.  Especially in the Suez Canal area, 
people here are used to foreigners.  There have always been foreigners here in 
Port Said, from Italy, Greece, France, Britain, and so forth.  And even people of 
these different groups could sit down and work out a problem peacefully – in fact, 
they used to intermarry.  And the people here are accustomed to serving 
foreigners and learning how to be tolerant and peaceful with them.  Many men 
here used to carry coal and load it on the ships coming through.  They served the 
boats and the foreigners.  After a while, they stopped carrying coal when the boats 
began to run on petrol.  But always we have served outside populations passing 
through, and we do this with a good heart.  Port Said was always a cosmopolitan 
city.   
Now it’s less so, now there are few foreigners here, and few tourists, but 
historically it was very mixed.  Traders could call [one another] and make a deal, 
no papers to sign.  A man would call a wholesaler and order things and say he will 
pay him back in a week or two, no problem.  They were good for their word.  
Wealthy, pioneering families like Hamza and Laheta, their whole families were 
involved in trading and they were very experienced in how to do business in a 
way that looked towards the future, towards building good relations and not just 
getting rich quick.  They dealt with people in a very good way, wisely.  With the 
Free Zone, the capitalist parasites appeared and these traders were not good at 
working things out in an intelligent and fair and calm way.  They thought only of 
themselves and wanted to get rich right away.  Many did, and they lost it just as 
quickly.  It’s not just because they are from outside, not the ‘Sons of Port Said ‘ – 
there are good and bad people everywhere, and some of these new traders were 
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Amin, from one of the pioneering families Kareem mentioned, was our landlord.  
He too worked in banking, as a loan officer, and when I asked him to tell me about his 
father, he described him as someone whose “word could be trusted.”  Amin noted that he 
tries hard to follow in his father’s example, to always remain ethical and honest, but finds 
it challenging: 
It’s difficult, my work at the bank sometimes, because I’m so well known 
in this town.  I work in the loan department, and sometimes local businessmen 
who know me or my family come in wanting a loan.  But I’ve spent time abroad 
getting training in spreadsheets and background checks and I know that if 
someone doesn’t check out, if they have outstanding debts or if the money they 
want is more than they will be able to repay, than I can’t approve a loan for them, 
even if our families are connected from years back.  There’s been more than one 
prominent businessmen who has smeared my name, talked badly about me at the 
Shooting Club (a local social club for sports and entertaining), my friends and I 
have overheard nasty comments about me, because I refused to give a loan.  But 
this is my job, this is what I have to do.  Sometimes these men can just go to 
another bank and get the loan anyway, but the people working in these loan 
departments are making a big mistake, they will cause problems for the bank, 
doing favors like this. 
 
 I periodically visited the bank where he worked to withdraw money and would 
see him at his desk poring over spreadsheets, chain smoking.  Amin’s lament suggests 
some of the complications of life in post-Free Zone Port Said.  On the one hand, he is a 
part of a large network of local businessmen whose families count themselves among the 
old guard in Port Said.  On the other hand, he knows that the current business climate is 
risky and that businessmen today are more likely to be looking for a quick deal rather 
than focusing on long-term business relations or slowly growing a company. 
 In the 1990’s, structural adjustment policies were implemented, restricting the 
trade privileges to which Port Saidians had become accustomed.  The city, and some of 
the other designated free zone areas, were no longer legislated as the sole areas into 
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which particular foreign goods could be imported.  This meant that it became possible for 
traders in Cairo, Alexandria, and elsewhere to directly import goods such as European 
fabric and electronics that previously were only available in Port Said.  As Al-Fadil 
shows, shipments entering Egypt through Free Zones like Port Said declined from 101.92 
million Egyptian pounds in 1992 to 53.17 million EGP in 1997; that’s a decrease of 
almost half in five years (2002:102).  Thus began a decline in the local economy, 
exacerbated by the gradual phasing out of most Free Zone privileges (Law 5/2002) 
beginning in 2002, set to culminate in 2009.57   
Retailers and wholesale importers, who make up the majority of business interests 
in Port Said, have seen their businesses decline as the government seeks to expand 
industrial and export sectors in the Free Zones.  Most Port Saidians I talked to feel 
worried about the future, pointing out that residents have grown accustomed to being 
traders, and don’t have the skills to transition into the industrial sector as anything but 
laborers.  There are efforts underway to expand and promote tourism and manufacturing 
in the city, including the multi-million pound East Port Said project to expand the port 
and its storage and servicing capacity.  But the days in which Egyptians visited the city 
twice yearly to spend money on household goods and imported clothing and relax on the 
beach have faded.     
 I have sought in the preceding section to describe the complex social and 
economic landscape of Port Said and the transitions it has undergone.  Most significant, I 
would argue, are the imagined distinctions between the ‘old’ families and the post Free 
                                                
57 Law 5/2002, “Repealing the enforcement of the law on and system of transferring Port Said City into a 
Free Zone” was originally slated for a five-year phase out of exemptions.  Under political pressure, this was 
extended for an additional two years and is set to culminate in 2009, although there is always a possibility 
that it will be further extended.   
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Zone migrants that have settled in Port Said.  On the one hand, the sentiment that an 
unethical ‘capitalist parasites’ with short-sighted business practices has pervaded what 
was once a cosmopolitan city of honest traders is simply a fiction and an idealization of 
the past.  On the other hand, this impression is fairly widespread, asserted by many of my 
interlocutors who inevitably considered themselves to be on the proper side of the divide, 
unlike the newcomers.  The imaginings of the past and the realities of a more anonymous 
market and community both contribute to how transactions are conducted and disputes 
settled.  Next, I turn to trade and the retail credit market in contemporary Port Said.    
 
Shifts in Consumption and Reliance on Credit 
Port Said’s economy is still largely dominated by retail and wholesale trade; most 
families in Port Said have some connection as employees or owners to the market. This 
industry is the fourth largest economic sector in the city, surpassed only by employment 
in education, public employment (government offices) and transport (Abdel-N’aim 
2002), and many who are formally employed in these other sectors are informally 
working in trade as well.  One of my aims is to consider how and why certain crediting 
arrangements have come into being and continue to be used in Port Said.  Another aim is 
to investigate the ways in which social networks are bound up with crediting practices.  
Finally, surety practices originating in the commercial realm inflect agreements and 
disputes unrelated to trade as forms of pressure, a phenomenon I examine in later 
chapters.   
Credit and consumption are inextricable.  The extension of credit by the Egyptian 
state can be linked to an era in which the government was seeking to expand 
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consumption of state-produced goods.  In 1954, when the new revolutionary government 
began to implement nationalization policies and companies such as the Ideal appliance 
company were brought under state control, the government began extending credit to 
consumers in order to encourage growth in its manufacturing sector.  Abaza (2006:93) 
points out that consumers could purchase items like refrigerators, air conditioners, 
complete metal kitchens, beds, desks, televisions, and other household items from Ideal, 
and even locally manufactured cars from the newly formed Nasr Car Company, without 
payments for two years.  The installment (taqsiT) system was briefly blocked in 1965 and 
then brought back in order to instigate consumption of expensive appliances in the 
stalling economy.  Many of the Egyptian produced goods were not export-competitive 
and the government was entirely reliant on a local consumer market; when goods didn’t 
move, that they had no choice but to extend credit.  However, the new taqsiT system was 
only extended for a small range of appliances and a down payment of at least twenty 
percent of the purchase price was required.    
Prior to the Sadat era, there were four national banks and a few specialized banks 
that dealt in mortgages, cooperative credit and so forth, which made opportunities to 
obtain formal credit quite limited (Mayer 1985:32).  Only the privileged few had access 
to credit from banks to develop a business or for investment.  But in the 1980’s new 
banks were established as part of Open Door legislation and the availability of formal 
credit expanded considerably.  Yet, as Mayer points out, banking criteria in Egypt, as 
elsewhere, still favored moneyed applicants who could use it to build on their wealth.  
The reverse was true for the poor, who lacked collateral and thus relied upon informal 
crediting arrangements.  The potential for lending policies to promote upward mobility 
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for the poor was not seized upon during this period of expansion in crediting sources, due 
in part to the affect of credit policies instituted by a number of influential Islamic banks 
(Mayer 1985).   As such, the poor continued to seek loans through what might best be 
classed as informal channels.  Informal crediting strategies provide much needed capital 
and emergency funds for Egyptians.  At the same time, informal credit is by nature risky 
for both creditor and debtor. I return to the discussion of informal and what can be 
classified as semi-formal credit below.  
The expansion of both informal and formal lending in the 1980’s is tied not only 
to the emergence of new investment opportunities and banking policies but also to the 
increased availability of consumer goods. The Open Door era is marked by increased 
importation of luxury and household goods from abroad, and thus also the initiation of 
new consumption patterns.  It is possible to discern a progression towards the increased 
reliance on credit since the 1970’s in order to afford such items.  In the height of the 
economic boom in Port Said, locals were much more likely to be able to purchase items 
with cash.  However, as the market slowed after 1991, which also marks the beginning of 
structural adjustment policies in Egypt, families who previously had a high level of 
liquidity from their retail or wholesale operations experienced decreasing profits and less 
purchasing power.   
Shifts in consumption are to some extent most visible in relation to setting up a 
new household in preparation for marriage.  According to Abdullah, a self-proclaimed 
Nasserist, prior to the Sadat era people bought things for the home with cash.  “When 
people got married back then, the man bought some mattresses, a stove, a radio, and he 
laid his head down at night, listening to this radio, and his life was simple and he was 
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happy.”   According to Abdullah, credit was unnecessary in this imagined past.  A man 
could pay cash for the items needed in his household in preparation for marriage and 
throughout his life because his needs were limited and many modern appliances were 
largely unknown.   
In 2005, men and women in Egypt were expected to have purchased a vast array 
of consumer goods, from dishes to furniture to electronics prior to beginning their life 
together.58 The groom must purchase or rent an apartment, and all purchases, renovations 
and decorations must be completed prior to the day of the wedding celebration (faraH) 
because the bride and groom will move into their fully furnished apartment that evening.  
Each year, the expectation for what items and housing related tasks are essential for 
establishing a household grows, and with it the potential debt burden on both the young 
bride and groom and their families.  
Preparation for marriage is not the only event that gives rise to the consumption of 
household goods; clearly, families purchase household goods throughout their lives.  But 
the lead-up to marriage puts particular strain on young men and women and their families 
and requires a significant financial outlay within a relatively short period of time.  The 
financial strain of putting together a household is often exacerbated by low wages.  
Osama, a man of thirty-one who works in a relatively well-remunerated clerical position 
at a local Federal Express office in Port Said, saved for ten years before he had 
                                                
58 In addition to the basic set of dishes and silverware, a typical middle-class couple is expected to purchase 
cooking pots, linens, blankets, and towels, multiple serving trays, decorative curtains, pillows and table 
clothes, fake flower arrangements and vases, pictures, rugs and sets of furniture for the living room and 
bedrooms, and the bridegroom must purchase gifts of gold for the bride.  They must also obtain household 
appliances and electric equipment (agHayyza manzaliya) such as a television, a satellite dish, a refrigerator, 
lamps, a washing machine, a modern stove with oven, an iron, a hairdryer, a blender, a toaster oven, an 
electric kettle, and for the upper middle class, perhaps a dishwasher, microwave, computer, stereo, and so 
forth. The financial responsibility for these items is largely the groom’s although the negotiations before 
and after engagement regarding dower and trousseau usually require the bride-to-be and her family to 
purchase some portion of the household and personal items.   
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accumulated enough money to become engaged.  And in spite of his savings, his parents 
still had to help with the down payment on his apartment. 
While some buy household goods outright with cash, many buy on credit.  Maha, 
a young woman from al-zuhur who works as a store clerk, pointed out that it was difficult 
to save money to buy expensive items like blankets and dishes, because her low earnings 
from her job could easily be spent on daily expenses like food and transportation.  Buying 
on credit was a strategy for ensuring that she was putting money gradually towards these 
items for her marriage home, while avoiding the difficulty of saving money to be spent 
outright.    
In sum, Egypt in the last half of the twentieth century became marked by an 
increase in consumption of manufactured and imported household goods that constituted 
ubiquitous markers of middle class life.  Although credit is by no means a new strategy in 
this era for people to obtain goods and services, it is inevitable that increased 
consumption becomes linked with increased credit at various levels of formality.  For 
Port Saidians in particular, the immediate post-Infitah era was a time in which many 
locals were not as deeply reliant on credit because more cash was in circulation.  As the 
local economy began to constrict in the 1980’s and 90’s, Port Saidians experience a loss 
of revenue from the duty free retail and wholesale markets and reliance on credit 
increased.  
 
Retail traders and Retail Credit 
Economists Mahmoud S. Mohieldin and Peter W. Wright undertook a recent 
study on the coexistence of formal and informal credit markets in Egypt (2000).  
 
  130 
Classifying informal credit into five categories, including occasional lending, regular 
lending, interlinked credit, finance through collective agreements, and informal finance at 
the corporate level, they draw several conclusions.  Firstly, they note that a large 
percentage of households (86%, based on their sample of 200 households in 24 Egyptian 
villages) participate in either formal or informal crediting arrangements. In relation to 
this, the most common form of informal credit in Egypt is rotating credit and savings 
associations (j ami‘at).  Secondly, borrowing in the informal sector generally requires 
formal collateral as well as ‘social’ collateral.  Thirdly, the informal sector tends to be 
used for consumption or to ‘bridge’ (to get through a temporary period of low income 
and high debt) rather than for investment (2000:658).  Their study doesn’t directly 
address retail credit, which might be classified as semi-formal credit, although there are 
important parallels between informal and semi-formal credit.  Practices of retail crediting 
in Port Said are shaped by social networks and social collateral as well, and are used for 
consumption rather than investment purposes. 
As scholars have shown, (c.f. Hoodfar 1997; Singerman 1995; Wikan 1996) 
rotating credit associations form a kind of parallel banking system by which Egyptians 
are able to save small and large sums of money with the aid of other trusted individuals.  
Through the jami‘ at system large amounts of money change hands outside of state 
control each year (Hoodfar 197:219).  An individual organizes a savings club by drafting 
a number of friends, neighbors, co-workers, or family members who agree to contribute 
the same sum of money for a pre-determined cycle (100LE per month for twelve months, 
for example).  Each member receives the total monthly amount in turn.  For those who 
receive their share later in the cycle, the system is used to save up an amount of money 
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that might be otherwise difficult to save.  On the other hand, it acts as a line of credit for 
those who take the first payments in the cycle.  Moreover, an individual may be a 
member of more than one savings club simultaneously.  Mohammed, a young lawyer, 
was participating in three savings clubs at the same time in order to set aside money for 
some larger purchases he needed to make.   
Returning to Mohieldin and Wright’s taxonomy, I suggest that although jami‘ at 
are common in Port Said one of the most prevalent forms of local credit is what I 
consider ‘semi-formal’ credit.  This entails the extension of credit by retail traders, or 
small store-owners, to customers.59  This form of credit may be classed as ‘semi-formal’ 
because many merchants have structured crediting into their operation and keep records 
of some sort.  Moreover, the credit is being extended in a hierarchical manner, rather than 
between relative equals (as in jami‘at) in which a more credit-worthy entity is lending to 
a less credit-worthy entity; this is parallel to the extension of bank credit yet without the 
oversight and standardized procedures employed with bank loans.   
  Why would semi-formal credit be more prevalent than, for instance, credit 
cards?  After all, the extension of credit requires a retailer or wholesaler to assume the 
risk of default that might otherwise be absorbed by a multi-national corporation.  As in 
other countries of the developing world, Egypt has in the past decades become an 
emerging market for international banks such as HSBC and Barclays.  In 1999, Citibank 
entered into retail lending in Egypt by offering credit and debit cards, and by 2001 there 
were nearly 400,000 credits cards in the country.   In turn, Egypt-based banks such as 
ABC bank (bank al-mu’asasah al-‘arabiyah al-masriyah), Credit Agricole Egypt (kredit 
                                                
59 I use the term ‘small’ store owners to highlight the fact that in most cases retailers in Port Said own one 
store rather than retail chains. As such, their operation is of a relatively small scale.    
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agricole misr) and Arab Bank (al-bank al-‘arabi) have also been advertising the 
advantages of credit cards and initiating new account holders.  As one bank employee 
assured me, credit cards are widely available now in Egypt, and people have taken to 
buying on credit.  However, the industry has been slow to convince retailers to expand 
the range of services and goods that can be purchased on credit.  Major hotels and high 
end restaurants in Cairo and in tourist destinations like Sharm el Sheikh, Hurghada, and 
Luxor, and stores in the Cairo and Alexandria shopping malls generally accept major 
credit cards.  Yet the majority of retail goods and services in the country cannot be 
purchased with them.   
Owners of small shops are reluctant to set up service with an international credit 
company because of the service charges that come out of their profit every time they 
charge a customers card, and because of the delay in receiving payment.  A retail trader 
(al-tujjar al-ijzi’a, sing, al-tajir al-ijzi’a) who lets a customer charge items using a credit 
card won’t receive the payment from the company for between thirty and sixty days.  
Nadim, who manages a high-end children’s clothing store near the beach, pointed out that 
owners are accustomed to seeing their profits immediately and in cash.  In turn, the 
wholesalers from whom they buy in bulk also expect to receive their payments without 
delay and in cash.  Therefore, switching to taking payment through credit cards is a 
transition that is generally only realistic for successful businessmen and women with 
enough capital to see them through the cyclical delays in receiving their profits.  Further, 
the type of goods or services must be of fairly high value in order to justify the service 
fees charged by credit companies.  As a result, the vast majority of medium and small-
sized businesses do not accept credit cards; because they make up the majority of the 
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Egyptian market, most consumers have few sources for consumer goods and services that 
will accept the credit cards they might hold.  Despite the increasing availability of retail 
credit from banks, Egypt is still primarily a cash economy, and credit is largely informal 
or extended directly by shopkeepers for purchases made in their stores.  
Store-owners who extend credit take on the risks that large credit card companies 
and banks would absorb in other economic contexts.  Yet it is possible to note two ways 
in which taking on the role of creditor as a small business owner doesn’t just present risks 
but also accrues benefits.  Firstly, credit extension allows retailers to add fees to 
purchases.  In the processing of negotiating the price for purchases (typical for most 
purchases in the market in Port Said), the retailer will sell items that will be paid for in 
installments at a slightly higher price than those bought with cash. As one cynical local 
noted, ‘in some stores, they wouldn’t even take your cash if you had it.  They prefer 
people who pay on credit because it increases their take!”  A small-business owner may 
raise the price on the actual item when negotiating an installment plan for a customer or 
attach a service charge.  This may be seen as a way of charging interest at a non-fixed 
rate, thereby avoiding the Islamic prohibition against riba although it is generally just 
described as a negotiable fee for credit servicing.60  
The additional earnings available through the extension of credit are even higher 
through the more extreme ‘burned goods system’ (niTHam al-maHruq).   Burning goods 
is a way of obtaining a quick and substantial loan from a retailer.  A customer in need of 
such a loan purchases a substantial item such as a refrigerator on credit.  The item may be 
‘bought’ for 1000LE but the customer won’t actually give the retailer cash.  Rather, the 
                                                
60 As noted in chapter one, fixed interest is allowed by Egyptian commercial law, but is a subject of public 
concern and of ‘ifta.   
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customer will immediately ‘sell’ the item back to the retailer for a lower price, perhaps 
800LE or less.  The retailer gives the 800LE to the customer, who is then responsible for 
paying back 1000LE of the original purchase on installments.  The refrigerator, it should 
be noted, never leaves the store.  An alternative to this practice is to actually purchase an 
appliance on installment from one store and then sell it at a lower price to a retailer at a 
second store for a lower price. 
Secondly, credit helps build networks.  Negotiating a transaction is a subtle art for 
both retailer and customer and is an exchange through which the parties both work out 
mutually beneficial terms and build relationships that may prove useful in the future.  
Moreover, the type of store and its location in town also influences the tenor of 
negotiations and the terms.  Hani, the owner along with his two brothers of two small but 
lucrative home goods showrooms (mu’arad manzaliya), sat and talked with me one 
January afternoon about his system. Hani’s showroom is located in a sh’abi 
neighborhood known by its largest housing project, ‘Five Thousand’ (as Port Saidians 
pronounce it, khamas t-alaf).  Like many of these showrooms in town, Hani sells a 
variety of household items, from small and large appliances to bedroom furniture to 
dishes and cutlery.  Many of the items are low-quality goods imported from China, and 
thus more affordable to his clients who tend to come from the popular districts.  Only 
retailers selling expensive goods imported from Europe rather than Asia, and marketing 
towards a wealthier clientele, can afford to specialize.  For instance, upscale ceramics 
stores selling toilets and sinks, or appliance stores selling mainly refrigerators, air 
conditioners and heaters, and stoves, can be found primarily in Hayy al-ifranj and along 
the main roads where the more expensive housing in located.  The majority of retail 
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household goods stores in Port Said are, like Hani’s, geared towards middle and low-
income families.   
Hani pointed out that when a customer comes in to purchase something, they must 
first agree on a price, which among other factors depends on how many items the 
customer is buying; the more items, the bigger the discount.  Moreover, there is one price 
for paying cash immediately, and a higher price for paying on installments.  They must 
then negotiate about how much the customer will give as a deposit and whether he can 
take the items immediately or when more of the payment due is paid off.  Finally, they 
decide how much will be paid for each installment, and how much time will elapse 
between payments.  Some customers like to pay a small amount each day, Hani noted, 
whereas others like to pay larger sums each week or each month.  What is important, he 
said, is that whatever the installment arrangement is that it be workable for the client 
because he, the owner, simply wants to get paid.   
There is also a strong social aspect to negotiations over the terms of credit.  The 
price, down payment, and installment amounts might be affected by a number of factors.  
These include whether he has a personal relationship with the buyer or if she is a 
stranger, if the buyer has purchased goods from the store in the past and paid back the 
installments on time or ahead of time, if the store owner needs a favor from the buyer, if 
he is low on cash that day, if he has been trying to sell the particular item for a long time 
without success, and so forth.  Many of Hani’s customers are from the neighborhood and 
he has known them or their family members for many years.  He acknowledged that 
because his clients are often struggling to make ends meet he has to strike a very careful 
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balance between making a profit and building customer loyalty by being patient when 
they fall behind on their payments.   
Hani’s clientele, and thus his concerns as a retail creditor, can be contrasted with 
those of Tamer, who owns a high-end men’s clothing store on one of the main boulevards 
in downtown Port Said.  The suits and shoes Tamer sells are imported from Italy and cost 
more than five times what a suit would cost on Tugarry street in the Arab district.  Unlike 
Hani’s simple shop on a dusty street, his store is elegantly decorated, with hand-crafted 
wooden cabinets and shelving units that organize each imported Italian shirt and suit into 
a separate compartment for display; unlike stores crammed with racks of cheap clothes, 
the sparseness here is intended to communicate that the goods are prohibitively 
expensive.  The shop assistant brings Tamer boiled coffee in a delicate cup and saucer as 
he shuts down his laptop.  The marble floors gleam, and the sun that glints through the 
floor-to-ceiling shop windows. Tamer pointed out that for traders like him selling on 
informal credit to wealthy customers was accepted practice.  His brother, who sits beside 
him, explained how credit works: 
The people who come here, they know Tamer, they have a relationship.  
So when they choose something they like, they find out the price, and they take 
the item but don’t pay anything just then, or maybe some part of the price.  And 
then over the following months, they’ll stop in to say hello and will pay it back 
gradually.  It’s impolite to ask for the cash all at once, it’s not the way it works 
here.  It’s about relationships, it’s a way of being nice.  And besides, Tamer 
knows that if he doesn’t run his business this way, these men could go elsewhere 
and buy things, and he would lose business.  In the middle-end shops, or the low-
end shops, you pay cash.  Or if you buy on installment, sure, you write wasul at 
amana.  But not here, not in this kind of store.  And sometimes he loses money, 
it’s the way it works. 
 
Because these transactions, whether in a store like Hani’s or Tamer’s, are personal 
and face-to-face, with credit determinations being made through conversation as the sale 
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is being negotiated, being able to buy something on credit is hardly ever perceived as a 
simple transaction.  There are no straightforward criteria used to determine whether, and 
how much, credit will be extended.  Rather, an individual must convince the store-owner 
to trust him to repay the debt.  In effect, extending credit occurs in a field of negotiated 
power, with the seller wielding much of the power to decide how much risk to assume, 
yet needing buyers in order to stay in business.  The store-owner takes calculated risks, 
evaluating the character and the financial solvency of his customers. 
Naguib, a trader who owns the shop down the street from him, also selling 
expensive men’s clothing, weighed in on the topic on another occasion:  
Naguib: It says in the Quran… 
 
CH:    In the Cow? [the sura of the Cow] 
 
N: Yes, in the Cow, that you should write things down, no matter how small.  But 
we don’t.  My customers come and take very expensive goods from me and we 
don’t write it down.  It’s just not the way it’s done.  They might take their 
business elsewhere. If someone dies and they have debts, on the day of judgment 
they will be found guilty if they leave debts behind.   
 
At the same time, store-owners use the extension of credit to accrue debts of 
favors and to strengthen a good reputation that will help build a clientele.  In general, 
traders seek to become known as someone who will extend credit generously.  They do 
so in order to attract customers, and to widen their exchange network.  As Singerman 
(1995) argues in her study of the political economy of personal networks in Egypt, 
Egyptians rely on informal networks of favors and exchanges in order to accomplish any 
number of daily transactions and tasks.  A favor for another individual, whether known to 
one or not, not only puts someone in another’s good graces but produces a burden of debt 
whereby one has the right to ask for a favor from that individual in the future.  
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The repayment process further solidifies the personal nature of this credit system; 
customers come back to the store in person each week or month to repay a portion of the 
debt.  Some months the customer may not be able to pay back the full amount, and will 
have to ask the store-owner to readjust the payment schedule.  They must, in other words, 
ask the owner to be patient and to trust them.  This may happen a number of times before 
the debt is paid, and each renegotiation, each request for patience and trust, may put a 
strain on the store owner’s profit margin in any given month but will accrue social debts 
in his favor.  A trader in Port Said is typically in a very good position to call upon a 
number of individuals in town for favors.     
For example, Essam, a young math teacher, had recently purchased some items on 
credit from a small showroom.  He and the owner knew each other, although not well, 
from the neighborhood where Essam had grown up.  The owner, Samir, was about ten 
years older than Essam and had worked at a grocery store in his parents’ neighborhood; 
Essam remembers kicking a football around with him as a kid when business was slack at 
the store.  When he recently decided to purchase some new things for his house, 
including a cabinet for his computer and a bed for his growing son, he went to the 
showroom Samir now owns.  After choosing the items, worth about 600LE, and 
requesting to pay on credit, he and Samir negotiated about how much he would pay each 
month for a set number of months.  This arrangement for installment payments was 
verbally agreed upon and recorded in Samir’s logbook.  Because Essam and Samir had a 
relationship, although not close, Samir insisted that Essam merely give his word to repay 
the debt and didn’t request any other form of documentary guarantee.  A few weeks later 
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Essam also purchased more items, including a refrigerator and a dresser, for his brother-
in-law and the father of his brother-in-law, under the same terms.   
Essam expressed pride in the fact that Samir had extended such a large amount of 
credit to him and simply trusted that he would pay back the debt.  At the same time he 
was worried because Samir had begun to ask Essam to tutor his son in math.  Although 
Essam would ordinarily welcome new students, and expected that Samir would offer to 
pay for his services, he knew that he would have to refuse payment because of the 
generous terms of credit Samir had extended.  Every time he went to Samir’s shop to pay 
his monthly installment, he found an excuse to avoid tutoring the man’s son, although he 
figured that his excuses would run dry at a certain point and he would have no choice but 
to give the boy some lessons free of charge.  As such, Samir had used his generosity to 
garner a debt of favor from Essam.  At the same time, Essam hoped that by repaying the 
installments fully and on time each month, he would ‘repay’ Samir’s generosity and 
weaken the basis upon which he could pressure Essam into tutoring his son.  Relying 
upon a verbal agreement was risky for Samir, but a risk he was willing to take based on 
the twin factors of social connections with Essam and his family (the pretext upon which 
he could ‘trust’ him), and his knowledge that Essam was a sought-after tutor who might 
be able to provide lessons for his son (the favor he could extract in exchange for his 
trust).   
Along with illustrating how traders use the extension of credit on generous terms 
to garner social debts, Essam’s example points up some the ways in which the medium 
used to guarantee transactions is critical for how the transaction functions and the level of 
risk it engenders.   
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Guaranteeing Credit Transactions: Customary/Commercial Documents 
Let’s turn now to take up the question of medium more directly.  The expectation 
that one can reliably guarantee credit through social rather than contractual mechanisms 
is also present in crediting practices between wholesalers and retailers.  As traders 
describe it, in pre-free zone Port Said strong bonds of trust and respect existed between 
wholesalers and retailers that bound them together.  Wholesalers would extend credit 
generously, and retailers promptly repaid the advance of goods they’d received without 
written guarantees of any sort.  As Mahmoud Hamza, in discussing how his father 
conducted business in mid-century Port Said, recalled: “You would just call up on the 
phone and request a certain amount of goods from the wholesaler, and he would send it 
over.  You made a verbal agreement over the phone, and your reputation depended on 
paying for the goods.”  A ‘man’s word’ had value, he noted. Many traders insist that this 
is still the case.   
The connection between being a trader with strong connections and a good 
reputation and the absence of documentary surety for crediting can be seen in how Abassi 
describes his dealings with wholesalers.  Abassi owns a small workshop for installing and 
repairing automobile air conditioners.  The shop has several employees and is located on 
the ground floor of a multi-story apartment building in the ‘Five Thousand’ 
neighborhood.  Abassi describes himself as having good connections, built over the many 
years he has run his own workshop.  In particular, he stressed that as a retailer he had 
excellent relationships with the wholesaler who provided him with spare parts and air 
conditioning units.  In the fifteen years that he had worked with this wholesaler, they had 
never used any checks or honesty receipts to guarantee the goods Abassi took on credit; 
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there was trust (sikka) between them.  He points out that this is not always the case with 
wholesalers and retailers: “All [other] merchants write checks for him for the things they 
buy, except me.  Because of trust.”  (Abassi is using the term ‘checks’ to refer to both 
bank checks and honesty receipts).  
In contrast to Abassi, other traders expressed to me that the expectation of 
trustworthiness has begun to lead to problems as the economy worsens and credit can’t be 
paid back.  The Open Door era, and the establishment of the Free Zone are often pointed 
to as turning points in wholesaler-retailer relations and local business practices.  The 
community of traders, once presumably close knit and trustworthy, is now disaggregated 
and weak.  Moreover, interventions by other traders in the community to resolve credit 
disputes between wholesalers and retailers are not uniformly successful.  Ideally, traders 
pointed out to me, the pressure of maintaining good standing within the trading 
community guaranteed repayment of debts.  But the declining economy strains this 
expectation.   
But traders today also recognize that the marketplace is an increasingly 
anonymous space, and customers’ (and retailers) ability to repay is increasingly strained 
by the weakening economy and interrelated liquidity problems.  As such, there is ample 
evidence of the use of commercial documents to secure repayment of credit.  
In the preceding I discussed the way Hani negotiated with clients over the terms 
of a sale and credit.  Hani is also known for his elaborate bookkeeping and for using 
honesty receipts to secure credit he extends.  To keep track of all of his accounts, Hani 
not only keeps handwritten account logbooks listing each person, the amount they’ve 
taken on credit and the amount and number of installments they’ve agreed to pay, but he 
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also keeps a daily logbook to record all of the incoming payments and gives each 
customer their own small notebook to record the amounts they owe and have paid.  In 
addition, he keeps all of this information double-referenced on his computer, which sits 
on his desk in the middle of the small shop.  His business has grown over the course of 
ten years, during a period in which many businesses have suffered, and he has even 
expanded to open a second store elsewhere in the city, in part because he has been so 
willing to let people purchase items on credit.   
Unlike Tamer and Samir, Hani typically does not rely upon verbal agreements 
when extending credit.  He and his brothers have chosen instead to conduct their 
transactions more rigorously.  Along with their elaborate record-keeping system, they 
insist on procuring what are known as honesty receipts as surety from clients.  Even for 
those traders less rigorous with their accounts, the practice of writing honesty receipts to 
guarantee transactions is quite common.  Honesty receipts (iySal amana), are the primary 
means for guaranteeing semi-formal credit in Port Said today.   
An honesty receipt is a simple, mass-produced receipt purchased in local 
stationery stores intended to secure three party transactions (see Appendix A).  The 
document is intended for delivering sums of cash using an intermediary; if the cash isn’t 
delivered the person responsible for failure to deliver has misappropriated the funds and 
is legally liable for breach of trust.  As such, nonpayment of an honesty receipt is a 
misdemeanor criminal offence, juridically classified between a felony and an infraction; 
the legal status of this customary/commercial document will be discussed in more detail 
in the following chapter. 
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Most strikingly, buyers are sometimes requested to sign such agreements ‘ala 
buyaD.  Muwaqqa’ ‘ala buyaD can be roughly translated as ‘signing on the white,’ a 
reference both literal and metaphorical to putting one’s signature on a document that is 
missing concrete details or terms.  In other words, buyers sign their names to an honesty 
receipt without any sum filled in, so that the trader is able to write in any amount of 
money; if the original purchase was for items costing 1000LE, the trader is free to 
complete the honesty receipt as if the buyer owes them 5,000LE, 20,000LE, or more.  A 
buyer who intends to spend 1000LE (approximately 150 U.S. dollars) on a microwave 
may soon find himself criminally liable for 50,000LE, the equivalent of about 9,000 U.S. 
dollars.  One retailer posited a hypothetical scenario for me, based on his many years of 
experience dealing with clients.  His comments reveal the difficulty he has faced 
recouping money owed:  
Suppose I gave you an honesty receipt with the amount of 500 pounds and you 
did not pay. Of course, I'll make a complaint against you in the court but the court 
will not give attention to the 500 pounds. So, when I write an honesty receipt, I 
write a high sum of money.  I just take my money (i.e., gets from the client what 
he actually owes), but I have to do that to guarantee that the client will pay back. 
When the client knows that there is an honesty receipt with a lot of money, he 
responds and pays regularly. If the sum of money is little, neither the court nor the 
client responds to my request! 
 
Buyers must typically sign at least one honesty receipt, either for a specified 
amount of money or ‘ala buyaD.  Some traders insist on obtaining several such 
documents; a common practice is to have buyers sign one completed honesty receipt for 
each installment payment to be made (ten payments over the course of ten weeks, for 
example) and one honesty receipt ‘ala buyaD as surety for the entire debt.  The creditor 
keeps the only copy of each honesty receipt in his or her possession until the debt is paid 
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and then is expected to tear up the document in the presence of the debtor, to prove that it 
can no longer be used against the debtor61.   
In addition, traders typically request that a buyer who wants to take something on 
credit have a guarantor whose name will be written in the logbook where the account is 
recorded, and who will also be expected to sign one or more honesty receipt, ‘ala buyaD.  
A guarantor might be a family member, a friend, or someone who is a relative stranger to 
whom the buyer will pay a small sum of money for agreeing to take the risk of 
guaranteeing the debt.  The trader has no need to conduct a ‘background’ check to 
determine the solvency of either the debtor or her creditor and thus their ability to repay.  
The honesty receipt serves as the mechanism by which the loan can be recouped.  If the 
buyer stops making installment payments, the trader can complete the for a large sum of 
money, file a report at the police station, and thus start criminal proceedings against the 
buyer and/or the guarantor.   
Yet even with an honesty receipt at his disposal, it is expected that a trader will 
try other means to recoup the debt rather than turning immediately to the courts.  Hani 
relate. the procedure he tends to follow when someone stops paying installments. 
CH: If you have someone who wrote an honesty receipt, and he stops paying, 
what do you do? 
  
Hani: I call him, after 60 days, 2 months.  After 60 days we begin to act, because 
he didn’t come (to pay his installments).  We send him a warning from us.  That 
he has 3 days to appear or we will raise an action.  The warning is in the name of 
the lawyer, not in the name of the store.  From us, but by way of (the lawyer).   
The lawyer sends the warnings, he has forms in his office that he created for this.  
After this, if he comes and pays a certain amount, according to his credit, let’s say 
100LE if he owes 300LE, then fine, we move on, he goes back to paying 
                                                
61 I came across a number of stories in which a creditor was accused of forging, or admitted to forging, an 
honesty receipt to destroy in front of the one who signed, so that in fact the creditor kept possession of the 
original document to use against the other party at some later point. 
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installments as before, and it’s fine, he pays according to his circumstances.  If he 
doesn’t pay, we wait until 5 months have passed and we file a formal complaint.    
 
He also explains what he does when he first approaches them about failing to pay:  
First, I ask them why they’ve stopped paying.  Is there some problem, which 
prevents him from paying the money back.  Some people give excuses – I was ill, 
my wife is ill, he doesn’t have work, like that.  Some people are making these 
things up, but I can tell if they’re liars or if they’re telling the truth.  By talking to 
them like this, I let them know if I believe them, and sympathize with their 
problems.  But other times, I feel like they’re lying and I’ll tell them so outright.  
There are people who go from one store to the next, taking things on credit to get 
the money, burning goods.  They’ll come here and pay one month, and then they 
won’t pay for three months because they’re paying at the other stores they 
borrowed from.  In situations like this, I don’t have patience for their excuses 
because I want my money 
 
In accordance with the bishakl wadi ‘ ethic, a good trader takes people’s 
circumstances into account when deciding how to proceed when a debt is owed.  Later in 
the conversation, Hani emphasizes that it’s important to be generous, because you will be 
rewarded for your generosity.  Although he doesn’t make explicit reference to religious 
teachings, he indicates through his gesture of uplifted hands and face that he refers to a 
spiritual form of reward.  At the same time, Hani and other traders have a threshold for 
such generosity and are not adverse to pressuring people into repaying debts by taking 
things to the level of the court.  The honesty receipts Hani requires his customers to sign 
provide him with a basis for a legal case in such instances. 
Along with honesty receipts, traders may sometimes use checks (shikat), although 
honesty receipts appear to be more common in Port Said.  Checks include both bank 
checks and non-bank-issued checks known as shikat ghayr bankiya.  Both are generally 
post-dated for a debt to be recouped through the bank, or as collateral for a forthcoming 
cash payment; the latter are legally weaker and more easily forged; this will also be 
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addressed in the following chapter.  Post-dating checks as a form of guarantee is found in 
other transactional contexts as well (c.f. Kaufmann Winn 1994; Pinheiro and Cabral 
1999).  There are useful parallels to be drawn from economic sociologist Kaufman 
Winn’s work on relational practices and the marginalization of law in Taiwan (1994).  
She notes: “A large component of Taiwan’s informal financial sector is comprised of 
postdated check (PDC) transactions.”  This was so because the Republic of China 
Negotiable Instruments Law made criminal charges for bouncing a check possible.  
Moreover, “[u]sing PDCs to document commercial transactions thus helped maintain the 
viability of attenuated relationships without forcing the parties to assume the expense and 
inconvenience of completely converting the transaction from a relational to a legal basis 
by drawing up a contract that fully expressed the parties’ agreement” (220).  The criminal 
basis of bouncing a check was repealed in the 1987, yet PDCs are still in use.  She notes 
that they have been used to bolster increasingly tenuous networks of connections as 
consumer culture boomed in Taiwan.  Businessmen could assume that most people were 
unwilling to risk imprisonment as a cost of doing business, and felt confident extending 
credit to people outside their close network of friends and family (220-221).62   
Kaufman Winn’s findings parallel to some degree the use of honesty receipts (as 
well as checks) in Egypt in relation to both crediting practices as well as to ‘coercive’ 
uses of honesty receipts in the context of disputes.  These customary/commercial 
documents allow for retailers and others and make secure debts while also relying on 
nonlegal forms of authority that are rooted in notions of community and morality.  The 
debt can be converted into a viable case, although it must be pointed out that through the 
                                                
62 Kaufman-Winn also demonstrates that there is a connection between, on the one hand, the prevalence of 
networks and an ideology rooted in Confucianism that prioritizes personal relationships over reliance on 
state institutions, and on the other hand the use of post-dated checks. 
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practice of signing ‘ala buyaD, there is leeway in how steep a penalty might result in 
legal action.  A retailer has the option to fill in a small amount that will not be regarded as 
severely by the judge.   
 
Conclusion 
 Clearly, one of the important differences between semi-formal and formal credit 
is that formal loans are considered such precisely because laws on secured transactions 
regulate them.  El-Dean notes that the Egyptian Civil Code, principally articles 1030 
through 1084 and 1096 through 1129, articulates the rules governing the taking of 
security, covering such issues as pledges, business charges, notification, enforcement and 
sale (2002:82).   Although El-Dean makes clear the many weakness of the current law on 
secured transactions and makes recommendations for amendment of it, the regulations in 
place suggest that defaulting on a bank loan will be processed formally through the legal 
system.63  In contrast, semi-formal loans backed by customary/commercial documents 
provide opportunities to lend and renegotiate based on criteria other than fiscal solvency 
and in so doing, to build networks and a reputation.   
 Port Said has undergone changes in the 20th century that have altered the 
community in significant ways.  In particular, the economic and demographic shifts 
initiated by the Open Door policies of the 1970’s ruptured the old social order in which 
the authority of local notables was uncontested.  A new group of capitalist entrepreneurs, 
                                                
63 However, there is evidence to contradict this assumption.  One case I learned of involved a man who had 
defaulted on a number of loans taken from the bank to expand his cattle farming project.  To secure the 
loan, the bank requested – just like a store-owner would – that he sign a large number of honesty receipts.  
These were kept in his file to use against him should he fail to make payments.  This ‘informality’ in 
securing bank loans was asserted by the man’s lawyer, as well as by my landlord banker, as routine at some 
banks.   
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the ‘capitalist parasites’ as some Port Saidians classify them, rose quickly to form a 
nouveau riche class.  Customary ways of conducting business, based on relationships that 
spanned generations, were seemingly disrupted by the influx of new traders, and later by 
the weakening economy following the structural adjustment period that marked the 
beginning of Port Said’s slow decline after the consumerist heyday of the 1970’s and 
1980’s.  Over time, some newer documentary practices emerged to guarantee delayed 
transactions, involving honesty receipts and non-bank issued checks; these documents 
proved to be useful for reinforcing attenuated relationships in the evolving marketplace.  
As we will see in the following chapters, these same documents have proven to be useful 
in non-commercial contexts as well.   








Customary/Commercial Documents:  
Real Debt, Fictional Crimes, and Breach of Trust 
 
 It is relatively unsurprising to find traders making use of customary/commercial 
documents like honesty receipts to guarantee retail credit.  Yet sometimes customers are 
required to accept a high degree of risk as part of guaranteeing a transaction.  In 
particular the practice of procuring at least one honesty receipt that has no sum inscribed 
(‘ala buyaD) can later be used to claim that a significant sum (far beyond the original 
debt) is owed.  As I talked to Port Saidians about disputes unrelated to retail credit, they 
routinely made mention of the same documents in relation to disputes they had been or 
were currently involved in.  After hearing perhaps a dozen stories, typically involving 
honesty receipts as a form of ‘pressure,’ I came to realize that this unanticipated use of 
customary/commercial documents, including the risky practice of signing ‘ala buyaD, 
outside of trading and credit contexts was worthy of deeper investigation.   
This chapter focuses on the use of customary/commercial documents (muharrarat 
‘urf iya) in Port Said as transactional devices among locals largely outside the context of 
trading.  In particular, it considers how one type of customary commercial document, the 
honesty receipt (iySal amana), is employed to secure transactions unrelated to trade and 
to resolve disputes.  Honesty receipts are both ubiquitous and perceived as uniquely 
efficacious in pressuring another party to follow through on an agreement or promise. 
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Their alternate uses raise questions about what this particular variety of commercial 
document offers in contrast to other types.   
This chapter finds that there are particular social and juridical logics that 
undergird their popular use, in that honesty receipts allow for dispute resolution processes 
that have positive social value coupled with the potential for harsh legal consequences. 
Legally, their efficacy is related to the fact that honesty receipts can be used to press 
charges against the signer, designated as the party who has failed to deliver monies, who 
then faces a possible misdemeanor sentence.  Thus, an honesty receipt is considered 
stronger than a contract or other type of commercial document that only offers recourse 
to civil action for compensation or damages.  Guarantee, it will be shown, is constituted 
by staking the body, rather than assets, as surety.   
More importantly, these practices suggest that Port Saidians make pre-emptive 
determinations about how the law shall adjudicate their disputes by transforming 
fundamentally civil disputes into possible misdemeanor charges by misrepresenting the 
nature of transactions.  Port Saidians interpret the civil law as an inappropriate set of rules 
to apply to some private disputes and its courts as an ineffective context through which to 
process them.  Through practices that deny the legal system the capacity to adjudicate the 
true subject matter of a dispute, Port Saidians assume the task of adjudication and use the 
law to make resolutions and transactions binding and to force compliance.   These are a 
hermeneutic acts: in these instances the law is interpreted to be a productive source of 
violence and denied to be a source or site of fair and adequate adjudication of civil 
disputes.  This is not to present Port Said or particular communities within it as 
‘interpretive communities’ that “generate distinctive responses to any normative problem 
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of substantial complexity” as Robert Cover posits (Cover 1995:141).64   Rather, this is 
simply to suggest that the use of honesty receipts is a practice through which 
interpretation of law’s meaning, capacity, and efficacy occurs.     
As such, these pre-emptive determinations are productive and multivalent.  On the 
one hand, they are processes by which ethical or moral personhood may be constituted.  
Conversely, they may be processes by which one may leverage law to punish or threaten 
another person to achieve self-interested aims.  In such examples,we see Port Saidians 
overriding the law in order to assert rights outside the scope of what the law might allow.   
 In the preceding chapters I have sought to lay out a multi-faceted social, 
economic, and legal framework in which these documents come to be used, a framework 
in which urbanization processes have complicated local transactions and dispute 
resolution and in which separate spaces of law and morality have been demarcated 
through secularization processes.  In such a framework, taking one’s right and fashioning 
a moral self are in tension.  In this and the following chapters, I focus on document use in 
two modes, in moments of production (and the implications of such moments) and in 
circulation.  Through these moments and circulations we can observe how documents are 
social actors, modifying states of affairs and relationships, and contributing to the ways in 
which state violence is leveraged and social value is accrued.  
 
Customary/Commercial Documents 
In any of the many stationery shops in Port Said, Egypt one will find shelves 
stocked with pencil sharpeners and 2-hole punches, colorful notepads for schoolchildren, 
                                                
64 His analysis of ‘interpretive communities’ focuses on well-defined communities like the Amish in the 
U.S. 
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and somber desk sets for professionals.  One will also find inexpensive booklets of shikat 
(checks), kambiyal at (bills of exchange or drafts), and iySal at amana (honesty receipts).  
Each booklet contains ten or twenty single-copy (non-carbon) printed forms on (usually) 
low-quality paper, and costs about two Egyptian pounds.  These simple instruments are 
the means by which many local retail credit transactions are guaranteed.  They are types 
of informal commercial documents, in local parlance often referred to as customary 
documents (muharrarat ‘urf iya), a term that applies to a range of commercial documents 
that are informally composed and sometimes legally weak.   
In this section I consider the legal differences between two primary commercial 
documents, the promissory note (kimbiyala) and the honesty receipt in order to interpret 
their differential use in and out of commercial transacting contexts.  In relation to this, I 
further discuss the practice of signing honesty receipts (and shikat) ‘ala buyaD (on the 
white, or blank), in which signatures are present but the sum of the transaction is left 
unspecified.  This increases the risk for the debtor and enhances the document’s potency 
for the creditor.   The legal implications I point out here clarify some of the social 
implications discussed later in the chapter.   Moreover, the honesty receipt has largely 
come to supplant other commercial documents that were previously used with more 
regularity in these types of exchanges, namely checks (shikat) and drafts or bills of 
exchange (kimbiyal at). Through the practice of misrecognition, there are times when 
weaker legal documents have the same transactional veracity as a stronger document.  
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To some extent Egyptian muharrarat ‘urf iya, as these documents are generally 
considered, can be seen as running parallel to mustanadat.65   In the Evidentiary Law as 
to the Civil and Commercial Articles of Law 25/1968, a distinction is made between 
‘informal’ and ‘official’ documents.  In sum, official documents are legally characterized 
as those produced by a public employee or those ‘received’ by him (notarized).  Informal 
documents, on the other hand, are characterized as follows: “If such documents do not 
assume official capacity, they shall merely have the value of informal documents 
whenever the parties concerned shall have put down their signature, their stamps or their 
fingerprints thereupon” (Trade Law 25/1968/Article 10).  As a young, self-possessed 
lawyer named Hamdy informed me, customary documents can be contrasted with 
mustanadat because the latter tend to include government or court issued forms, legal 
briefs and memos, contracts that are written according to recognized legal standards, or 
informally composed documents formalized through the process of notarization or by 
being witnessed.  A customary document, on the other hand, may be a slip of paper, 
rather than a multi-page document, and is often hand-written rather than word-processed, 
simply composed, and not notarized or witnessed.   
There are examples of customary documents that exist outside the milieu of 
commerce and trade (for example, an ‘urfi marriage contract is a customary contract for 
the non-commercial exchange of property and the definition of rights and obligations), 
                                                
65 Mustanad at (mustanad, sing.) is translatable as documents but distinguished in practice as formal, as 
opposed to informal, legal documents.  Each term indexes the other, although this indexing is more implicit 
in the term mustanad at. According to the Hans Wehr Arabic-English dictionary, mustanad at (from the root 
s-n-d) generally refers to document as well as paper, deed, voucher, record, receipt and legal instrument; 
it’s juridical definition is more precise: documentary proof, records, data, legal evidence.  Muharrar, on the 
other hand, is defined as bookings or entries; in its singular form it is a passive participle, i.e. “written, “set 
down in writing”, and even “consecrated to God”.  ‘urfi (adjective; the noun form is ‘urf; custom) is 
commonly translated as customary and associated with customary law practices and forms in contrast to 
ibad at (traditions), a term with little legal connotation.   
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although my focus here is on customary documents that are linked more directly to 
commercial transactions.  In the course of my research, I encountered non-bank-issued 
checks (shikat ghair bankiya), bills of exchange or drafts (kambiyal at), honesty receipts 
(iySal at amana), false contracts (‘uqud al-Suri) and anti-contract devices (awraq al-Did), 
all examples of customary/commercial documents.   Moreover, a contract that is 
handwritten and composed without the aid of a lawyer or the use of a form can be 
considered a type of customary/commercial document.     
What does it mean to suggest that muharrarat ‘urf iya run ‘parallel’ to 
mustanadat?  The parallel might suggest a repertoire of fraudulent or counterfeit 
documents posing as legal documents, in circulation to serve nefarious purposes and 
perhaps undercutting the efficacy or validity of legal documents.  On the other hand, the 
positioning as parallel could simply suggest that there exists a complementary set of 
quasi-legal devices that sometimes supplant official documents, with varying efficacy 
shaped by both social practices and legal status.  For the most part, this latter description 
accords more closely with the documents I discuss in the following.  This is not to say 
that forgery is never a feature of customary documents; forgery of and within customary 
documents does occur with some regularity; this will be addressed in more detail in the 
following.   
How might form, legal status, and patterns of alternative uses bear on the 
classification of certain commercial documents as customary?  The issue of form was 
noted above in pointing out that customary documents are often handwritten, not 
notarized, and the like.  Second, the legal status of customary commercial documents is 
difficult to generalize because there are many different types.  However, it is not accurate 
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to assert that customary commercial documents are always weaker than or have a quasi-
legal status in comparison to formal documents (mustanadat). For example, both hand-
written contracts and ‘false’ or ‘fictional’ contracts (‘aqd al-Suri) are often indexed as 
customary documents.   A hand-written contract containing few details about the 
substance of a transaction, undated, without the signatures of witnesses and so forth may 
contain so many errors that if used in a civil case as evidence of an obligation it may be 
essentially void or unenforceable.  By contrast, a contract declared by the parties to it to 
be false may be a well-composed contract with clear terms and conditions (and may even 
be a ‘standard’ contract of sale) and legally valid.  But the legal validity of false contracts 
is often irrelevant because they are typically written for sham transactions to hide assets 
or subvert laws of inheritance; they serve as evidence of a transaction that never took 
place.  Hence, some customary documents are likely to be found unenforceable whereas 
others will be found valid.    
Let us dwell momentarily on a comparison of the legal status of honesty receipts 
and bills of exchange. A bill of exchange, also called a draft (kambiyala), used 
historically between retailers and wholesalers, is simply an unconditional order to pay a 
fixed sum of money to a third party by a particular date.  The ‘third party’ is typically a 
bank; there are offices within some Egyptian banks that accept kambiyal at payments and 
disburse the funds to the designated accounts.  Compensation for non-payment can be 
substantial; as stipulated in article 443 of Trade Law 25/1968, one who bears a draft that 
has gone unpaid upon maturity is entitled to claim not only the original amount of the 
draft but also any agreed-upon interest, additional interest at the Central Bank of Egypt 
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rate, and expenses of the protest, notifications, stamp duty, and others.  This is a 
commercial document, with redress falling under civil law.   
A sh ik is a non-bank issued check that can also be bought at a bookstore.  It is 
designed such that bank account information is filled in by hand, rather than pre-printed 
with the name, address, and account number of the account holder.  Because such checks 
provide ample room for fraud (in cases where one writes down incorrect or nonexistent 
bank account information) they were recently deprived of legitimate status as of Banks 
Law 5/2005.  Despite this, they are still available and are still used; while they no longer 
pose the legal threat of check fraud, they still can serve as surety for a delayed transaction 
or a promise.  As noted previously, they are typically post-dated and guarantee future 
cash exchanges (i.e., the repayment of a loan in cash) by putting up one’s bank account 
balance as collateral.  Bank checks are non-negotiable instruments and, as in other 
contexts, if written without adequate funds to cover payment once submitted, the account 
holder can be charged with a misdemeanor for knowingly issuing a check in bad faith.66 
Honesty receipts, on the other hand, secure three-party transactions.  They are 
intended to document and provide surety for a transfer of assets using an intermediary, in 
which money or goods moves from person A to person C via person B.  Such transfers 
are common in Egypt, where much business is transacted in cash rather than through 
checks, credit cards, and bank transfers.  There are many varieties sold in stationary 
stores throughout Port Said and Egypt, each with a slight variation in the wording of the 
document and the information requested.  In addition, some booklets include a receipt 
stub that can be filled out to record the names and addresses of each of the three parties to 
the receipt.  The following is a translation of the text of one version: 
                                                
66 According to Article 534 of the 1999 Egyptian Commercial Code. 
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     Honesty Receipt 
I (space for B’s name), residence (space for address), ID card number (space for 
number), governorate (space for governorate) have received from Mr. (space for 
A’s name and residence) the amount (space for sum) and no more.  And therefore 
with all honesty I will convey it and surrender the amount to Mr. (space for C’s 
name and residence).  If I do not surrender this amount it will be considered 
squandered and to be a breach of trust and carries a misdemeanor with it.  The one 
who admits to what is in the receipt (space for B’s signature).  And this receipt 
from me is notification of surrender. 
 
Failure to deliver means that the intermediary (B) can be accused of breach of trust 
(khiyanah al-amana) in the form of embezzlement, charged with, and found guilty of a 
misdemeanor.  It is a commercial document with potentially criminal consequences for 
non-delivery.  In addition to the misdemeanor case the plaintiff can also raise a civil case 
for compensation.  In sum, drafts or bills of exchange are viable but viewed as a less 
potent way to guarantee delivery of a payment in that a failure to pay the amount 
stipulated does not legally amount to a breach of faith or trust (khiyanah al-amana).  
Non-payment of the draft allows for civil recourse only, whereas an honesty receipt 
carries the potential of both criminal and civil recourse.   
Not only is criminal recourse more directly connected to the coercive power of 
the state, there is a perception that criminal cases move much more quickly through the 
courts, thus avoiding some of the delays involved with a civil case as noted in chapter 
two.  This perception is validated by some of the current legal reform efforts underway in 
Egypt.  In addition, the procedures by which debts or damages are recouped for plaintiffs 
are perhaps inadequate. This was not a matter I pursued in any depth, but it is worth 
noting that because many Egyptians are informally employed or self-employed, the 
option of garnishing wages that would typically be a strategy for forcibly obtaining 
money owed by order of the court is limited to government employees and select others 
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whose wages can be officially accounted for.  Moreover, as will become evident in the 
analysis of false contracts in chapter five, Port Saidians make use of some legal and 
illegal strategies to hide their assets; defendants who lose a civil case may easily appear 
to have no assets or money to seize. 
Further, the practice of signing ‘ala buyaD gives honesty receipts particular 
efficacy.  Port Saidians are often expected to, or offer to, sign their names and leave 
blank the sections in which the amount of the transaction is to be stipulated.  While the 
inclusion of spaces and blanks, and the exclusion of important terms and stipulations are 
relatively common practices with other types of customary documents, the practice of 
signing on the white (mawqa ‘ala buyaD) with honesty receipts has particular juridical 
implications.  A breach of faith charge based on non-delivery of monies stipulated in an 
honesty receipt can result in up to three years imprisonment and fines.  The jail sentence 
is at the discretion of the judge, although lawyers I interviewed pointed out that there was 
usually a strong correlation between the amount of money involved and the sentence such 
that a higher sum resulted in a longer prison term.  They argued that if the original 
amount of debt at stake is relatively small (for example 300LE), the judge will be more 
likely to grant a light sentence or fine to the party found guilty of breach.  On the other 
hand, if the receipt purports to represent a failure to deliver tens or hundreds of thousands 
of pounds, a judge will tend to assign a harsher sentence.  Therefore, Port Saidians extract 
even more leverage from this simple receipt by insisting that no sum be stipulated upon 
signing.  The bearer of the document can subsequently inscribe a large sum, or is at least 
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acknowledged to have the ability to do so.67   Judicial discretion, in this way, shapes the 
‘customary’ usage of honesty receipts.  
This is not to propose that Port Saidians who procure or sign honesty receipts ‘ala 
buyaD are explicitly aware of the legal implications.  Some Port Saidians who talked 
about their experiences using honesty receipts expressed an understanding of how this 
made the document more powerful by noting that the judgment would be harsher.  In fact 
the knowledge that signing ‘ala  buyaD can lead to a harsher sentence is conveyed as 
gesture that one is willing to take a bigger risk; this suggests confidence in one’s ability 
to repay or fulfill the terms of the agreement to which it is linked.  Yet others pointed out 
that it was simply how it was done, or that they felt they had no choice, suggesting that 
they were in a weaker position relative to the other party.  In the following chapter I 
dwell on several ‘moments of production’ in more detail, in order to analyze the 
productive nature of risk-taking through signing on the white.   
Knowledge of the legal differences between these devices and of important 
changes in the law is not uniform.  Even in discussions with lawyers it seemed that they 
had different information about what exactly differentiated them.  In particular, the new 
law regarding non-bank issued checks made their legal status and efficacy unclear for 
many users.  New laws are generally published in the papers, but this is not to say that 
people read or understand the changes and their implications.  For example, Abassi 
pointed out that bank checks were used less often today, and that wholesalers primarily 
                                                
67 This is so common that some lawyers assume that a large debt inscribed in an honesty receipt is fictional 
even when it is real.  In one case, a lawyer delayed submitting the documents to initiate a case on behalf of 
a client, a wholesaler dealing in tires, because he assumed that the 30,000LE inscribed in the honesty 
receipt was an inflated sum to strengthen the case and that the real debt under dispute was merely hundreds 
of pounds.  He later discovered that the customer truly owed the wholesaler 30,000LE. 
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insist on using iySal at amana for surety, but he didn’t necessarily understand the legal 
basis for the difference between them: 
 CH:  Do you still use shikat (checks)? 
A:  Yes, but wasuulaat more [often] because they are stronger than checks. 
 CH:  Are you talking about shikat bankiya (bank checks)?  
A:  Yes.  But the wasala amana is more powerful than the check…In the law, 
the wasala amana is stronger.  The check used to be the strong one, but 
nowadays, it is the wasala amana.   
 CH:  How did you know that? 
 A:  From the su’ (market). 
 CH:  [From] talking with people? 
A:  Yes, from life despite the fact that I’m illiterate. 
Bills of exchange (kimbiyal at) that offer less legally potent surety can still be 
productive sources of pressure through a process of misrecognition.   For example, 
Waleed, a newly-married tutor, was entrenched in a dispute with a neighbor, ‘Amr, over 
300LE.  Waleed owed this money, which represented several months of back-rent on his 
government-subsidized apartment, to the local administration office (Hayy).  He had 
asked Amir, who happened to be employed at the Hayy in the security department, to 
deliver the payment for him.  “I was busy at that time, and it seemed easy, to just ask him 
to deliver it, since he was going there anyway” Waleed recalls.  Amir agreed, and Waleed 
gave him the 300LE in cash.  But in the days and weeks following this, Amir could not 
produce the receipt for Waleed to verify that he had paid the money; each time Waleed 
asked, he made excuses about why he didn’t have it.  Soon, Waleed progressed to 
approaching Amir at work: 
Waleed: I started going to the Hayy and I would say to him, either give me a 
receipt to show you paid, or give me the money.  But he said that he had no 
receipt because the rent was late and they didn’t give him one…At first, I would 
talk to him quietly, in the hallway, but eventually I began to deal with him in front 
of his co-workers. 
  
CH: How long did you do this?   
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Waleed: I went to see him at the Hayy every morning for a month!  Finally, I 
decided to make him sign a kambiyala for the amount or I would take the problem 
to the president of the Hayy.  So under this pressure, he agreed to sign.  
 
CH: Had you ever used a customary document in this way before?  Where did 
you get the idea to do this?  
 
Waleed: I never had, but I just knew, I’d heard of others doing this…we went and 
bought one receipt (from the bookstore) and filled it in…After four months, he 
gave me the money back.  But I held on to the kambiyala for a while, just to make 
him nervous, to punish him, and then after a while I ripped it up.  
 
CH: Why didn’t you ever go to the police and make a complaint against him for 
theft?  
 
Waleed: I had no evidence, nothing to prove he took the money!  
 
Waleed was finally able to force his neighbor to admit that he had taken the 
money, and because Amir was worried about his reputation, he agreed to sign a blank 
kambiyala as a guarantee that he would repay the loan.  This resulted in the return of the 
money and solved the problem, although Waleed has never asked the man to deliver a 
payment again.  
 However, Waleed had purchased a booklet of kambiyal at from the stationary 
store rather than a booklet of honesty receipts, without realizing that kambiyalat can only 
be used to raise a civil case.  ‘Amr was under the same mistaken impression that the 
document he signed for Waleed could land him in jail if he didn’t repay the money.  As 
such, the kambiyala provided as much leverage as would an honesty receipt because 
neither party realized the difference until after the money had been returned.  A lawyer 
friend of Waleed’s informed him of the difference when he later recounted the story.  
 There are some reverberations here with economics and in particular alternative 
currencies, as Bill Maurer (2005) writes on with cogency. Maurer notes that because 
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alternative currencies are locally derived and have no formal connection to national 
economies, their transactional veracity is constituted through multiple strands (59).  For 
instance, denominations are marked in relation to the national currency thus constituting 
a clear parallel to the larger economic context in which they operate, and local residents 
agree to honor the currency for services and goods.  Alternative currencies are, on one 
level, false because they have no value outside of a particular local context.  But yet 
within that context they have purchasing power.  The kambiyala, by comparison, is an 
‘alternative’ customary/commercial document.  It is quite legally weak in comparison 
with the honesty receipt.  But through the mutual misunderstanding noted above, it came 
to represent as much of a threat as were it actually an honesty receipt.  
 
Legal Fictions and the Body as Collateral 
 Although Waleed’s example involves the repayment of money, it is critical to 
note how the writing of an honesty receipt constitutes a new debt and falsifies the nature 
of the actual debt.  This is due in part to the form of the receipt itself, which suggests that 
three parties were involved rather than two.  There may also be a falsification of the 
actual amount of debt involved, and in some instances there is no debt at all but rather a 
promise to do something (or not do something) for which a party wants guarantee.  
Many innovative uses of customary documents occur within the context of 
marriages and engagements and thus bear some relationship to how people perceive the 
family courts.  To some extent, using honesty receipts and checks suggests that they are 
ambivalent or unconvinced that the family courts are an effective medium of adjudication 
able to compel compliance with its rulings.  This is related in part to some of the common 
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strategies men use to avoid responsibility for payments, as will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  Salma pointed out that honesty receipts and post-dated checks are 
often used to compel husbands to pay the maintenance they are contractually obligated to 
provide for their wives but have neglected.  
Such cases (of men signing a document ‘ala buyaD to reassure the wife and her 
family that he will begin to pay regular household maintenance) happen a lot.  
What happens is when there are many problems between the two people in court 
we try to finish the whole thing in a friendly way (bishakl wadi ‘).  In order for 
the wife to let go of the cases she’s raised against him, he must do something to 
guarantee her rights.  This guarantee could be a blank honesty receipt or a check 
so that if he does not fulfill his duties she can sue him again.  Despite the fact that 
the woman could take her rights through the court, they prefer to solve it in a 
friendly way for the sake of the children.  However, there must be this kind of 
guarantee just to ensure her rights.   
 
Alternatively, if he continues to neglect his duty his wife can fill in a sum and 
submit it to the bank.  Salma, unlike other lawyers, tends to counsel her female clients in 
particular to obtain post-dated checks rather than honesty receipts; in her opinion this 
provides two possibilities.  Either there is money in the bank account that the wife obtains 
upon cashing it, or if there are insufficient funds a misdemeanor case can be initiated 
against him.  The potential legal case, it must be emphasized, is not formally related to 
his failure to provide the contractually stipulated maintenance.  Rather, it is a case against 
him for knowingly issuing a check in bad faith.      
In such fictionalized transactions, there is technically no ‘A’, a party that has 
entrusted B (the customer/debtor) to deliver money to C (the retailer/creditor).  However, 
to complete the form a name will be filled in (a co-owner, employee or other party at the 
creditor’s discretion), although this person has no real role in the transaction.   
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As such, even when used to guarantee simple credit transactions, the honesty 
receipt falsifies or misrepresents the nature of the exchange.  In other instances, the 
promise or claim to marry is transformed into a commercial transaction.  The space 
between fact and law can be productive: when judges review such cases, the evidence is 
reviewed based on what it appears to be, not on what is might actually be.68  Even in 
instances where the judge may have a clear sense that a breach of trust is a legal fiction, 
he must apply the laws “whatever the nature of works for which they were created” 
(Article 378, Egyptian Commercial Code).  
The use of honesty receipts in these instances is a process by which the real 
subject of the transaction or agreement is masked by a legal fiction, performing an ‘as-if’ 
act.  Annelise Riles’ (2009) work on collateral expertise and financial markets in Japan 
draws our attention to Vaihinger’s contribution to the idea of the legal fiction.  
Vaihinger’s (1952) philosophy of ‘as-if’ proposes that fictions are an elemental feature of 
human thought and life; legal fictions are merely one manifestation of perpetual 
fictionalization.  The human mind, he argues, is forever simplifying, classifying, 
organizing and converting experiences in ways that create ‘as if’ realities.   We convert 
complex ideas into simple explanations, new experiences into familiar experiences.  Lon 
Fuller addresses the ‘as-if’ act in relation to legal fictions, pointing out that one form of 
legal fictionalization occurs when new cases are fitted into existing categories (Fuller, 
1967:114).  Lawyers and judges do this with regularity, yet litigants (or parties to an 
agreement) also perform ‘as if’ acts.  
                                                
68 Because these types of legal fictions are common, it is likely that judges are aware that some commercial 
documents entered as evidence represent fictional debts.  One judge with whom I spoke went so far as to 
describe instances from his own family in which family members had used post-dated checks as pressure in 
marital disputes.   
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Honesty receipts and post-dated checks construct a useful legal fiction to preempt 
various marital problems, and in particular to preempt problems relating to fulfillment of 
dower obligations.  Upon coming to an agreement about the dower a woman’s family 
may insist that her fiancé sign an honesty receipt to be held as surety by her family.  This 
represents a source of pressure on the fiancé to save money for purchasing the array of 
domestic items agreed upon as a suitable reflection of her social status.  It may also 
pressure the young man to follow through on the marriage (instead of breaking off the 
engagement), and can even be held following the wedding as a guarantee that the 
husband will provide the stipulated maintenance.69  
Tarek, a social worker in the newly established (October, 2004) family court 
mediation offices, noted that he witnesses and hears about this practice with some 
frequency, and suggested that it was more common amongst ‘villagers,’ peasants who 
had moved to the city in recent years.  He also noted that he sees cases where women, 
young women and new brides in particular, have been deceived into signing honesty 
receipts under the pretext of signing something insignificant.  The husband can 
subsequently use these honesty receipts to threaten legal action against the wife in the 
event she raises a case for maintenance or to claim other rights.   
The examples from Port Said can be compared to what Nathan Brown found in 
his research on popular uses of the courts in Egypt (1997). In particular, Brown notes the 
use of checks to guarantee contracts that corresponds with uses of post-date checks 
described to me by Port Saidians.  He provides an example of an engagement on the 
                                                
69 This may be in lieu of other ways of guaranteeing the terms of the marriage contract.  For example, Ron 
Shaham (1997:30) discusses marriage contractual practices in the first half of the 20th century in Egypt, 
noting that it was common in this period for a man’s father to register in the official marriage contract his 
surety (kafala) for the wife’s dower (mahr) and trousseau (jihaz).  A wife could thus sue her father-in-law 
to claim unpaid maintenance, as well as her “shar’ and other rights” (30). 
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verge of collapse over money and the potential of the prospective groom’s migration 
abroad for work:   
She [the prospective bride] therefore insisted that he write her a check for the 
value of the household furnishings he had pledged to provide.  (In Egypt checks 
are often used not to exchange money but as guarantees of good faith, or they are 
postdated and used as promissory notes).  He agreed, but when the engagement 
finally collapsed he withdrew the money from the bank account.  She then took 
the matter to the police, because writing a check without sufficient funds is a 
criminal offense punishable by a jail sentence.  Her family then used the criminal 
case to increase their bargaining power. [Brown 1990:200] 
 
The prospective groom had to be diligent about withdrawing his funds from this 
account in order to avoid having these assets disbursed upon presentation of the check. 
In relation to the comparison between honesty receipts and post-dated checks we 
move now to consider some aspects of the juridical field that directly impact uses of 
honesty receipts.  According to lawyers in Port Said and based on interviews with locals, 
checks have come to be used less frequently and are commonly substituted with honesty 
receipts for surety.  While some still advocate for the use of post-dated checks, many 
people find that there are particular advantages to using honesty receipts instead.  The 
debate often revolves around the type of risk each entails: checks, unlike honesty 
receipts, pose a risk to the debtor’s assets which can be procured upon presentation of the 
check unless the funds have been withdrawn.  Honesty receipts don’t transform personal 
assets or private property into collateral.  Rather, they transform the body into collateral; 
the body is staked as surety.   
Risking incarceration, rather than assets, for a real debt or a fictional crime 
suggests that an individual may be highly concerned to protect her assets, confident in her 
ability to repay, or poor or otherwise powerless to avoid doing so.  There may be some 
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useful parallels to be drawn with analyses of the criminal incarceration of debtors 
historically.  As Finn (2003) points out for eighteenth century England, “By seizing 
men’s bodies for their debts, the civil law substituted persons for things in market 
exchange, allowing the human body to serve as collateral for goods obtained not through 
productive labor and the cash nexus but rather through the operation of consumer credit” 
(10).  This practice was supported by small-claims statues that gave creditors broad 
powers and by the legal challenge of seizing debtors’ lands and monies.  Further, 
completion of the prison sentence liquidated the debt, such that one could truly absolve 
the debt with the body (111).  Mauss’ (1967) classic study of gift and crediting relations 
in ‘pre-modern’ societies provides a fruitful way of thinking about the slippage between 
person and thing; Finn notes his observation that gift exchange can animate objects and 
objectify persons, “endowing goods with human characteristics and incorporating human 
bodies alongside material possessions in networks of circulation” (Finn 2003:10).  The 
objectification of the body is a fundamental feature of transactions involving honesty 
receipts.  
In contemporary Port Said, the threat of incarceration is generally enough to 
induce the debtor to repay.  As a lawyer pointed out to me, when a breach of trust case is 
initiated against a defendant he typically begins to concentrate on collecting funds 
quickly to absolve the debt.  A defendant might gather the sum by neglecting other debts, 
borrowing money from friends and relatives, ‘burning goods’, or retrieving money he 
might be owed.  Within the span of the weeks or months it takes for the court to hand 
down the sentence against the defendant he will have the money paid back and the 
creditor will drop the charges.  Typical court delays can thus be productive by defining 
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more clearly a space of time in which the debt must absolutely be repaid to avoid 
spending time in jail.  However there are also stories that circulate Port Said of locals 
who have borrowed and spent large sums of money and have served time to avoid 
repayment.  In such stories, the ‘collateral’ of the body has been seized and then returned 
after completion of the sentence, sometimes to begin the cycle again. 
Debtors are not the only ones who stake their bodies as surety.  As a former 
policeman, Am Ghassan, put it, honesty receipts ruin lives, and not just the lives of those 
who buy too much on credit.  They also ruin the lives of unwitting guarantors.  One 
might “bring anyone, a donkey-cart driver from the street, to sign receipts as well”.  By 
paying another individual, or in some cases asking a friend or relative, to act as guarantor 
it is possible to obtain more credit than a retailer might be willing to extend.  The hired 
guarantor and the debtor both sign honesty receipts for the creditor, taking on equivalent 
risk.  Thus the bodies of the poor who would be willing to serve as guarantors for 
compensation are also staked.  Should the debt go unpaid, the ‘donkey-cart driver’ can 
also be charged, sentenced, and imprisoned.     
 
Social Logics  
 In the preceding section I sought to show some of the ways in which the legal 
system, its procedures, processes of classification, and modes of adjudication, shape the 
use of honesty receipts and checks.  Honesty receipts can be used as evidence in a 
criminal case, and the potential of imprisonment – the coercive power of the state – is a 
powerful source of pressure on parties to an agreement.  Another angle from which to 
consider practices of surety involving honesty receipts is the vantage point of virtue and 
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morality.  How might honesty receipts allow people to align themselves with socially 
positive value?  What are the social logics, alongside the legal logics, of their use?  
Honesty receipts, I argue, allow Port Saidians and other Egyptians greater control over 
the trajectories of their disputes and transactions. Avoidance of the courts has positive 
value.  On may forestall police involvement by procuring an honesty receipt; the receipt 
gives one the power to press charges for breach of trust in the future, but allows the 
receipt holder to offer another chance and to show mercy for the present.  
For instance, one shows mercy by taking circumstances into account in someone’s 
inability to repay a debt, and traders often discussed giving people many chances to re-
instigate payment.  To be merciful is also to resolve problems in a friendly way (bishakl 
wadi ‘).  The desire to keep disputes out of the legal system is ‘friendly’ although it is 
certainly also pragmatic in relation to cost and time.  Giving people many chances to 
right a wrong or repay a debt is a sign of generosity.  As with Kaufman-Winn’s analysis 
of the use of post-dated checks in Taiwan as a way for businessmen to “maintain the 
viability of attenuated relationships” while simultaneously avoiding the complete 
conversion of transactions from a relational to a legal basis, so too do honesty receipts 
help balance financial and relational considerations.  Honesty receipts make law’s 
interaction in a transaction rhetorical rather than certain.   
This can be seen in Mahmoud’s discussion of the appropriateness of procuring 
honesty receipts in credit transactions with friends and relatives.  Mahmoud was 
describing how, like traders dealing in household goods, he uses honesty receipts when 
selling cars on credit to people, explaining that after taking a down payment he typically 
has buyers fill out one honesty receipt for each installment they will pay along with one 
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honesty receipt ‘ala buyaD.  He pointed out that this was the way to ‘ensure his right’ if a 
client stopped payment on a car.  Yet I wondered if he conducted business with friends 
and relatives in the same way he might with a stranger, and asked if he requested that 
family members sign honesty receipts as well.     
M: This happens a lot [doing business with friends and family].  However, life 
taught me.  I used to not write honesty receipts for friends and the like.  We are 
basically an Eastern society where there is respect (iHtiram) and fear (khawf) 
among people.  So I used to respect people who I know.  But in the end, I was the 
one who lost.  In the end, I had no choice but to write honesty receipts whether 
this person is a relative or not.  But I can’t file a complaint [in court] against a 
relative.  Nevertheless, an honesty receipt is considered a kind of threat that 
makes him worried and makes him want to pay.  But if he didn’t pay, I really 
couldn’t raise an action.   
 
CH: What do you do at that point, what do you say to such a person to convince 
him to pay? 
 
M: Whether a friend or a stranger, we are in an Eastern society, so I talk from a 
religious perspective.  This religious logic makes me feel concerned about others 
because in Islam we are commanded to have mercy (raHma) and kindness 
(Hasana) in our dealings with each other.  I must also seek excuses for my 
Muslim brother.  There are people whom I haven’t gotten money from for over a 
year and three months.  One of them came to me with his mother, she was crying 
and asking me not to file a complaint against her son… 
 
CH: Is this a relative you’re talking about? 
 
M: No, a stranger.  So they came saying that they will arrange it with me so that 
they can pay me on regular installments.  I sympathized with him and withdrew 
my complaint because my principle is religion and Islam commands us to be 
merciful… 
 
Mona interjected to say that not all people are like her husband.  She pointed out 
that some people don’t care about mercy or about what God ordered. Mohammed nodded 
and continued. 
M: I have a situation with my father’s cousin Abu Amru.  He hasn’t been paying 
me back.  He was going through hard times financially and besides not being able 
to pay me back, he was having to borrow money from me just to pay for his kids’ 
private lessons and other stuff for the family!  
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CH: So not only does he not pay you back for the car, but he’s borrowing more 
money from you? 
 
M: The problem was that one day while he was driving his car late at night, an 
officer took his license and suspended it for five months.  So for five months he 
couldn’t work and didn’t have any money to pay me. 
 
Mahmoud’s example reveals some of ethical and pragmatic concerns that shape 
practices of private law.  In relation to these ethical and pragmatic concerns, Mahmoud 
revealed both the ways in which he seeks to control his own level of risk, and the ways in 
which he willingly accepts a loss.  He acknowledged that one might not always ‘win’ or 
take what they deem to be their due.  Rather, ‘losing’ or bearing the brunt of a broken 
promise is part of living a moral life.  He may secure a deal with an honesty receipt, but 
that doesn’t mean he will necessarily feel free to use it because he is morally required to 
be merciful and patient.   
Yasmeen is a female lawyer in her mid-thirties with a number of relatives who 
also work in law, some as lawyers and others as clerks.  Most of her caseload revolved 
around breach of trust claims resulting from honesty receipts, and the bulk of her work 
was as principle lawyer for two brothers who owned a busy showroom selling household 
appliances.  The brothers required the majority of their customers to sign honesty receipts 
when taking credit.  As such, they were regularly dealing with recouping credit payments 
by having Yasmeen file cases against defaulting customers using these receipts.   Two 
weeks prior to my conversation with her, Yasmeen had received a call from one of the 
shop owners about a different kind of case.  The brothers had an employee who was 
primarily in charge of receiving and recording installment payments from customers in 
order to free up other employees to handle sales.  Payments were noted in a logbook and 
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cash deposited in a box to be counted at the end of the day.  Over the past months the till 
had sometimes been short when they were cashing out at the end of the day.  By 
undertaking their own investigation the brothers realized that this employee, Rasheed, 
had been skimming money from the installment payments coming into the shop.  He 
would record the accurate amount in the logbook, but take money hoping that it wouldn’t 
be noticed; at other times he underreported installment payments and took the difference.  
Over the course of perhaps six months he’d stolen approximately 1,900LE.   
 It was at this point that they called Yasmeen for advice about how to proceed.  
She recommended they wait to report Rasheed to the police until first confronting him 
personally about the theft.  If they reported him, she reasoned, the employee would be put 
in jail and it would be difficult to recoup the money he’d stolen from them.  
The point is to get the money.  So I recommended they let Rasheed know they 
had discovered the theft and could prove it in court using the logbook in which he 
had recorded payments on the days money was missing.  And I told them to have 
him sign an honesty receipt to guarantee he would repay the money.  Then the 
whole matter could be finished.  
 
Yasmeen noted that “Mohammed (the elder brother) is a good man and wanted to 
handle it without involving the police.”  After confronting Rasheed, the young man’s 
mother was drawn into the situation as well, coming to the store to beg Mohammed and 
his brother to give Rasheed the chance to pay back the theft.  Instead of one honesty 
receipt, however, the brothers forced Rasheed to sign thirty-six, all of which were signed 
‘al a buyaaD.   Yasmeen felt that this was excessive, but could not dissuade the brothers 
who were intent on making sure Rasheed felt pressure to pay back the theft.  At the time 
of our conversation this had just occurred, so Rasheed was at the stage of trying to gather 
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the money and no cases had been raised against him thus far using the blank honesty 
receipts.   
Although Yasmeen emphasizes that this strategy was most expedient, she further 
pointed out that the store owners were also swayed to keep the matter out of the courts, 
they reported, by Rasheed’s mother’s plea for mercy (raHma) for her son.  Although 
Yasmeen’s clients took her advice farther than she intended by forcing Rasheed to sign 
thirty-six honesty receipts rather than one, this course of action forestalled police 
involvement in the crime and demonstrated the store-owners’ mercy. 
 These two examples suggest that the use of honesty receipts can be associated 
with mercy, in that they are a mechanism by which police involvement in a crime can be 
forestalled.  Mohammed demonstrated that he was a ‘good man’ by addressing the 
problem without official intervention.  In Yasmeen’s example, if the case against 
Rasheed had been brought directly to the police the brothers would have lost their ability 
to control its trajectory.  
Likewise, in the example cited previously, Salma’s female clients who agree to 
drop their legal cases against husbands neglecting maintenance duties do so in exchange 
for the security of an honesty receipt.  This strategy may be a more expedient way for a 
woman to achieve her aim, yet it also conveys forgiveness and patience.  The overt 
legalization of the dispute is exchanged for a more subtle legal pressure, such that the 
party who forfeits legal redress in the civil courts might be perceived as working the 
problem out ‘in a friendly way’.  At the same time, honesty receipts anchor moral-
normative forms of pressure.  Port Saidians often positioned legal and ‘friendly’ 
strategies as opposed: The law represents expensive and inexplicable legal delays, in 
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contrast to a mutually renegotiated timetable; loss of control over a problem due to legal 
intervention, in contrast to working it out personally in due time; blind justice, in contrast 
to merciful justice that takes circumstances and weeping mothers into account.  Honesty 
receipts are a vehicle by which Port Saidians negotiate settlements that are ‘friendly’ yet 
binding.  
On the other hand, there are many instances in which the honesty receipt is not 
intended to create space for mercy, for personal moral considerations.  Rather, it is a 
device by which someone may fraudulently pressure another party to forfeit rights or give 
up a claim in court.  Examples of this include the practice of forging honesty receipts in 
the name of a wife or an ex-wife (or, in some cases, a husband or ex-husband) in order to 
force her to drop a lawsuit against the husband.  This was the case for an older woman 
named Amina who had filed for divorce from her husband on the basis of injury (Darar), 
which would give her financial rights as a divorcee.  Her husband had forged two honesty 
receipts in her name for rather large sums (250,000LE each, approximately $45,000 US 
dollars) and initiated a case against her.  Amina’s lawyer suggested that he had done so in 
order to avoid responsibility for compensation for harm that he would owe if she won her 
case for judicial divorce.  The case against her for breach, her lawyer reasoned, was a 
way to pressure her into dropping her claim of injury.  Likewise Michael, an engineer and 
jewelry trader, had been involved in at least forty-nine lawsuits with his ex-wife, many of 
which were cases against him for non-delivery of money using honesty receipts forged by 
his ex-wife.  He admitted that their divorce had been quite acrimonious, and this was her 
strategy for hurting him financially and emotionally.     
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It must be noted that honesty receipts also have a tenuous place in customary law 
processes.  Mahmoud described a complicated business deal between family members 
involving the sale of a piece of property that had gone awry.  The family had turned to 
customary mediation to resolve the issue.  He noted that because the mediator was a 
blood relative of both parties he didn’t have them sign honesty receipts as guarantees.  In 
general, however, he argued that honesty receipts are absolutely necessary: 
M: Honesty receipts are used nowadays to guarantee that neither of the parties 
will default on fulfilling his promise.  Because one of the parties might be from 
another family or even another town. 
 
CH: Were honesty receipts used like this in the past?” 
 
M: No!  There was a man’s word and his honor.  In the past, the mediator’s word 
would be carried out no matter what.  But nowadays, society has changed along 
with many things in it.  So if there is some one from another village or town that 
the mediator does not know, how can he trust that this person would listen and 
carry out his decision?  In the past, there was a complete commitment from all the 
parties and everyone would do anything to prove that he is a man of his word and 
he has honor.  So when in a session someone did not fulfill his promises, they 
would make him wear a [woman’s] gallabaya and ride a donkey in the streets to 
publicly announce that he is not a man but a child.  That used to happen a long 
time ago.  So, it made it difficult for a person not to fulfill his promises.  Before, 
people used to know each other but now the cities have expanded and people are 
distant from one another.  Thus, honesty receipts became a way to guarantee that 
people will not violate their promises or the decisions handed down [by the 
mediator].   
 
Mahmoud draws a correlation between increasingly attenuated social relations 
(“people are distant from one another”) and the need to use honesty receipts to make 
obligations efficacious.  This is posited in contrast to an imagined past in which men 
were concerned to prove they were honorable and good for their word.  Nowadays it is 
necessary to secure even customary agreements with honesty receipts because society has 
changed and the old methods of guarantee – the threat of public humiliation – is no 
longer a viable option.    
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Conclusion 
Uses of honesty receipts are indelibly marked by legal and social constraints and 
potentialities.  With contracts, bills of exchange, and non-bank issued checks, one must 
rely on civil justice to compel fulfillment of agreements.  Yet the Egyptian civil law 
courts are slow and defendents strategically hide assets to avoid having them siezed (as 
will be discussed more in the following chapter).  
Honesty receipts override the weaknesses of civil justice.  As technologies of 
guarantee, they rest on law’s articulation of breach of trust (khiyana al-amana) as the 
basis for a misdemeanour charge.  This charge can be pressed against the party who has 
taken on the fictional role of intermediary with the fictional responsibility of delivery of 
monies. Through the instrumentalization of criminal law and the transformation of the 
body into collateral, an outstanding debt may be finally repaid and a faded obligation 
renewed.  
At the same time, the power to press charges must be delayed as long as possible 
in order to convey that one is merciful.  The law is a bargaining power, but it must be 
used judiciously.  It possible to see in practices of guarantee using honesty receipts the 
subtle, or not so subtle, ways in which people clear a path into the juridical field on their 









On the White and False Contracts:  
Accruing Social Value in Moments of Documentation 
 
Documents such as marriage licenses, employment contracts, adoption 
certificates, and leases create and attest to relationships between individuals or between 
individuals and organizations; such documents are both constitutive and reflective.  
Furthermore, neither content (i.e. names and dates) nor form (adherence to local 
bureaucratic standards, notarization) can be neglected if the document is to effectively 
promulgate the relationship.  Yet even these types of legal documents, which have as 
their primary aim the establishing of a particular association and consequent rights and 
duties, do more than affect or make official a relationship between parties.  Legal 
documents are also signifiers in which multiple referents converge.  A document may 
simultaneously symbolize access to health insurance, economic stability, future college 
expenses, or membership in an exclusive community or neighborhood.   
An ethnographic approach to the question of how documents come to signify 
beyond their literal content might also fruitfully center on moments of documentation.  
Such moments involve parties coming together to negotiate, articulate and inscribe 
content.  The conversations that occur around the document can indicate what the 
participants orient to and value.  This is to some extent a concern with the way in which 
legal documents like contracts can be extraneous to how agreements are made and 
become binding, as relational contract theorists argue.  But I argue that by reckoning with 
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the document as an object or an artifact in these processes allows us to further attend to 
the object as a social actor and as a medium of collaboration and contestation.   
Moreover, in studying uses of customary/commercial documents in Port Said, I 
was struck by the form some documents took.  Through the purposive exclusion of 
important information regarding the terms of an agreement, such documents appeared to 
increase the risk involved for the parties.  In order to understand why Port Saidians might 
make and sign documents that put their assets or their bodies at risk, I turn to the 
dynamics at work in moments of documentation.  It is also the case that moments of 
documentation are only a beginning, setting into motion a process of circulation through 
different hands and spaces by which its meaning and import may change radically.  These 
circulations and how they constitute effective agreements is my focus in chapter six.   
After considering some of the ways in which honesty receipts and contracts come 
to be purposively partial, this chapter examines the making of what are known in Egypt 
as false contracts (‘uqud al-Suri, sing. ‘aqd al-Suri).  A false contract is simply a contract 
that the parties agree not to enact for some beneficial purpose.  It engenders a high degree 
of risk because the stipulation that the contract should not result in an exchange or 
transaction is contingent on a verbal agreement.  This suggests that the contract performs 
other types of work besides the work of exchange and raises questions about the 
relational and normative features that counteract the apparent legal risks.   
I dwell on one example in particular involving two brothers, and posit that the 
mutual production of a false contract is both reflective and constitutive of their 
relationship.  It is a process of making and remaking economic and affective ties between 
them.  The degree of risk taken, and in relation to it the amount of trust conveyed, by this 
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pseudo exchange are not predetermined for either party.  Rather they are part of a 
longitudinal familial dynamic.  Of equal importance is the way in which a meaningful 
interpretation of property rights emerges through interactions with and around the false 
contract itself. 
I examine how the risks inherent in a false contract are mediated (and 
exacerbated) both by the ongoing social relationship between the parties, and in so doing 
draw fruitfully on relational contract theory.  Yet this example demonstrates that 
relational contract theory doesn’t adequately address the role of the artifact.  Neither does 
it provide a way to better understand the gestures that are part of the event of signing the 
contract as modes of accruing social value.  Because the ‘text’ of the contract is 
composed across multiple planes of communication, part of this investigation involves a 
mapping of the understandings of oral and textual mediums that are in play.  
Although the instance I primarily focus on was conveyed to me retrospectively, 
through descriptions of events several months prior, there is value in applying some of 
the principles of a praxiological analysis. Dupret (2007) outlines the praxiological study 
of law, noting that it:  
aims at analyzing practices concerning what people, both professional and lay, 
identify as law and to which they orient as such. It seeks to describe the 
modalities of production and reproduction, the intelligibility and the 
understanding, the structuring and the public character, of law and the many legal 
activities.70 
 
There are two characteristics of such an analysis that are particularly pertinent in 
the following.  These are the “attention to social facts as ongoing social and collaborative 
productions within culturally identified contexts; [and] the description of what 
                                                
70 For more on praxiological approaches to the study of law and society, see also J. Ferrie and B. Dupret 
(2005). 
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participants in particular settings are oriented to” (Dupret, 2007).   Some of the ‘social 
facts’ being collaboratively produced in the making of a contract are the object or subject 
matter of the contract, its terms and stipulations.  Yet trust or suspicion is also being 
produced, likewise gratitude or generosity and other virtues; the meanings of these social 
facts emerge within culturally identified interactions.  
 
‘al a buyaD and the Potential of Partiality 
 In the preceding chapter I pointed out how honesty receipts are regularly signed 
without a stipulated sum; this practice is known as signing on the white (mawqa ‘ala 
buyaD).  The legal logic behind the practice is that it strengthens the hand of the holder, 
who can subsequently complete the receipt for a tremendously large sum.  It will be 
regarded by the judge as of more consequence and the sentence in such cases tends to 
involve a longer prison sentence than if the sum is less significant.   
 Signing on the white is also situated practice.  It occurs within the context of, 
typically, ongoing relationships.  As such, it can be understood as a vehicle for conveying 
trust and the willingness to take a risk.  For instance, in disputes between and woman and 
her family and a husband over unpaid maintenance, an honesty receipt or check may be 
signed to guarantee that past and future maintenance will be paid.   
In Salma’s office late one night a woman arrived with her husband and some 
members of her natal family to deal with her husband’s repeated failure to provide 
maintenance.  Although she didn’t have a case pending against him in the family courts to 
claim unpaid maintenance, she was threatening to initiate a claim.  As they sat in Salma’s 
office, her husband argued that he simply was not earning enough money to provide 
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enough maintenance but was trying his hardest.  His wife’s family countered that this was 
untrue and he was spending his earnings elsewhere.  The husband insisted on his 
innocence and pointed out that he was willing to sign a blank check to be held against him 
if he failed to begin providing her the proper amount of maintenance. As the wife’s 
lawyer, Salma was charged with holding on to it until the husband demonstrated good 
faith and began to provide maintenance, at which point the family could choose to tear it 
up.   
From his jocular demeanor and his submissive gestures, I observed the husband 
clearly trying to make amends to his wife and her family, and to demonstrate that in 
future he would follow through on his promise.  In offering to sign the post-dated check, 
he made a specific point about not writing a sum on it, insisting that it be done in this 
way although Salma argued that it would be better to fill it in completely.  She pointed 
out to me later that she would have preferred if they’d written a specific sum; it’s unclear 
whether her concern was over the potential that doing it this way might provide the 
opportunity for the husband to later claim that the check was forged or due to some other 
risk to her client.  What seemed evident is that the husband’s intention was to convey his 
willingness to increase his own level of risk as a demonstration of his trustworthiness.  
The parties left the office after he signed the check and the mood was far more amiable 
than when the meeting began.  
Hassan, who co-owns a small dry-goods shop on Mohammed Aly street, offered 
another example.  His friend Usama wanted to marry a young woman.  Her family 
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insisted that before he marry her he sign a blank check so that if there were any problems 
she would be protected.  According to Hassan, Usama willingly signed it because he 
loved her and wanted to marry her.  But in Hassan’s assessment, “her family was bad, it 
was bad to ask him to do this.”  After some time, Usama’s new wife told him that she 
would sign a blank check made out to him as well, because she wanted to show him she 
trusted that he would care for her and that he loved her.  So this was done in secret.  After 
a couple of years, they began to have problems and she went to the court and accused him 
of taking and selling all of their furniture, which belonged to her.  In truth, Hassan 
insisted, Usama didn’t do this, it was a false accusation.  So then they worked out the 
problem and she dropped the accusation and they got back together.  But after a bit they 
had problems again and in the end she “ended up with everything” (the furniture and the 
household items).  The tension between this couple and her family and their use of 
honesty receipts at various points to demonstrate trust is instructive.  In particular, it’s 
instructive to note how the bride demonstrates her faith in her new husband by using the 
same surety document, signed on the white, that her family used to express a lack of 
faith; the bride’s mirrors that of her family and was initially intended to counteract it.  
Honesty receipts are not the only documents that are produced as partial.  It is also 
possible to find instances of contracting in which the parties leave details unspecified.  
Moreover, unlike the examples above in which two families brought together through an 
impending or existing marriage work out their distrust of one another through the practice 
of signing on the white, there are also instances in which the practice is connected to 
expectations of familial closeness.  One of the el-Sayyid cases involved two contracts of 
sale composed ‘al a buyaD.  Two family members, adult siblings, agreed to sell their 
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nephew small sections of the plots they had inherited.  The aunt and uncle simply signed 
their names to separate contracts of sale and gave them to their nephew to complete.  On 
the standard sale contract, there are spaces for writing in the number of feddans 
(comparable to an acre) and smaller increments of land (see Appendix D).  There is also 
standard text in which the price per feddan and total amount of the sale would be written.  
In this instance, the uncle and aunt had agreed to sell less than two feddans each to their 
nephew, an agreement (reportedly) reached amicably.  As Mustapha, their lawyer 
explained to me, they trusted their nephew to write in the terms they had agreed upon.   
In the end, the nephew completed the contracts stipulating that his relatives had 
sold him twice as many feddans as they had verbally agreed upon.  The case had gone to 
court, but because they had signed their names to the contracts it was difficult to prove 
that the contract had been forged in contradiction to the verbal agreement and was 
therefore a breach of trust.  When I expressed surprise that his clients would be so 
trusting, particularly when there was already tension between family members over the 
inherited land and how it was divided, Mustapha shook his head and noted that he sees a 
lot of cases like this in his office.  In his opinion, the uncle and aunt were trying to mend 
the relationship with this nephew by trusting him with the blank contract.   
We might also consider that allowing a contract to be written by hand is an 
expression of trust and may occur between businessmen.  Abdullah’s client Wissam 
owned a building with commercial space on the ground floor.  Wissam’s father had 
rented this space many years ago to a man who had passed away, and whose son, Mounir 
Abdel Haj, had thereafter inherited the lease.  Wissam was interested in repossessing this 
space to open his own shop and therefore offered to buy Mounir out of the lease.  
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Because rental laws in Egypt provide broad protections for renters, such an arrangement 
is not uncommon for landlords who seek to reclaim their property from a long-term renter 
or inheritor of a lease.   
Wissam and Mounir have known each other for most of their lives and have done 
business before.  They had agreed previously on a buyout price of 200,000 Egyptian 
pounds, and Wissam had already paid 150,000 of this to Mounir and still owed him 
50,000.  Mounir requested that they write up a contract concerning the remaining amount.  
Because they had done business together over the years, Abdullah explained, when it 
came time to document the buyout arrangement, Wissam was not concerned enough 
about the risks of the transaction to have a lawyer draw up the contract.  Several times 
during my conversations with Abdullah without Wissam present, Abdullah stressed what 
a ‘donkey’ Wissam had been to take such a casual approach to the contract.  No only did 
Wissam not bring him (Abdullah) in to assist in writing it, he allowed Mounir to write it 
by hand.  As will become clear, this was the aspect that made the contract so vulnerable.  
The simple contract, as originally written by Mounir and signed by both he and 
Wissam, stated that Wissam agreed to pay Mounir 50,000LE as payment to relinquish the 
commercial space, of which the address was given on the document.  The document in its 
original form contained neither a date of inscription, nor a date upon which the payment 
should be received.  He then took the document and the pen with which it was written, 
and left.   
Subsequent to this, Mounir sued Wissam for breach of contract.  When Abdullah, 
as Wissam’s lawyer, was given the opportunity to look at the contract as part of the case 
file, he saw that Mounir had altered the text of the original agreement.  He had added a 
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‘1’ before the 50,000 so that it newly read that Wissam would pay 150,000.  Mounir also 
added a “waw” (and) and the sum “27,000 U.S. dollars”.  In other words, Mounir 
internally forged the contract such that Wissam was responsible for paying a significantly 
higher amount of money to Mounir than they had originally agreed upon and that had 
been written in the original contract.  To achieve this, Mounir left spaces between 
particular words and sums so that after the fact he could internally forge the document.  
Moreover, only one copy of the document was ever produced and it had remained in 
Mounir’s possession. 
Nowhere in Wissam and Mounir’s contract is it noted that the total amount agreed 
upon for release of the rental contract was 200,000LE or that three quarters of that 
amount had already been paid.  Abdullah pointed out that Wissam should also have asked 
for a receipt for that amount to have proof that he had paid it. The production of a single 
copy, and allowing Mounir to keep it together with the pen in his possession until the 
completion of the exchange, can be interpreted as ways in which the parties came to have 
unequal access or control over the document.  Instead of insisting on writing it himself 
and retaining a copy, Wissam accepted this ‘term’ of the arrangement.   
There are some indications as to why Wissam ceded control over the contract and 
the form it took.  In our discussion of the case, Wissam pointed out that there was trust 
(sikka) between them and he didn’t feel the need to worry about the writing of the 
agreement.  His trust in Mounir is likewise evidenced in his failure to properly document 
the initial payment he made (150,000LE).  At the same time, he explained to me that 
“according to Egyptian law, if the owner wants the renter to leave the shop, the owner 
must have the renter’s approval first and then he gives him fifty percent of what was paid 
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to rent the shop.”  In Wissam’s understanding of the law he was in a weak position, only 
having the right to buy Mounir out of the lease if Mounir agreed.  This may have 
contributed to Wissam’s casual approach to how the new contract was written; were he to 
demand that the documentation process be more formal (for instance, be drawn up by a 
lawyer rather than written by hand) he might encounter resistance from Mounir.  
Wissam’s recollections of making the agreement were that they ‘sat and wrote it 
together’ and that he never noticed the spaces between the words that would later become 
so important. Abdullah pointed out to me that because they were both traders, the 
casualness of the agreement, even though it revolved around a relatively high sum of 
money, was not unusual.  This resonates with the discussion in the previous chapter about 
reputation in the trading community and the presumed veracity of verbal agreements; this 
is the wadi ‘ way to make agreements.  
Because Wissam and Mounir are traders, it is also possible to think of the 
example as a manifestation of old and new Port Said.  Port Saidians and particularly 
traders may be nostalgic for an earlier time when their city was smaller and the trading 
community more close-knit than perhaps they ever were.  As an older lawyer, Mr. el-
Sibay, pointed out to me, such days are now gone.  
Well, people in Port Said are like one big family.  For example fulan (a person) 
doesn’t know me but he might have heard my name somewhere.  In Cairo, it’s 
bigger and hard to know people easily.  Consequently, because people almost 
know each other, they tend to trust and give money to one another…But 
nowadays the pace of life does not allow people to know each other more.   
 
Mr. el-Sibay articulated an idea of community in which people make decisions 
based on perceptions of mutual understanding and social closeness, which is contradicted 
by the increasing impersonality of the locale.  Wissam’s legal case regarding the 
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internally forged customary contract is an example of how customary documents can 
provide the opportunity for deception because their partial nature is borne of contracting 
practices rooted in the anticipation of trust and mutuality.   
In the preceding examples parties take risks by signing their names to documents 
they know are incomplete, with some awareness that by doing so they might be 
defrauded in some way.  Yet in so doing, they present themselves as trusting in order to 
imbue the exchange with positive sociality and to mend trust that has been broken.  These 
can be seen as ways of transacting bishakl wadi ‘ and ways in which people try to 
diminish the legal nature of an exchange by emphasizing the relational and ‘customary’ 
basis of trust that animates it.  There are certainly many ways to make attenuated 
relationships more viable; I suggest that the silences embedded in these 
customary/commercial documents are an innovation that allows Port Saidians to achieve 
this aim.   
  
False Contracts, Brotherly Love, Property Rights 
A false contract (‘aqd al-Suri) is to some extent structurally similar to an asset-
protection trust.  It defies categorization as a customary document because it is generally 
a contract drawn up by a lawyer according to legal standards outlined in the civil and 
commercial codes.  Yet it contains the unwritten stipulation that although it appears to 
represent a real offer and exchange, it won’t actually be honored or put into effect by 
either party.  It is made ‘false’ by the two parties declaring verbally that it is false, giving 
rise to verbal and written contracts that contradict one another.  In addition, false 
contracts are sometimes used in conjunction with an anti-contract document known as an 
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inversion, or ‘against,’ paper (waraqa al-Did), to be discussed below.  As one might 
imagine, false contracts sometimes become the source of a dispute because one party 
betrays the verbal agreement that defined the terms of the contract as fictional and 
decides to put the contract into effect.  The problem between Dr. Hesham and his oldest 
brother Ibrahim, which erupted in the fall of 2006, is one such instance.   
Dr. Hesham is a pediatric and family doctor in Port Said.  His private clinic and 
apartment are located adjacent to one another in a low-rise building on the main 
commercial street in Port Said.  Both the clinic and the apartment are owned by his 
brother Ibrahim, who purchased the two units many years ago.  Despite the fact that Dr. 
Hesham has inhabited and made sole use of these properties since their purchase, Ibrahim 
maintains official ownership of the units as his name is on the deed.   
Dr. Hesham has three older brothers, all of whom are doctors living overseas in 
the U.K. and Canada.  Ibrahim has just retired after practicing medicine for decades in 
London, and moved with his wife back to Egypt. Unlike his brothers, Dr. Hesham never 
left Egypt for work because as the youngest son it fell to him to care for their aging 
mother.  She suffered from a number of chronic illnesses throughout the years, and Dr. 
Hesham continued to live with and look after her into his late 40’s.  He earned a small 
income from his private medical practice, although he emphasized to me that his 
brothers, and especially Ibrahim, had always been very generous in sending money back 
to him and his mother.  He noted, “In the last 20 years, I didn’t buy anything.  He bought 
me everything from A to Zed.”  Along these lines, he points out that the office space and 
the apartment were his ‘prize’ for staying behind in Egypt with their mother rather than 
pursuing a much more lucrative medical career abroad.  It’s unclear whether Dr. Hesham 
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actually pays his brother any rent on the properties currently, although, as he points out in 
the following transcript, they did have a formal lease agreement with a small rental fee 
stipulated.  
Dr. Hesham seemed embarrassed to admit that he’d recently been deceived by 
Ibrahim with a false contract.  The gravity of the dispute was immediately clear.  
Throughout our conversation Dr. Hesham alternately described their close relationship 
and showed me photos of their vacations together, and repeatedly pointed out that 
Ibrahim was “no longer my brother.”  He describes the meeting during which his brother 
convinced him to sign a false contract: 
Dr. Hesham: While [Ibrahim] was making a visit, 3 or 4 months ago, he told me 
“Hesham, I want to take a loan over the office [with the office as collateral]… 
I want to get a loan on this place, a big loan, say a couple of hundred thousand, 
and I want to make like a…I want to sign a contract that you hire this place for a 
large amount, and this will enhance the loan”…He told me, “let’s go to the lawyer 
because I want to take a loan.  To take a loan.  On the office and on the clinic.”  
Because it is written in his name.  It belongs to [him], it is his own.71 
 
CH: He wants a loan why? 
 
DH: Why?  He wants a loan!  Wants a loan, wants money…He told me he wants 
to get a loan and he wants to make a Suri, ‘aqd il-Suri…for a big price.  
  
CH: So he wanted to make a contract saying that he rented this clinic to you for a 
very high price.  
 
DH: Yes, but I didn’t read the contract!  He’s my brother!  My brother!  Didn’t 
read the contract.  He deceived me, him and his lawyer, this man Metwelly.  I 
didn’t read this contract.  My brother!   He deceived me and he made a dirty trick 
on me.  And I didn’t read the contract…It is written in this contract that it will 
start from the first of August to the end of January, 5 months, for 3000LE a month 
[rental fee], and that it will cancel any previous contract, that means the previous 
contract is nil, doesn’t exist, and by the end of this 5 months, by the end of 
January, I’ve got to leave.  No way!  I didn’t read at all.   
 
                                                
71 The clinic had been turned into an apartment in which Hesham, his wife and daughter were currently 
living. 
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I was here (points to my chair), he was here (points to his own chair).  “Hesham, 
sign here” (he gestures, to show how his brother indicated for him to sign).  I 
didn’t even take my wife with me, she was in the car.  [Ibrahim] said [to her], “no 
you’re not supposed to come with us to the lawyer, stay here Zizi.”  Because 
Zizi’s very clever.  A very clever girl, and she can…(figure out his plan).  And I 
sign it!   
CH: And it was supposed to be a false contract, not real contract? (‘aqd il-Suri, 
mish ha’ee’ee?) 
 
DH: Yes, of course!  
 
A bit later, I asked Dr. Hesham if he and Ibrahim had also written a waraqa al-
Did (in colloquial Egyptian Arabic, warat id-Did).   
 
DH: No, I didn’t, there isn’t one (a waraqa al-Did)!  
 
CH: By word only? 
 
DH: By word only!  And of course he didn’t give me a copy of this contract, 
because I would read it and say “What are you doing? What is written here?  
What did I sign for?”…Just like that, all with the lawyer [present].   
 
 
Dr. Hesham’s brother convinced him to sign what he declared was a false contract 
stipulating that the rent for both units would become three thousand Egyptian pounds 
each month, rather than the nominal one hundred pounds stated in their current lease 
agreement.  This new lease agreement also stated that after five months, Dr. Hesham was 
obliged to vacate the premises.  According to these terms, Dr. Hesham was to pay his 
brother one hundred and fifty thousand pounds in all and would no longer be able to live 
or work in the units.   
In Hesham’s telling of the event, Ibrahim was explicit that the contract was 
merely intended to demonstrate to the bank that Ibrahim rented the property for a large 
amount, and wasn’t intended to change their current arrangement in any way.  Yet within 
a month of signing the contract Hesham discovered that his brother intended to force him 
out of the units so that Ibrahim could use them for his own purposes or sell them.  When 
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Hesham didn’t pay the increased rent, Ibrahim raised a case in court for non-payment and 
in response Hesham hired a lawyer. 
Hesham stressed repeatedly that he never read the contract.  In addition, he 
neither took a copy of the contract nor requested an inversion document (waraqa al-Did).  
A waraqa al-Did is an anti-contract in the form (typically) of a simple, handwritten 
document explicitly reversing the terms of the false contract.  For instance, if a false 
contract stipulates that a piece of property has been ‘sold’ to someone, the anti-contract 
might state that the piece of property was re-sold to the original owner, nullifying the 
terms of the false contract.  In some cases an honesty receipt is used as an anti-contract, 
rather than a document that mirrors and reverses the original contract.  The honesty 
receipt would then serve the purpose of guaranteeing that the false contract won’t be 
implemented.  The importance of these gestures – the refusal to read the contract, to take 
a copy, or to request a waraqa al-Did - will be investigated below.  
 
Making Sense of False Contractual Practice 
In his article “The Contract as Social Artifact,” (2003) Mark Suchman notes that 
despite the relevance of social mechanisms in transacting and securing performance, as 
relational contract theorists emphasize, the fact that contracts are documents must not be 
lost.  According to Macaulay (1963), among the first to explicate a theory of relational 
contracting, contracts are surrounded by practices that actually constitute obligations.  
Among Midwestern businessmen, Macaulay made the important observation that 
contracts are most meaningful as texts that clarify the terms of an agreement.  Contracts 
are not typically used to litigate when business deals go sour; relationships, not 
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documents with potential legal weight, tend to bind parties most effectively to an 
agreement.  He pointed out that the non-contractual aspects of contract production, such 
as handshakes and the desire to build long-term business relationships, are far more 
important to producing a binding agreement; texts are in many ways tangential.  In 
recognizing the importance of personal interactions and the expectation of future 
transactions, relational contract theory refutes the idea that contracts are largely discrete. 
Following Macaulay, Bernstein has argued that within particular business communities 
such as the diamond industry in the U.S. extralegal contracts are used with much more 
frequency than legally-enforecable contracts, with agreements made binding by internal 
rules of transaction, an industry-specific arbitration council, and the high value placed on 
reputation in the industry (Bernstein 1992).   
Although relational contract theory has taken seriously the extralegal practices 
that hold deals together, Suchamn brings our attention back to how the contract, as an 
artifact, might share characteristics with other types of artifacts.  In particular, he points 
out that the contract document contains symbolic properties that evoke normative 
principles and illuminate experience (100), as well as technical devices that establish 
frameworks to accomplish objectives (99); these can be seen as types of ‘significant 
gestures’ (Mead 1962) at work in artifacts generally.  
The social facts represented by a false contract are in some ways contradictory to 
those in a typical contract by virtue of the fact that this type of contract is meant to be 
fictional and represents expectations and meanings purposely unarticulated in the 
document.  Because the content of a false contract is supposed to be meaningless to the 
parties, the ‘symbolic properties’ and ‘technical devices’ contained in the document are 
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less relevant for the signatories than they are for the bureaucratic entity for which they 
are intended to prove a relationship to property.  However, Suchman’s suggestion that the 
contract document deserves closer scrutiny is relevant to the production of false contract 
documents in Egypt, encouraging attention to contract-making as an artifact-making 
event comprised of interactions and gestures that also forge meaning and relationality. 
There are similarities in this suggestion to anthropological approaches to material 
culture that make material objects central to the investigation of social practices that may 
surround them (for example, archaeological studies of ritual objects); the form of the 
object is critical to its use or role in social life.  I pursue this line of inquiry by positing 
that 1) documentary form, in contrast to the oral medium, is important, as is 2) the 
parties’ relationships to the document.  The document, despite its seemingly irrelevant 
content, is not an ‘extraneous epiphenomenon’ as the relational contract theorists might 
consider it to be in other contexts.  Rather, it is the central vehicle through which people 
express values and make meaning in these types of transactions.   
According to Suchman, “…to make sense of a contractual practice, one must 
understand both the economic and the cultural environments that give it birth.  At the 
same time, however, one must also recognize that contracts, like any artifacts, are 
themselves capable of affecting these environments, both culturally and economically” 
(2003:92).  To ‘make sense’ of false contractual practice there are a number of things to 
understand about the cultural and economic environment that brings it into being.  What 
are the understandings and the discourses embedded in the false contract artifact type, as 
 
  194 
well as in the inversion paper artifact type, that allowed Ibrahim to use these documents 
to put his strategy into effect?   In particular, what are the values or virtues specifically 
assigned to both entextualization and spoken forms that underlie this contractual practice?   
Firstly, false contracts are quite commonly used for hiding and protecting assets, 
not dissimilar to asset protection strategies in other legal contexts.  They are most 
commonly used by men trying to avoid or lessen maintenance payments to their wives or 
ex-wives and children.  By appearing to have fewer assets, a man reduces his legal 
responsibility to pay substantial support.   Under Egyptian family laws, men bear sole 
responsibility for economic maintenance of the family and for paying any child support 
following a divorce.  Here’s a situation described to me by Hossam, a lawyer in Port 
Said:  
Yes.  I had a very famous case of a quite well known hairdresser called 
Khaled…He has a boy and a girl [from his first wife].  He’s a very rich man, and 
when his first wife demanded more [money, as maintenance for their two 
children], he started to hide his properties.  He wrote everything to his friend (i.e., 
they created false contracts of sale) and they wrote the inversion paper (warat id-
Did) for each other.  When the shaykh al-Hara investigated, [Khaled] said that he 
works in the hairdresser’s as an employee and not as an owner of the shop 
anymore.  After that, the maintenance was reduced from 1000LE to 300LE [per 
month].  This was because he wrote everything for his friend so that no one 
knows exactly what belongs to him.72   
 
False contracts can also be used to circumvent the mandates of the laws of 
inheritance, which provide for family members to receive shares of an estate according to 
their degree of relation to the deceased.  While talking with Mustapha about false 
contracts one evening, my assistant Wael spoke up about an example from his own 
                                                
72 A shaykh al-H ara is a state employee charged with maintaining up-to-date information on residents in a 
particular neighborhood.  This is likely an informal rather than a formal title now; the history of the shaykh 
al-H ara as an intermediary between the police and the residents of neighborhoods in Egypt has been 
examined by Toledano (1990). 
 
  195 
family: “My aunt has five daughters.  Her husband wants a son badly, but it’s not God’s 
will.  So recently he visited a lawyer and drew up ‘u’ ud is-Suri selling property to his 
daughters and wife.”  Mustapha responded that this isn’t what shari‘a says and that his 
uncle should not have done this.  Wael protested, “He has five daughters, what can he 
do?  Can he trust his brother?”  In other words, according to the codified shari‘a, the 
husband’s brother would inherit more than his brother’s wife or female children.  This is 
the mechanism by which he will be able financially to carry out his religious duty to 
provide for his brother’s family upon the brother’s death. But Wael’s uncle assumed, for 
whatever reason, that his brother would not adequately provide for his wife and daughters 
so he took preventative measures to make sure they would not fall into destitution should 
he die.  
False contracts are also employed for matters outside of personal status laws.  In 
the 1960’s, when land redistribution laws limiting landholding to fifty feddans per person 
came into effect under President Nasser, landowners sometimes used false contracts to 
represent false sales of land to neighbors, friends, and family members. Landowners 
divided up their land, Mustapha pointed out, ‘giving’ land to people who were neither 
offspring nor siblings so that the government wouldn’t take it.  Often these arrangements 
were immediately, although secretly, reversed by the making of an anti-contract.  The 
anti-contract (a second contract of sale by which the property was ‘resold’ to the 
landowner) was typically not notarized.  After the land law was reversed through 
subsequent legislation, such lands were returned to their original owners, although there 
are certainly instances where the reversal of ownership was contested despite the fact that 
ownership was never intended to be other than fictional.   
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Port Saidians also report using ‘uqud al-Suri to avoid taxes, circumvent 
inheritance rules, and circumvent laws prohibiting private ownership of a business by 
government employees, among other circumstances.  Articles 328 and 329 in the 
Egyptian Penal Code (Appendix E)  obliquely reference the illegality and fraudulent 
nature of some of these asset-protection practices achieved through the use of false 
contracts.73  Despite the risks, their use is normalized and socially accepted.  
Contractual and anti-contract device practices are another type of legal fiction.  
Unlike common uses of honesty receipts, however, the false contract is typically not used 
between disputants but between friends or family members.  They allow a person who 
valuable property or assets to pretend ‘as-if’ this property belongs to someone else.    
Moreover, a false contract is generally produced to perpetrate a deception in 
relation to an authorizing body such as the government, the bank, or the tax authorities.  
It embodies an attitude towards and a common way of handling formalities and 
bureaucratic entities, as political scientist Diane Singerman has shown in her work on 
Egypt.  Singerman looks at how Egyptians find ways to achieve aims despite an array of 
excessive and complex laws that stand in their way.  She notes, in reference to a sha’bi 
(popular) community where she conducted research:  
although the community may not agree on the illegality of certain acts, people 
may not be condemned or censured by their peers for other activities such as petty 
corruption, moonlighting, unlicensed construction or renovation, forging official 
documents, or tax evasion.  The social definition of criminal behavior often 
contrasts with its institutional definition. [1995:214]  
  
                                                
73 These articles address the ‘hiding’ of property among traders in order to claim bankruptcy and avoid 
payment to creditors as grounds for penalization. 
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Ibrahim presented the false contract as necessary to obtain a loan, and in so doing 
referenced a variety of understandings about bureaucracy, banks, and necessary 
falsification of documents to get around regulations perceived to be overly-restrictive.  
These understandings about the legitimacy of false contracts as a mechanism by 
which regulations and rules can be morally circumvented out of necessity are enmeshed 
in a broader field of understandings about entextualization and the spoken word.  Dr. 
Hesham points out that he explicitly did not read the contract and simply signed where 
his brother and his brother’s lawyer asked him to.  He performed his trust or faith in his 
brother by refusing to even look at the document itself.  Likewise, he didn’t ask for a 
copy of the contract.  Neither did he ask for a waraqa il-Did, an anti-contract.  These are 
gestures that seem intended to convey a message to his brother about the differential 
value of the spoken promise and the text.  The text of the false contract, he seems to be 
expressing, is meaningless to me by virtue of the fact that you’ve just promised me that 
the text is meaningless.  To read, to request a copy, might indicate that the document did 
have value between them, and they had just agreed that it did not.  
But, what is the significance of Dr. Hesham’s failure or refusal to request that an 
anti-contract be written as a guarantee of the contract’s falseness?  Certainly, this was 
also intended to be a gesture of trust and faith; Dr. Hesham says repeatedly, “I trusted 
him, my brother!”  But what is the connection between not writing it down, not inscribing 
the agreement in writing, and trust; what is the ‘common sense’ at work here?  Decisions 
about whether to write down agreements, and in this case to spell out that the contract 
was false and should be considered non-binding, are complicated by the way people tend 
to interpret the Quranic sura, il-baqarah (The Cow).  This is a verse commonly cited in 
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relation to contractual issues.   Because the sura of the Cow plays a role in everyday 
decision-making in the community I look at the social life of this sura, how it gets 
interpreted and frames promise-making.74  For instance, as one Port Said lawyer noted: 
People write everything down, if they make an agreement, they write it so that 
each side knows their right and their obligation.  If two people make an agreement 
about money, they must write it down, it is stated in the Quran.  No matter how 
small or large the amount, they should write it.  The aya, in summary, says that if 
there is any debt between you and someone else, write it down and bring two 
male witnesses.  If there aren’t two men, bring a man and two women, or four 
women.  The second woman may forget and the first can remind her and vice 
versa…This is The Cow, Aya 2:282…But, the prophet also says that if they have 
honesty (amana) in their hearts, they don’t have to write it but can trust one 
another.  So sometimes they write it, sometimes they don’t. 
 
A young teacher expressed a similar construal of this sura: 
 
In the Quran, it states very clearly, and more than once, that if you make an 
agreement, if you sell something, first, write it down (no matter how big or small), 
and second, have it witnessed.  This is from the second sura, the Cow, aya 282 
and 283.  If you take something on credit, you have to write it down…But if you 
trust each other do it without writing or even witnesses.  
 
 
Interpretations of the Sura of the Cow in this vein abound and illustrate the moral 
ambiguity people face when making agreements.  One the one hand, it is commanded in 
the Quran to write down agreements, no matter how big or small.  Yet if there is trust in 
one’s heart, writing isn’t necessary.  These Quranic verses are part of the common 
vernacular such that not ‘writing it down’ often becomes equated with demonstrating that 
one has trust, whereas to insist upon writing is an expression of distrust.  Clearly, beyond 
the moral implications there are legal implications for entextualization as well, in that it 
represents the potential of litigation and a willingness to get the courts involved.    
                                                
74 As such, rather than cite the text of the verse itself it seems more pertinent to cite interpretations of the 
Cow that various people offered in discussions about the relevance of documentation and verbal 
agreements. 
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Orality, by contrast, is associated with a number of positive processes and 
qualities.  As noted in chapter two, it is associated with wadi ‘ strategies of resolution.  It 
has temporal associations with a golden era of trade in Port Said when men conducted 
business on a large scale relying entirely on verbal agreements.  These shape the 
sentiments that a man who is good for his word, who keeps verbal agreements, is 
respectable, honorable, and vice versa.   The oral as an honorable medium also resonates 
with the spirit of ‘urf; Port Saidians often pointed out that it was customary (‘urf i ) 
practice to make and keep oral agreements.   
The high value placed on a man’s word can also be seen as a manifestation of the 
ambivalence some Egyptians feel about formalizing agreements and turning promises 
into contracts.  As Jonathan Yovel points out in his work on contracts, promises, and 
speech act theory (SAT): “[P]romises are not ‘skeletal’ and legal language is not merely 
‘about’ them…because (legal language) shapes and transforms (promises)” (2000:960).  
With formal contracts, law’s language inevitably interacts with and alters normative 
mediums such as promises.  Verbal agreements both exemplify customary norms and 
prevent law’s language from altering a promise. 
A verbal agreement can also be seen as a performative speech act that is both 
collaboratively and individually produced.  A contract is marked as false by a declaration 
(“Suree, mish ha’ee’ee;” “false, not real”) that is presumably transformative, which may 
bear some resemblance to other performative speech acts.  The vow of falseness has the 
potential to have illocutionary force, if the proper conditions are met.  Such force, as J.L. 
Austin (1962) argues, rests in part on the structural or institutional authority of the 
speaker and on certain felicity conditions, in particular the sincerity of the speaker.  By 
 
  200 
declaring the contract false, Ibrahim performs a type of vow.  Hesham, in turn, interprets 
this declaration as sincere and thus as actually transformative.  
The performative features or gestures that are part of the making of the false 
contract both reveal and enact a spectrum of evaluative ideas about the written and the 
oral.  These gestures are not extraneous to the making of this contract, but rather integral 
to clarifying the relationship between the document and the oral agreement that 
accompanies it.  Such gestures as refusing to read or take a copy of the contract express a 
lack of concern for the documentary aspect of the agreement and empahsize the value of 
the verbal agreement.  
 
Risk and Reciprocity 
Despite the fact that Hesham asserted to me: “I was willing to sign (the false 
contract) because I was not afraid to sign,” signing a false contract is inevitably risky. It 
represents the potential forfeiture of use rights to the property according to the actual 
terms of the contract.  Simultaneously, Hesham risks legal sanction because he 
perpetrates bank fraud by helping his brother misrepresent his income. 
Precisely because this type of contract contains a high degree of legal and 
economic risk to the signatory, it can be a vehicle to perform other social-relational work.  
In this instance, it contributes to the generalized reciprocity between family members.  
Hesham’s financial well-being has been connected to Ibrahim’s generosity for more than 
twenty years.  Ibrahim, along with their other brothers, supported Hesham and provided 
him with a comfortable life in Egypt by sending money regularly for the purchase of 
household items and to cover other living expenses.  This economic support is tied to 
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familial narratives of duty towards an ailing mother and the brother who stayed behind to 
care for her; Ibrahim’s duty to provide support to compensate Hesham for being their 
mother’s caretaker is a familial, not a legally defined, obligation. According to Hesham’s 
narrative, Ibrahim’s economic support was also a reward for sacrifice and lost 
opportunities, and for what Hesham describes as ‘the black days’ relating to this sacrifice.  
Although he was proud of having cared for his ill mother and noted that it was something 
he wanted to do out of love for her, he was also quick to point out that it was done at the 
expense of his own career and independence.   
Hesham made clear to me that he was owed his brothers’ generosity.  He 
described his brothers’ generosity as a duty, and noted that his own sacrafice grants him 
particular rights within the family.  Because these rights are not legally inscribed – after 
all, Ibrahim’s name is still on the deed – and so his claims to them must be staked 
through reciprocal acts that nurture both their economic and affective ties.  Unfortunately 
for Hesham, signing the false contract in this instance was a failed reciprocal act.  
Ibrahim used it to deceive Hesham and to claim legal rights to the property.   
Hesham responded to this deception by initiating a process to resolve the dispute 
bishkl wadi ‘.  His shift in strategy was in part an acknowledgement that despite his 
lawyer’s best efforst he would most likely lose the case in court.  There was no getting 
around the fact that his name was on the contract, and even though it was illogical that he 
would sign a new contract for 3000LE per month when he already had a lease for 100LE 
a month, he didn’t anticipate that the judge would consider this strong enough evidence 
that he was coerced into signing. Hesham anticipated that he would lose ‘at both courts’ 
(primary and appeals).  He hired Mustapha to represent him because, Hesham noted, 
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Mustapha was very good at using delay to his clients’ advantage.  Mustapha had 
immediately submitted a stop action (ta’an) on the basis of forgery; this type of action 
keeps the case from going forward until the status of a piece of evidence is evaluated.  
This meant that the contract would have to be submitted to the Ministry of Justice Office 
of Experts and eventually examined by a forgery expert, the process of which could take 
months because of bureaucratic backlog.  Even though his signature on the document 
would most likely be found to be real and not forged, the formal delay tactic was part of a 
larger strategy.   
Hesham had contacted his two other brothers in Canada, told them about the 
situation, and they were making plans to travel to Egypt to help resolve it. Hesham had 
asked them to step in as mediators, and to negotiate a resolution with Ibrahim.  The delay 
tactic in court was intended to buy time until they arrived, and he fully anticipated that 
his brothers would resolve the issue in his favor, that they would continue to support his 
rights claims and somehow force Ibrahim to withdraw the case.  In other words, Hesham 
may have responded to his brother’s legal case by mounting a legal defense, but he did so 
only as a strategy to move the problem back into the realm of the personal and the 
familial. The law for him, in this case, is not necessarily a source of power, but a 
bureaucratic tool to deploy in his effort to delay the case against him. 
Despite the fact that Ibrahim had legal ownership of the apartment and the clinic, 
Hesham had long ago been given clear and unbounded use rights to the apartments as a 
reward for his sacrifice.  To rescind use rights by simply requesting that Hesham give 
them up willingly would involve denying the sacrificial narrative that had underwritten 
their dynamic over the past twenty years.  Ibrahim’s efforts to reclaim his property, 
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through the misrepresentation of a false contract’s purpose as a legal maneuver are in 
tension with Hesham’s efforts to keep ‘obligation’ from being legally defined and return 
it to the normative realm of familial reciprocity.       
 
Conclusion  
 Analyzing moments of document production allows us to consider the way 
documents come to signify beyond their literal content.  The gestures and verbal 
exchanges that accompany the simple act of signing one’s name on the dotted line imbue 
the document with added value.  Although this might suggest that the relational aspects 
of contracts or guarantry instruments make the document extraneous, I argue that the 
document is integral to the exchange.  It must be reckoned with as a particular kind of 
artifact and as the object around which interactions revolve.  This can be seen most 
clearly in the practice of signing on the white, in which the form the document takes is 
shaped by the desire of parties to display a willingness to increase their risk.  It is also 
visible in the refusal to write anti-contracts that refute the terms of a false contract.  
Through such practices, relationships are mended and trust is re-established.   
 False contracts and customary/commercial documents signed on the white 
necessitate verbal agreements to ‘fill in the blanks’.  This mediates the intervention of 
law’s language in promises and inflects transactions with the normative value of a man’s 
word.  Moreover, we can see that the making of false contracts is not simply a strategy 
for hiding assets but is also a medium through which reciprocal exchange is enacted and 
familial relationships remade.      
 




 Family-To-Be: Betrothal, Broken Promises, and Documentary Interventions 
 
Among Egyptian Muslims, a marriage is made manifest as a contract.  The 
contract is based on Islamic shari‘a as codified by a series of laws in the early part of the 
20th century that mandated the requirements for validity.  The contract articulates the 
distinct rights of the husband and the wife as well as their mutual rights, connotes 
permanence, and requires offer and acceptance of the terms.75  Although sometimes it 
will be signed long before the wedding day and the parties agree to delay cohabitation 
until that time, the marriage contract marks a transformation by which persons are 
formally wed and legally recognized as bearers of specific duties and rights vis-à-vis one 
another.     
 Like other contracts, a marriage contract may be proven invalid under certain 
circumstances; in particular, other documents may be used to contest a contract’s validity. 
For instance, Egyptian court records from 1984 show that a man sought to annul a 
marriage between a husband and wife in order to marry the wife.  His annulment request 
was based on letters of proposal exchanged between he and this man’s wife, which letters 
he claimed as evidence that a contract had been established between them.  He 
maintained that this contract made the woman’s present marriage contract void; his claim 
was rejected through to the appeals level (Dawoud, 1992:16).  In the well-known 1994 
                                                
75 Couples in contemporary Egypt now use a state-issued marriage contract, which is standardized; a blank 
section in the contract may be used for additional stipulations. 
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hisba case76 against Dr. Nasr Abu Zayd, the Quranic scholar’s controversial publications 
prompted a Muslim lawyer to file a case in the personal status courts demanding Abu 
Zayd’s forcible divorce from his own wife on grounds of apostasy.  The case rested on 
the assertion that Abu Zayd was a heretic, and that a Muslim woman cannot, according to 
shari‘a, be married to a non-Muslim. The appeals court ruled in the lawyer’s favor and 
Abu Zayd and his wife were legally divorced.  
In both of these annulment cases texts or documents were brought to bear on the 
validity of a marriage.  These documents interact with the marriage contract and in so 
doing create effects, reveal hidden truths, and instantiate claims.  These letters professing 
love and the offer and acceptance of marriage, and scholarly writings interpreted as 
heretical did not originate as legal documents but come to play a role in litigation as 
evidence.  In so doing they intervene in a marriage and threaten its dissolution by 
requiring the court to judge whether their very existence invalidates the existing contract.  
The fact that love letters might invalidate a contract, or that Quranic exegesis unrelated 
even to marriage might dissolve a marriage suggests that documents may do 
unanticipated things; their participation in processes may be attenuated and non-linear.   
In light of historical and contemporary analyses of textuality and shari‘a subjects 
(Messick 1995; Messick 1998) and work that has sought to foreground documents as a 
particular kind of ethnographic artifact (Riles 2006) these legal cases provoke a 
consideration of legal documents as ethnographic subjects.  In so doing documents may 
be analyzed not simply as bureaucratic artifacts or objects that ‘contain’ information or 
reflect realities, but as part of the action.  This chapter is an attempt to go beyond a 
                                                
76 hisba/ihtisab is the canonical injunction to command good and prohibit evil.  See Salvatore (2004) and 
Bernard-Maugiron (2004) for more on hisba cases in Egypt.   
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particular legal document – a marriage contract - in order to discern the relevancies that 
occur in the documentation and to see how legal documents participate in making social 
realities.  It is an investigation into one case in order to observe the documentary 
interventions that led to the making of a marriage contract between two people who did 
not necessarily want to be married to one another.   
To go beyond the marriage contract in contemporary Egypt is to begin with a 
consideration of betrothal, marriage, and family law.  Through a discussion of what 
valuations and procedures are a part of these rites of passage for Muslim Egyptians, I 
suggest that the period of engagement is socially and legally perilous for women in 
particular.  In Egypt, betrothal is often the point at which a couple will begin the process 
of becoming acquainted and allows the affianced to spend time together in approved 
contexts yet puts strict limits on intimacy.  It is also the point at which the couple and 
their families begin to prepare for marriage by making substantial financial and time 
expenditures.  Section one investigates what is at stake, legally and socially, in betrothal 
before moving to analyze some of the ways families secure a promise to marry through 
the deployment of various legal documents.  These deployments are in contradiction to 
the spirit of the law designating betrothal as mutually and freely revocable.   
A second coordinate – a recent case from Port Said Egypt revolving around an 
alleged rape and a broken betrothal – brings into focus an example of how legal 
documents intervene to secure an engagement.  I consider the way that three documents 
play a role in bringing a promise to marry to fruition in this case: a police report, an 
honesty receipt, and a marriage contract.  Each of these documents has transformative 
potential yet, as I show, the transformations they achieve require particular circulations 
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and intersections.  The documents move between people and between people and 
institutions, they beget one another, and in so doing they come to have efficacy that is not 
predetermined but fashioned by the participants.  The police report serves not to follow 
through on an accusation of rape but instead to produce a commercial document, the 
honesty receipt, instantiating a fictional debt.  This debt in turn secures the marital 
pledge.  By invoking the law through these devices, litigants can pressure one another to 
honor agreements that are not otherwise legally enforceable.  As such, I excavate the way 
these three types of legal documents come to bear on one another both at the creative 
request of the litigants and at the insistence of the law.   
Considering circulations of seemingly disconnected legal documents as part of 
betrothal and marriage – processes by which new interfamilial relationships are in flux 
and being formed - can help us see how they assemble and reassemble relationality.  My 
analysis draws on Latour’s position that objects are actors and can be seen to participate 
in action.  Further, he argues (2007), they are mediators in that they achieve 
transformations and modify a state of affairs.   A marriage contract, on one level, 
concretizes or formalizes marital intimacy; at the same time, the contract is intersecting 
with other documents that alter or modify rights, obligations, and sensibilities.  As 
participants and mediators, objects, in this case legal documents, are inextricable from the 
‘social’ processes they might at first seem to be merely reflecting.   
 
Betrothal, Sexual Intimacy, and Law 
Mother of the Bride (1963) is an Egyptian romantic comedy directed by Atef 
Salem that revolves around the complications of betrothal.  In the film, Ahlam, the eldest 
 
  208 
daughter in a middle-class family of seven children briefly encounters a handsome man, 
Galal, at an engagement party for her cousin.  They are introduced, exchange shy looks, 
and privately confess instant affection for the other.  Within a few days they are engaged 
and a small party is held to formalize the engagement, during which Galal presents 
Ahlam with a ring, the guests eat cake, and Galal’s family members hand over a cash 
dowry payment to Ahlam’s father Hussein.  They also make a series of demands about 
the type and amount of furnishings Hussein must contribute to the marital home: a 
rosewood armoire, oak dining set with twelve chairs, six mattresses, and other requests 
far beyond the means of the bride’s father Hussein.  As the film progresses the groom’s 
family becomes increasingly agitated by delays, insisting that the marriage must take 
place quickly.  The necessity for a swift wedding is emphasized by scenes of Ahlam and 
Galal spending time together on chaperoned outings, during which Galal tries to contain 
his physical desire for Ahlam and Ahlam’s younger brother aggressively protects her 
virtue. The tension in the film builds until Hussein finally decides that his only recourse 
to ensure his daughter’s future is to steal from the office safe to purchase the necessary 
trousseau items.  In the end, punishment for his crime is averted through the kindness of a 
coworker and Ahlam and Galal are transported through the wedding into a state of 
sanctioned intimacy. 
The humor of Mother of the Bride draws directly on a number of real concerns in 
Egyptian society, trafficking extensively in the trope of engagement as fraught with 
economic and moral hazards.  Parents and family members are charged with setting the 
marriage on a course of financial security while at the same time helping the young 
couple to control their passions. Although made in the 1960’s, the film’s dominant theme 
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of betrothal as perilous is still relevant in Egypt today.  Engagement is an approved social 
space for couples to get to know one another prior to marriage, yet it is also a confession 
of desired intimacy not yet licit.   
Unlike betrothal for many non-Muslims in Europe and the U.S., betrothal in 
Egypt typically marks the beginning of a relationship rather than the culmination of 
months or years of dating.  Engagement is therefore an official start to the process of 
becoming acquainted under the watchful eyes of family members.  This is less so for kin 
marriages between cousins and even non-kin couples may have spent time together at 
work or school or may have known another from their neighborhood or as the friend of a 
sibling.  Among Egyptian Muslims, betrothal (khutba) is the first step in a series of 
publicly observed stages of marriage.  It is formalized by the reading of the fatiha (the 
first Sura of the Quran) and by the giving of shabka (gifts of gold to the female).  
Following this, sometimes years later, is the katb al-kit ab, the signing of the marriage 
contract, the faraH, the wedding celebration, and the dukhla, the ‘entry’, the first night of 
cohabitation and presumed consummation of the marriage.  It is only upon the conclusion 
of all of these stages in this precise order that a marriage is conceived to be both legally 
and socially sanctioned.  However, as noted below, there are cases of secretive or 
unregistered marriages that fulfill the minimum legal requirements of marriage.  
Anxiety about what engagement allows and prohibits is exacerbated by the long 
term of many engagements.  Unlike Egypt in the 1960’s, it is now typical for couples to 
remain engaged for a year or more, and sometimes for many years, while the groom, the 
bride, and their families gradually procure an apartment, renovate and furnish it, purchase 
the trousseau, and prepare for the wedding festivities.  Moreover, Singerman and Ibrahim 
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note that the costs of setting up a marital home are more intense for newlyweds in urban 
areas (such as Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said).  The high costs of marriage fall primarily 
on the groom’s family; in urban areas the groom and his family provide an average of 
72% of the wedding costs.  Moreover, according to statistical data from 1999, the average 
cost of marriage equals eleven times the annual household expenditure per capita.  This 
suggests that families must save for years to afford a marriage (particularly if they have a 
son), and thus that marriage preparations are protracted in direct relation to the economic 
burden they represent (Singerman and Ibrahim 2003). 
Although the economics of marriage typically necessitate a long engagement 
period, some Muslim couples in Egypt subvert this pattern by privately conducting 
common-law or customary (‘urf i) marriages.  Prior to 1929, when the Egyptian state 
incorporated Muslim marriage, all Muslim marriages were technically ‘urf i as they were 
unregistered yet met the requirements of shari‘a (mutual consent, presence of a guardian 
for females who had not previously married, a dowry, and two male or two female and 
one male witnesses).  But in contemporary Egypt ‘urf i marriages are commenced under a 
variety of circumstances, for instance as a way for a man to secretly take a second wife. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the 1990’s saw a rise in ‘urf i marriages among young 
college students who sought to have a (legal) sexual relationship with one another while 
simultaneously avoiding the interfamily negotiations and protracted formal engagement 
period of a formally registered marriage (c.f. Allam 2000; Shahine 1998).  ‘Urf i 
marriages of this type can be seen as a kind of marriage of convenience or temporary 
marriage.  As Rashad and Osman note, “[i]ndeed, the emerging common-law (‘urfi) 
marriage among young couples in Egypt, as well as other non-conventional forms of 
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marriage, may represent a coping strategy among youth as a compromise to the economic 
constraints to marriage and the cultural denial of extra-marital sexual relations” 
(2003:39).  The presence of ‘urfi marriages alongside registered marriages points up the 
importance for Muslim Egyptians of limiting sexuality to the domain of marriage.  
Moreover, female sexuality outside of marriage in particular may be perceived as 
having greater consequences for the family (Mcleod 1991; Rugh 1984) and in Islamic 
thought, women bear primary responsibility for maintaining the sanctity of male-female 
relations.77 Muslim jurists argue for gender segregation, pointing out that “interactions 
between women and men who are unrelated by immediate kin ties (ghair maHarim) are a 
potential source of unvirtuous conduct and illicit relationships (Mahmood 2005:110)”.  
Mahmood notes that modesty practices, including veiling and averting eyes, are practical 
strategies to deter the danger of women’s sexuality to sanctity of the Muslim community 
(111).  Even though men and women now have more opportunities to mix publicly than 
in the past, unsupervised interaction between unmarried men and women is normatively 
conceived as sexual and sends a message that a woman doesn’t have akhlaq (good 
morals), threatening her chances for a finding a suitable husband (Sherif 1999: 620).  
Ethnographic data from a 1970’s-80’s-era study of family in Egypt emphasizes the 
particular consequences for females: “As one (Egyptian) mother noted: ‘If this young 
man doesn’t marry her nobody else will if they think he has even so much as kissed her’ 
(Rugh1984:157).  As will be seen in the case from Port Said, guardianship of female 
sexuality is intimately related to the consideration of marriage prospects. 
                                                
77 As Armbrust shows (1998), sexuality outside of marriage is depicted frequently in Egyptian films, yet 
historically it was made palatable through plots in which some terrible misfortune (death or otherwise) 
befalls the character.  Films also illustrate the sexual double standard in Egyptian society, with male 
characters having greater ability to experiment sexually outside of and before marriage without 
consequence. 
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Betrothal is perilous precisely because the expectations for propriety for the 
affianced are strict whereas their legal rights vis-à-vis one another are weak.  Rugh 
articulates the coexistence of fears of impropriety and weak legal rights, noting that “The 
[affianced] couple is considered particularly vulnerable to moral indiscretion at this time 
[while they are engaged], and their legal attachment is not so great that the relationship 
cannot be dissolved” (1984:157).  I posit that the extreme effort invested in ensuring that 
the affianced avoid impropriety is inextricable from the fact that the laws related to 
betrothal are (purposively) flexible. The affianced have few legal rights or duties in 
relation to one another, and their status is primarily socially constituted.  As Nasir notes, 
betrothal is merely the prelude to the marriage contract; for the marriage contract to be 
valid, the betrothal period is necessary to ascertain the potential spouse’s character and 
behavior through enquiries, investigations, consultations and the meeting of the couple in 
the presence of a chaperon (2002).78   
Therefore, betrothal is entered into as a preliminary step toward valid marriage 
and may be broken with few if any legal consequences.  To illustrate this, we can 
consider the Egyptian court of Cassation hearing 14/12/1939, Appeal number 13, which 
notes that: 
Betrothal is only a preliminary step towards a marriage contract, a mere promise that is 
not binding on either party who are lawfully free to end it at anytime, especially as in the 
marriage contract the two parties must enjoy absolute liberty to enter into it, in view of its 
paramount importance to society, which freedom of action shall be hindered if either 
party is under the threat of being liable to damages. [cited in Nasir, 2002:47]  
 
Betrothal is not a new legal status or a contractual relationship.  Rather, it is legally 
interstitial in order to ensure the liberty and free will of the parties considering entering 
                                                
78 See also Bernard-Maugiron and Dupret (2002) on family law as regards betrothal and marriage.  
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into a marriage contract.  Men and women alike must have the ability to break an 
engagement for any reason in order to avoid entering into a marriage that they may 
anticipate will be unsuitable and thus unsustainable.  Betrothal is a promise, and there are 
limited circumstances under which there may be legal consequences for its withdrawal.  
The conclusion of Egyptian court of Cassation hearing 14/12/1939, Appeal number 13, 
Year 9J states:  
However, if the promise to marry and the subsequent withdrawal therefrom are 
accompanied by other acts entirely independent thereof, of such a nature as to cause 
material or moral injury to one of the parties, such acts shall give rise to a lawful suit for 
damages against the party from whom they emanate on the ground that such acts, apart 
from the mere breach of the promise, shall constitute tort that requires redress. 
 
Despite its interstitial status, betrothal may provide, in part, the necessary grounds for 
civil redress under certain conditions.  Moral or material injury in conjunction with 
withdrawal from the promise to wed (by either party) may constitute tort; breach of 
promise alone does not constitute tort.   
 
Realities of Betrothal: Noha’s case 
 A case of broken betrothal from Port Said may be analyzed as occurring within 
this socio-legal framework.  At the same time, the strategies employed by the litigants 
and the values attributed to them by my interlocutor must also be seen as constitutive of 
this framework.  In this instance, betrothal is secured following an act of sexual 
impropriety through the deployment of multiple legal documents.  The production of 
surety in this case illustrates how legal documents may transform the subject of a 
promise, and how intersections between documents are critical to their separate 
performances.  
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I met with Noha, a nurse and divorcee, one evening at her lawyer Noor’s office.  
Noor was out at the time but a junior lawyer working on the case was present and as 
Noha related her story, he confirmed and clarified certain details.  In 2004, Noha’s 16-
year old daughter, Randa, who became engaged to a young man named Amr, and 
according to Noha the engagement was good.  Amr was a friend of her son’s as well and 
would often visit them at home and share meals with them.  Around the same time Noha 
had to travel to Mansoura for a medical emergency and while she was away Noha learned 
from Randa that her fiancé Amr had raped her.  Moreover, Amr had taken her to a doctor 
who performed an illegal abortion and reconstructive surgery on her hymen.  When Noha 
returned to Port Said she attempted to track down Amr with the intention of convincing 
him to marry and then divorce Randa.  But Amr had gone into hiding and couldn’t be 
found so mother and daughter went to the police station.  There Noha filed a report 
stating that her daughter had been raped, naming Amr as the perpetrator, after which Amr 
was quickly arrested and brought down to the station.  As Noha describes it, the police 
initially sought to resolve the situation bishkl wadi ‘; “as is usual, they tried to make a 
friendly solution.  They told him he should make the marriage contract now, and the 
wedding party, and be done with it.  He refused to do this.  So they put him in jail.” 
Amr stayed in jail for four days, at which point his father came to Noha and 
pleaded with her to drop the case against his son.  She agreed to do so only on condition 
that he sign an honesty receipt (iySal αmana) for 10,000LE (about 1,800 US dollars) to 
guarantee that Amr would marry her daughter.  Her daughter, she argued, was “no longer 
a girl but a woman”, and Noha wanted to have absolute certainty that Amr would follow 
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through on the marriage.  Amr’s father agreed, an honesty receipt was drawn up, signed 
and notarized at the court.79   
After Amr’s father signed the honesty receipt, Noha dropped the charges against 
Amr.  But following his release Amr again refused to marry Randa.  Noha hired Noor to 
raise a suit against Amr’s father.  The lawsuit was a breach of honesty case using the 
honesty receipt and charging that he failed to deliver 10,000LE as stipulated in the 
document.  Noha pointed out that “because of this pressure, his son finally agreed to sign 
the marriage contract with my daughter and they were married”.   
But even after the marriage took place, Noha delayed withdrawing her civil case 
and it continued to wind its way through the court.  Further, soon after the wedding Amr 
and his father convinced Randa to sign a number of blank honesty receipts and checks by 
suggesting they were for some other purpose.  In Noha’s view, they “charmed her into 
doing it”, and “she was too naïve” to understand what they could be used for.  Hence, 
Amr obtained his own honesty receipts to use in the future.  He divorced Randa, who 
soon thereafter gave birth to a child, and he subsequently raised a number of actions in 
court against her using the honesty receipts.  Again according to Noha, this was done in 
order to pressure her into giving up her right to child support (nafaqa HiDana) for the 
son.80  
Under other circumstances it might be more appropriate to focus on the alleged 
rape and the legal consequences – or lack thereof – for the act.  Noha, however, pursues a 
                                                
79 In many cases, honesty receipts are not notarized and are considered ‘informal’.  Having it notarized 
strengthens its evidentiary value as it becomes less likely for a defendant to argue at some later point that it 
was forged, a common legal strategy to create delay. 
80 Most recently, Noha pointed out, the court rejected Amr’s case on the basis of a false testimony by a 
witness, and previously one of his cases was thrown out when the forgery expertise office found a 
document submitted as evidence to have been internally forged.  
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different sort of restitution that can be seen as enacting ideas about sexuality, morality, 
and betrothal in Egypt.  Her restorative process prioritizes her daughter’s honor and 
marriage-ability over compensation or punishment for rape.  Insisting on Amr’s 
imprisonment would not reestablish her daughter’s honor and marriage-ability.  A signed 
marriage contract, a wedding party culminating in the dukhla, followed quickly by a 
divorce, on the other hand, preserves Randa’s reputation and gives her the opportunity to 
remarry.  Egyptian law recognizes rape as a crime and sets out procedural and substantive 
rules for adjudicating such cases.  It does not, however, recognize forced marriage as a 
possible recourse for the rapist.81  Although the police officers themselves tried to rectify 
the situation in line with Noha’s sense of justice, their actions were technically outside 
the purview of the law.  The legal classification of rape as a crime for which an alleged 
perpetrator may be found guilty and imprisoned is out of alignment with how the 
participants wish to handle the situation, and this is precisely where the various legal 
documents come to play a role.  The police report converts the rape accusation into the 
opportunity to procure an honesty receipt, which in turn allows for the dispute to be 
converted from a broken promise of marriage into a debt, subsequently culminating in 
marriage.   
 
Textual chains 
Noha’s police report is an important documentary intervention in the making of 
the marriage contract, as I will discuss shortly.  It becomes linked to a number of honesty 
                                                
81 Egyptian Penal code, Article 267: “Whoever lies with a female without her consent shall be punished 
with life or aggravated imprisonment.  If the felon is from the victim’s ancestors, or those in charge of 
rearing, or having power on her, or is a paid servant to her or to the aforementioned persons, he shall be 
punished with life imprisonment” (translation by MELES, Middle East Library for Economic Services). 
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receipts.  As noted in chapter four, honesty receipts and post-dated checks are often 
utilized within and between families involved in some form of marital, pre-marital, or 
post-marital dispute (relating to the conditions and terms of the divorce and custody).  
They are quite commonly used to compel husbands to pay the maintenance they are 
contractually obligated to provide for their wives but have neglected.  The honesty receipt 
can thus be used to guarantee the terms of the marriage contract.  Honesty receipts and 
post-dated checks are also used prior to marriage to preempt problems related to the 
fulfillment of dowry obligations.  Upon coming to an agreement about the dowry a 
woman’s family may insist that her fiancé sign an honesty receipt to be held as surety by 
her family.  And finally, as Amr and his father did, signed honesty receipts may also be 
obtained by men after marriage to stymie a wife’s claims to various types of contractually 
stipulated marital and post-marital maintenance. 
Honesty receipts are increasingly used in lieu of, or alongside, post-dated checks 
in Port Said, but both of these devices serve the same purpose: to put pressure on the 
fiancé.  This pressure may be focused on encouraging him to save money for purchasing 
the array of domestic items agreed upon as a suitable reflection of her social status.  It 
may also pressure the young man to follow through on the marriage instead of breaking 
off the engagement.  As Hoodfar notes, marriage prospects diminish more quickly for 
women as they age so families want to ensure that years of marriage preparations don’t 
result in a broken betrothal (Hoodfar 1997:69).  The end of an engagement means starting 
anew to identify a suitable mate for one’s daughter and another long engagement period, 
further delaying marriage and motherhood.     
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Although honesty receipts are intended to secure three-party delayed transactions, 
in Noha’s and other cases honesty receipts are not being used to do so but are legal 
fictions.  They are used as leverage to threaten prosecution in the context of contested 
claims.  The use of honesty receipts to transform a non-binding promise to marry into a 
transfer of funds secured by a commercial paper that stakes the body as collateral is an 
‘as if’ performance.  The socially derived status of fiancé is converted into a jurally 
derived status of agent-intermediary.  In so doing, the perilous nature of betrothal 
becomes less perilous, more assured, through the transformative power of the commercial 
paper.  All of this bears on the efficacy of the honesty receipt.    
Another piece that bears on the efficacy of legal documents is how and why 
documents beget one another.  Honesty receipts both create pressure and emerge under 
pressure.  As the discussion above illustrated, honesty receipts are often used to compel 
offer and acceptance of the marriage contract.  They can produce the conditions under 
which a marriage contract will be signed.  At the same time, honesty receipts carry clear 
legal consequences for the signer, who is either compelled to sign the document to 
proactively preempt or retroactively dispel mistrust of the other party, or because of some 
type of imminent legal threat.  As such, they come into being not only as part of a web of 
social relations but also through their interactions with other legal documents.   
In Noha’s case it is possible to see how the honesty receipt was beget by the threat 
of criminal charges based on the police report she originally made against Amr on behalf 
of her daughter. Following the alleged rape, after Amr was brought down to the police 
station, both Noha and the police officers on duty at the station sought to convince him of 
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his duty to follow through on the marriage.82 The police report documents Noha and 
Randa’s allegations and makes the charges ‘official’.  Yet as a bureaucratic artifact the 
police report does more than simply document.  The making of a report entails a 
particular interaction between the police and the complainants, through which a messy or 
complicated incident is summarized, standardized, and streamlined.   
For example, the following is an excerpt from a police report (see Appendix F for 
original handwritten version) concerning a dispute between two female neighbors.  The 
policeman writing the report was neither using a pre-printed form nor a template on a 
computer, although there are particular conventions he follows that are found in other 
handwritten police reports.   
Security Directorate Port Said 
Police Station Al-Duwahy 
Date the Brief was Opened: April 3, 2005 
Time: 5:30pm  
By Police Agent: (Agent’s name) 
It was proven that: 
 
Citizen (Magda el-Assiouty) came to the administrative police station at an hour 
and made a verbal report against the party (Nagwa Metwelly).  That is because 
she (Nagwa) had assaulted on and injured her {"her" refers to Magda}. Hence, 
and as she is present in front of us, we (the Police Agent} asked her and she 
answered as follows: 
 
My name is Magda el-Assiouty, born on 23/11/1950 B.C, a house wife, and I live 
in El Salaam new housing, building number…, flat number… the last one, and I 
carry a national I.D number…, and I say: 
Question: What are the details of your report? 
                                                
82 This suggests that the police officers concurred with Noha’s interpretation of the ‘problem’ as a failure to 
follow through with the intended marriage rather than as a crime to be prosecuted, although procedurally 
they were required, ultimately, to detain Amr on rape charges. 
 
  220 
Answer: What happened is that the person I'm complaining against had beaten 
and injured me. So, I came to report her. 
Q: When and where did that happen? 
A: Today, at El Salaam New Housing 
Q: In front of whom did that happen? 
A: In front of all the residents of the building 
Q: What is the reason behind pushing the person you are complaining against to 
make an assault on and injuring you? 
A: Because of some neighborhood problems 
Q: What is your injury? And who was the one causing the injury? And how was 
the injury caused? 
A: I'm injured in my head and the one who did that was the person I'm 
complaining against and she used a wooden stick to hit me. 
Q: What is the relationship between you and the one you're complaining against? 
A: We are neighbors. 
Q: Is there any previous disputes between you? 
A: Yes, I made a report against her at el-Duwahii Suburbs Police Station last year. 
  
 This police report illustrates a number of points Ferrie and Dupret (2005) make in 
relation to police reports and Conley and O’Barr (1990) make in relation to court 
transcripts.83  The police report as a written genre emanating from an oral exchange 
                                                
83 For instance, Conley and O’Barr discuss the formal structure of testifying and witnessing, all the rules 
surrounding these discourses.  The note how people in their study often expressed a sense of frustration 
because they felt like they could not tell their whole stories within the confines of the legally structured 
process of testifying and witnessing (199:14).  These modes of talk are outside the conventions of everyday 
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represents a mode of talk and narrative that is structured by legal constraints.  Ferrie and 
Dupret suggest that legal characterization “stops the revision process through a broad 
restriction of indeterminancy.  Indeed, it is constrained at three levels: formal, procedural, 
and institutional” (2005:9).  In filing a police report and submitting to a predetermined 
series of questions, one consents to the “general economy of the legal narrative” (10).  
The formal constraint implies that characterization of events must be adapted to a legal 
taxonomy so that the police report contains ‘legally relevant statements’ intelligible to 
other legal actors,” with the procedural implication that “characterization can only be 
embedded in a judicial sequence partly predefined and that the compliance to this 
sequence is sanctioned” (9).84  This is the process by which a version of events comes to 
satisfy the requirements of legal bureaucratic domain and by which it is authorized.  
A police report is officially a ‘procedural action.’  In turn it becomes part of a 
textual chain that may eventually include a record of the public prosecutor’s findings, 
memoranda and briefs produced by the defense lawyer, notes on or summaries of court 
sessions, the judgment and so forth.  
To file a police report might, in another circumstance, move the dispute 
irrevocably into the juridical field, whereby its resolution would henceforth be enframed 
by legal procedure.  In constrast, Noha’s case illustrates a way in which the police report 
reinvigorates external negotiations and effectively returns the dispute to a non-juridical 
milieu.  To consider this in terms of a document’s ‘career’, those administrative processes 
through which it moves, as Harper (1998) proposes, the career of this police report is cut 
                                                                                                                                            
language.  Because of 'evidentiary constraints' witnesses often cannot tell many of the details of an incident 
in the way they would typically tell it - with commentary, speculation, hearsay, etc., all of which are not 
allowable. 
84 The institutional level refers to the way in which the positions of the various actors are defined within the 
judicial framework and shape their capacities; this is less pertinent to our focus on the police report. 
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short.  Yet its momentary existence is productive, giving Noha leverage by marshalling 
state power.  She exchanges prosecutorial remedy for a commercial document, the 
honesty receipt, signed by Amr’s father.  In contrast to the police report, the honesty 
receipt doesn’t constrain indeterminacy by articulating the ‘facts’ cohesively.  Nowhere 
in the honesty receipt is there any mention of the real subject matter of the agreement 
between the parties.  Rather, the honesty receipt begets another legal document: the 
marriage contract.85 These legal documents are in some sense inextricable from one 
another, arising in relation to one another.  Perhaps more importantly, they intervene in 
relationships and participate in forging and reassembling relationality between the 
participants.   
 
Circulations and Documents as Social Actors 
The labyrinthine twists of Noha’s case as she recounted it exemplify how 
struggles over power and relatedness may be worked out through documentation 
processes. Documents do more than simply document statements of reality.  Rather, they 
are produced and circulated by and between people, provoking particular actions and 
making things happen. This inquiry into what documents do and how they make things 
happen is a response to Latour’s exhortation to make objects participants in the course of 
action (2007: 70).  As pointed out in the introduction, Latour holds that objects are actors, 
which he defines as “any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference” 
(71).  More specifically, the types of legal documents under discussion are arguably 
‘actants’ in that they are in the process of being given figuration; their figuration is in flux 
                                                
85 Although I don’t analyze the additional honesty receipts Randa signs for Amr and his father in depth (in 
part because I have less information about them) it should be noted that they are also part of the textual 
chain and impact Randa’s rights in subsequent divorce and child maintenance cases. 
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as they do things.  Hence, the legal documents do not merely ‘reflect’ a state of 
relationship, status, complaint or obligation.  They do not passively express or symbolize 
something, or at least not merely so.  On the other hand, they don’t wholly originate or 
determine social action, although “things might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, 
permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on” (72).  Rejecting the 
attribution of both deterministic and passive roles, Latour posits that objects must be 
brought into the analysis as participants in the action, their participation fully considered.  
In analyzing betrothal and marriage in Egypt, it is fruitful to consider how legal 
documents participate as key objects in the making of relationality; this line of inquiry 
clarifies practice and its logic.  At the same time, the examples presented support 
Latour’s argument that objects participate in social action by modifying a state of affairs 
and assembling (and reassembling) social relations.  These are processes by which 
kinship ties are constructed. 
The police report, the honesty receipt, and the marriage contract are all mediators 
in that they transform and modify the meaning that they are supposed to carry (Latour, 
39).  The police report, for instance, doesn’t just carry a claim from spoken account to 
bureaucratic form.  The report changes the nature of that account and transforms a 
narrated event into a record, and continues to transform it further through bureaucratic 
achievements.  It modifies a private sexual encounter between two persons into a criminal 
charge.  And it modifies the relationship between the parties from one state – affianced, 
among other aspects of the relationship – into an adversarial state involving a plaintiff 
and a defendant.  The honesty receipt, as discussed previously, transforms agreements of 
various types into fictional debts, and in so doing modifies the nature of those 
 
  224 
agreements.  Importantly, it modifies the efficacy of an agreement; together with various 
forms of social pressure, the invocation of state power motivates an obligee toward 
fulfillment.   
Perhaps one of the most critical ways in which these documents each modify a 
state of affairs is by altering the relative power of the participants.  Each document that 
Noha secures makes Amr more powerless to avoid marrying Randa; this is so because the 
documents (the police report and the honesty receipt) marshal the violence of the state on 
her behalf.86  This suggests that documents are transformative by virtue of their 
circulations and moments of production.  Their significance is wrought through the way 
they are part of face-to-face encounters in which they are produced and rhetorically 
invoked in conversations and debates.  The making of the police report brings the players 
together in the police station, where versions of events are articulated, their meanings and 
outcomes debated.  The honesty receipt grows out of a conversation between Amr’s 
father and Noha, yet after its production and notarization (for which it circulates briefly 
through the legal milieu), it comes to rest in Noha’s possession.87  It then moves from 
Noha to her lawyer to a case file to the court as evidence.  These circulations, between 
persons and between persons and institutions, reinvest a piece of paper with meaning and 
create effects.  
As they circulate and modify states of affairs these documents can be seen 
assembling relational ties.  Alongside their distinct purposes as documentary types, the 
police report, the honesty receipt, and the marriage contract share a common purpose in 
                                                
86 As Robert Cover famously noted, legal interpretation occasions the imposition of violence.  For more on 
this, see Chapter 5 in Minow, Ryan, and Sarat (1995). 
87 Like a check, an honesty receipt is not composed in duplicate or triplicate copies to be held by each party 
(as would a contract); a one-copy form is filled in and retained by the agent.   
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Noha’s case: they re-orient the participants towards one another.  Like a schoolteacher 
rapping her ruler on the chalkboard to get her students’ attention, the documents demand 
the attention of the participants through the rhetorical invocation of consequences.  They 
also reckon marital kinship in new guises – as a requirement, as temporary, as an 
alternative to state violence, in contrast to marriage as an expression of love or as a union 
of two people and their families intended to be permanent.   
This is a different way of thinking about how legal documents intervene in or 
make relationality.  A more straightforward constitutive analysis of law and relationality 
might posit that, for instance, law constitutes a marital relationship through legal 
recognition of the relationship, as concretized by a document like a marriage license (or 
in a Muslim context, a marriage contract).  Marital status, in turn, is a determining factor 
in the instantiation of many economic and non-economic rights, responsibilities, and 
benefits for spouses.  In the preceding analysis, however, I have sought to demonstrate 
how legal documents may forge relationality in ways external to their explicit content or 
to the laws they reference.  By going upstream of the marriage contract between Amr and 
Randa it is possible to see how legal documents seemingly unrelated to the marriage are 
integral to its making and to the kin relationship it produces.        
Reports, commercial papers, and other artifacts of bureaucratic settings seem from 
a distance to grant statuses or to report information in rather straightforward ways.  Yet 
under the magnifying lens it is possible to discern their more complicated, non-linear, and 
unexpected movements.   Not merely reflective, they are active participants in the 
perpetual making and unmaking of social ties.  
 
 





 My aim in analyzing practices of private law and the use of 
customary/commercial documents in contemporary Port Said has been to understand 
them as part of a particular history and locality.  Legal reform in the 19th and 20th century 
in Egypt radically altered the scope of law and carved out a separate space for moral 
personhood in the private sphere.  As I have demonstrated, the shift to a modern secular 
state has been productive of indefinite legalities.  These include practices that intersect 
and simultaneously draw upon different legal and normative orders and which diverge 
from the rule of law as reformers envisioned it.  In examining the three nodes through 
which disputes and related legal documents generally move, my aim was to make visible 
some of the movement back and forth between registers of law, custom, and morality.   
I have argued that innovative uses of customary/commercial documents must also 
be seen as connected to the limits of modern secular law.  Innovation may be seen as a 
process of invention in response to constraints.  It may be that the impersonality of civil 
law, through which facts and law are made to be discrete and morality is demarcated as a 
separate sphere, does not fully respond to Port Saidian’s expectations of how to 
meaningfully process disputes.  At the same time, uses of customary/commercial 
documents also link back to practices of trade and the credit market in Port Said in 
particular and to the specific manifestation of social disaggregation that stems from 
economic and demongraphic shifts in the 1970’s.   
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Checks and other forms of commercial devices are ubiquitous in any modern 
economic context.  However this doesn’t mean that they have the same value or achieve 
the same ends everywhere.  In considering specific legal and economic reconfigurations 
in Egypt and Port Said, I argue that as Port Saidians make determinations about how the 
law shall adjudicate their problems by fictionalizing the nature of disputes, and as they 
seek to limit law’s intervention in their problems, they are disregarding legal authority.  I 
am less interested in linking their pursuit of alternatives to political motivations on the 
part of my interlocutors than I am in merely suggesting that they often seem to be 
asserting the right to make law fit their needs.   
 The Egyptian and international media often report on lawyers and judges taking to 
the streets of Cairo and elsewhere in support of judicial independence, in defense of free 
elections, and in opposition to police brutality and censorship.  Such acts of public 
resistance are generally dedicated to structural change.  The intimate transactional 
practices with which I am concerned, and the technologies that are part of them, are not 
overtly transformational.  Retail traders, their customers, husbands and wives, landlords 
and tenants are simply making loopholes and delays work in their favor.  In drawing on 
custom, they make law correspond to the ideal of resolving problems bishakl wadi ‘.  
Lawyers and customary/commercial documents are useful mechanisms for reinterpreting 
meanings of justice and redirecting law’s gaze.   
 I have sought to respond to Baudouin Dupret’s call to deepen our understanding 
of the relationship between law and morality in Egypt through the ethnographic 
endeavor.  In his suggestion that morality is a contingent and context specific notion, 
given substance in practice but fundamentally unstable as a category of social meaning 
 
  228 
(Dupret, 2007), Dupret insists upon a law-in-action approach.  Guided as well by U.S. 
socio-legal scholarship on law in everyday life, I have concentrated on the kinds of 
interpretations people and their lawyers make as they sort through possible responses to 
unpaid debts and broken promises rather than on legal interpretation by judges.     
 My aim has also been to rethink documents as bureaucratic objects in the service 
of society.  On the one hand, Weberian approaches to documents take most seriously 
their capacity to regularize and organize procedures.  In emphasizing the inextricability 
of documentation and bureaucracy, scholarship in this vein seems to suggest that 
documents do what they purport to do and nothing more.  Relational contract theorists, on 
the other hand, have turned our attention to the social interactions and gestures 
surrounding contracts to argue that the document itself is largely extraneous in the work 
of creating binding agreements.  But contracts as objects, like other commercial and legal 
documents, are part of these interactions.  Documentary objects are part of interactions 
because they direct the flow of talk.  The inscription processes I analyze involve interface 
through meetings, discussions, and negotiations with the document as a focal point; 
certain issues are addressed and others excluded from the discussion in relation to what 
the document requires.    
Documents also shape such interactions by virtue of the type of authority to which 
they are anchored.  In some cases authority derives from the coercive power of the state; 
Noha’s police report shifts the balance of power in her favor and allows her to redirect 
negotiations.  In other cases, a document may derive authority from multiple and 
overlapping sources.  The customary agreement drawn up by Galal in his client’s village 
to resolve a dispute over inherited land is made authoritative because it emerged out of a 
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customary mediation process and because it was later notarized at the court; conversely, a 
determination by the court for a husband to pay child support may actually be effected 
through a lawyers’ moralistic scolding, as we see among Salma’s clients.  
In analyzing particular moments of creation it is also clear that form creates value.  
Documents are not merely repositories of information but render agreements full of terms 
and stipulations or partial and incomplete. In the writing of documents, partiality cannot 
be chalked up to carelessness when it is purposive and meaningful.  Matters of form may 
be part of conveying intention or asserting status – a willingness to take a risk, 
submissiveness, power.  If we submit that moments of production are signifying 
processes, documentary form – from sloppy, handwritten contracts to pre-printed forms 
signed ‘on the white’ - is inevitably one medium through which signification occurs. 
Moreover, asserting or eschewing the right to view or possess the object conveys 
relational information, as we see in the case of Hesham and Ibrahim.     
Moreover, I have posited, in line with Latour, that objects are social actors.  As 
documents circulate between people and between people and institutions they are part of 
relationships and constitute new realities.  A focus on the maneuvers through which 
documents are put, the way they produce one another, allows us to see how they actually 
modify states of affairs.  By including objects as actors in social processes, it becomes 
ever clearer that they are not simply repositories of information.  Rather they instigate 
change and constitute new realities.   
There are myriad aspects of private law transactions and dispute processing in 
contemporary Port Said that I was not able to adequately address here.  For instance, it is 
critical to examine the way in which gender and class status shape legal practices.  
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Women and men have differential access to legal services and to information about legal 
processes and their rights.  As can be seen in some of the ethnographic data, women are 
often seen on the ‘reactive’ end of disputes, seeking to obtain what has already been 
legally articulated as their right to maintenance or inheritance.  The same may be said for 
poorer clients who stake claims vis-à-vis more powerful landlords, employers, or 
businessmen.  These power differentials and the way people use customary/commercial 
documents (and other strategies) to bolster their position are noted in some instances.  
The problematic of gendered and socioeconomic inequalities as specifically manifested 
through practices of private law requires further anthropological attention and 
theorization.     
 





Examples of typical blank honesty receipts (iysal am ana) 
Translation (Top Version): I (Spaces for Name, Residence, ID card number, governorate) 
have received from Mr. (space for name and residence) the amount (space for sum) and 
no more.  And therefore with all honesty I will convey it and surrender the amount to Mr. 
(space for name and residence).  If I do not surrender this amount it will be considered 
squandered and to be a breach of trust and carries a misdemeanor with it.  In the vicinity 
of ..................And this receipt from me is notification of surrender (Translation by C. 
Hegel).  
 




Blank Kambiyala (Bill of Exchange)  
 
stamp 
Debtor: ------------------------------- country------------ 
The sum ----------------------- ---------------------- only 
Pound        piaster  
Date  /    /     /     We pay according to this bill to ----------------------------------- the sum 
mentioned above -------------------------- the amount we had------------------------- payment 
and Litigation  ------------.  If we exceed the payment date, we shall be obliged to pay the 
amount in addition to the legal interests from the payment fixed date to the payment date 
and the creditor has the right to transfer this amount to anyone without our consent and 
we shall not discharge this amount unless the debtor pay and sign under by himself.  
There is no consideration of the testimony of witnesses.                   Signed by: 
Date   /       /   
We guarantee the amount and the creditor mentioned above has the right to demand it 












Blank Sh ik (Non-bank-issued check) 
 
Translation: The Name (space for name), Recorded in writing (space for date), Ginaayh 
and Miliim (space for sum), Bank (space for bank name), Branch Office (space for office 
branch), Number (space for number, perhaps branch number?), This Check requires 
payment upon demand to Mr. (space for name), Amount (space for written sum), 
Account number (space for account number), Signature (space for signature).  
(Translation by C. Hegel)
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Appendix C 
Law No. 25/1968 
Evidentiary Law as the Civil and Commercial Articles (Translation by the Middle 










The Official documents are those wherein a public employee, or wherein a person 
assigned public service shall evidence what has been done by him, or what he has 
received from the parties concerned, in accordance with legal status, and within the limits 
of his authority and discretionary competence. 
 
If the such documents do not assume official capacity, they shall merely have the value of 
informal documents whenever the parties concerned shall have put down their signature, 
stamps, or their fingerprints thereupon. 
 
Article 11 
Official documents shall be held against people as evidence, in as much as has been 
written down therein by the writer thereof, within the limits of his assignment, or in as 
much as they have been signed by the parties concerned, in his presence, unless their 
fraud and falsification is revealed and discovered by means legally stipulated. 
… 
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Appendix D 
 
Contract of Sale: Page One  
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Contract of Sale: Page Two
(Signatures of the parties to the contract have been blocked out) 
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Appendix E 
Egyptian Penal Code (Translation by the Middle East Library for Economic Services) 
 
Law 58/1937 
Part 9: Criminal Bankruptcy 
Article 328 
Any trader who discontinues the settlement of his debts shall be considered in a case of 
criminal bankruptcy in the following cases: First: If he hides, destroys, or changes his 
books; Second: If he embezzles or hides part of his property to the detrminent of his 
creditors; Third: If he admits or renders himself debtor, by defraudation, of amounts he 
does not owe in fact, whether this ensuing from his writings or his budget, or other 
papers, his verbal declaration, or his refrain from submitting papers or explanations, 
although he is aware of the consequences of such refrain. 
 
Article 329 
A criminal bankrupt and his accomplice shall be punished with imprisonment for a period 
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Appendix F 
Police Report, DuwaHi police station 
(Names and signatures have been blocked 
out) 
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